{ "id": 6140491, "name": "Shea HOSKINS v. ROGERS COLD STORAGE", "name_abbreviation": "Hoskins v. Rogers Cold Storage", "decision_date": "1996-03-06", "docket_number": "CA 95-187", "first_page": "219", "last_page": "225", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "52 Ark. App. 219" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "916 S.W.2d 136" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "267 Ark. 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719847 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664782 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1664706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.W.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8724857, 8724988 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/228/0856-01", "/ark/228/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ark. 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724988 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/228/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ark. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/42/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ark. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/50/0013-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 569, "char_count": 13046, "ocr_confidence": 0.897, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4923359967083869e-07, "percentile": 0.6632502512694756 }, "sha256": "8127afb9295a3e31f44f06167d9c2d0d9a1470cac07ea310952a980090d0d4a6", "simhash": "1:642475371cea923f", "word_count": 2150 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:48.648567+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jennings, C.J., and Robbins, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Shea HOSKINS v. ROGERS COLD STORAGE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.\nShea Hoskins, stepdaughter of Leonard Jack Slate (deceased), has appealed the November 28, 1994, decision by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission denying her claim for dependency benefits due to Slate\u2019s work-related death on March 30, 1984. Her appeal presents the question whether the Commission\u2019s determination that appellant was not wholly and actually dependent upon Slate at the time of his death is supported by substantial evidence. Because we find substantial evidence supporting the result reached by the Commission, we affirm its decision.\nSlate suffered a compensable injury resulting in his death on March 30, 1984. Appellant and her mother lived with Slate at the time of his death, and had lived with him for almost a year and a half, after appellant\u2019s mother separated from John Hoskins, her husband and appellant\u2019s father. On March 28, 1984, two days before Slate\u2019s death, appellant\u2019s mother obtained a divorce from John Hoskins, and then married Slate.\nAfter Slate\u2019s death, Fireman\u2019s Fund Insurance Company, the workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier for his employer, began paying death benefits to his widow (appellant\u2019s mother), and to his two children from a previous marriage. Dependency benefits were later paid to Cody Jack Slate, a child Slate fathered with appellant\u2019s mother but who was not born until after Slate died. No benefits were ever paid to appellant. Her mother contended that she did not learn that appellant may have been entitled to dependency benefits until nine years after Slate died. Appellant\u2019s father had been ordered to pay child support in the divorce decree entered on March 28, 1994, and did so for a period of time after the divorce. However, appellant and her mother testified that Leonard Jack Slate was her sole support for most of the time that appellant lived in Slate\u2019s home with her mother before he died. Appellant\u2019s father paid child support sporadically after the divorce, and later became disabled. Appellant received social security benefits based upon her father\u2019s disability, but argues that Slate was her sole support on March 30, 1984, when he died. An administrative law judge awarded dependency benefits to appellant after finding that she was wholly and actually dependent upon Slate at the time of his death. That decision was reversed by the Commission, and this appeal followed.\nAppellant contends that the Commission erred when it found she was not wholly and actually dependent upon Slate. That contention requires that we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding. In doing so, we are duty-bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the result reached by the Commission, resolving all doubtful inferences in favor of its findings. Our role is not to review the record de novo, or to weigh the evidence presented to the Commission. Instead, our responsibility is to review the record and decide whether there is evidence that could have led fair-minded persons to reach the same result. If so, our duty is to affirm the Commission. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995); Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 Ark. App. 168, 856 S.W.2d 30 (1993).\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-527(c) (1987) provides that compensation for the death of an employee shall be paid to the persons who were wholly and actually dependent upon him. Subsection (h) states that all questions of dependency shall be determined as of the time of the compensable injury. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-102 (10) (1987) contains the statutory definition of \u201cchild\u201d applicable to dependency determinations in workers\u2019 compensation cases such as this, and states:\n\u201cChild\u201d means a natural child, a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to injury of the employee, a stepchild, an acknowledged illegitimate child of the deceased or spouse of the deceased, and a foster child. . . .\nThe parties do not dispute that appellant was the stepchild of Leonard Jack Slate when he died. Their disagreement involves whether appellant was wholly and actually dependent upon Slate when he died so as to be entitled to dependency benefits pursuant to \u00a7 11-9-527 (c). Appellant argues that, through her testimony and that from her mother, she proved that she was wholly and actually dependent upon Slate, that Slate provided for her total support at the time of his death, and that he had done so for more than a year beforehand. Appellant also presented proof that her natural father provided no support during that time span. There was proof that although the divorce decree, issued two days before Slate\u2019s death, contained an order directing appellant\u2019s natural father to pay child support, he failed to do so consistently, and eventually became disabled some time after Slate died. Appellee maintains that appellant was not wholly and actually dependent upon Slate because her natural father had been ordered to pay child support for her at the time that Slate died, even though her father had not done so before that time.\nBefore our Workers\u2019 Compensation Law was amended in 1976 to provide that death benefits are payable to persons who are \u201cactually\u201d dependent upon a deceased employee, persons claiming entitlement to those benefits could prevail by showing that they were \u201cwholly\u201d dependent. But the Arkansas General Assembly amended the law in 1976 to require proof that a claimant to death benefits is \u201cwholly and actually dependent.\u201d Court decisions after the amendment was enacted reflect the different result that it produced. The pre-1976 judicial interpretation of the statutory requirement that one be \u201cwholly dependent\u201d resulted in benefits being awarded to a widow whose deceased husband provided no support to her or their children at the time of his death based on the view that the term \u201cwholly dependent\u201d was intended to be understood in its figurative, rather than literal, sense. Chicago Mill & Luber Co. v. Smith, 228 Ark. 876, 310 S.W.2d 803 (1958). By contrast, after the General Assembly amended the law to require proof that a claimant to death benefits was \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon the deceased employee, the denial of benefits was upheld in the case of a widow whose husband left her and moved to another city, married another woman without obtaining a divorce, and provided no support to her before he was accidentally killed in the course of his employment. Roach Mfg. Co. v. Cole, 265 Ark. 908, 582 S.W.2d 268 (1979). The rationale stated by Justice George Rose Smith in the Roach case for affirming the Commission\u2019s decision to deny benefits was that the wife made no effort to enforce whatever right to legal support she had during the eleven months of her husband\u2019s absence before his death, and that she had attempted to support herself. Yet, the Supreme Court in Roach affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision granting death benefits to the minor child of the deceased worker. In doing so, it reasoned that the eleven-month absence of action by the mother to enforce the child\u2019s right to support from her father did not demonstrate absence of a \u201creasonable expectation of support,\u201d because the child was unable to act for herself, and would incur increased necessary expenses as she matured that her mother possibly would be unable to meet to maintain her standard of living. Id,., at 265 Ark. 914.\nIn Doyle Concrete Finishers v. Moppin, 267 Ark. 874, 596 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. App. 1979), our court affirmed and modified a decision by the Commission that awarded death benefits to the minor child of a deceased worker who was not living with his father when the father died. The worker had been divorced from his wife and had been ordered to pay child support in the divorce decree. A claim for death benefits was made for the child, but the employer contended that the child\u2019s death benefit should not have been more than the amount of the child support decreed in the divorce decree ($108 per month), rather than the $77 per week maximum benefit then prescribed by law. Our court affirmed the Commission\u2019s decision awarding the maximum benefit, but modified the award because the Commission had concluded that the child was entitled to the maximum benefit \u201cas a matter of law.\u201d There was proof in the record that the child\u2019s father had provided child support pursuant to the decree plus other forms of support to the child before he died. Noting that a minor child may have independent resources and, therefore, be capable of being non-dependent upon a deceased parent for purposes of workers\u2019 compensation benefits, Judge Steele Hays, writing for the court in Doyle Concrete Finishers, rejected the dependency \u201cas a matter of law\u201d standard, and indicated that death benefits may nevertheless be entitled where the expectation and need for support are real or actual. Id., at 267 Ark. 881. Because the court in that case concluded that the Roach holding demonstrates that \u201ca minor child continues to have an expectancy of future support,\u201d it refused to conclude that a minor who was actually dependent and receiving support was entitled to less than full benefits.\nThe foregoing authorities show that before death benefits are payable to persons enumerated in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Law to receive them, there must be proof that the claimant was \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon the deceased worker at the time of the compensable death. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-527(c). Dependency may be established by evidence that the decedent actually provided support, as shown by the holding in Doyle Concrete Finishers. The dependency requirement can also be met by proof of actual need for support, and a reasonable expectancy of future support even if no actual support may have been provided the claimant when the decedent died, as demonstrated by the Roach holding. In any event, dependency is an issue of fact rather than a question of law, and the issue is to be resolved based upon the facts present at the time of the compen-sable injury. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-527(h).\nIn view of these principles, we believe that the Commission\u2019s decision to deny the claim for death benefits to appellant is supported by substantial evidence. It is true that appellant and her mother testified that the decedent provided actual support to appellant from the time shortly after she and her mother began living with him until his death more than a year later. There was also proof that appellant\u2019s natural father failed to provide support for her during that time span. Nevertheless, the Commission also received evidence that appellant was entitled to receive child support payments from her natural father pursuant to the terms of her parent\u2019s divorce decree that had been entered only two days before the decedent\u2019s death. This indicates that appellant had a reasonable expectancy of support from her natural father when the decedent died. But, that is not the critical inquiry. The issue is whether appellant had a reasonable expectancy of support from the decedent. She was his stepchild, to be sure, and she had enjoyed his support before he married her mother. There was no reason, however, to expect that the decedent was obligated to support appellant at any time. In fact, appellant\u2019s mother demonstrated as much by her conduct in seeking child support payments from appellant\u2019s father in her divorce. The Commission was entitled to consider this in reaching its decision that appellant was not \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon the decedent.\nOur result in this case should not be interpreted to mean that a stepchild may never recover death benefits following the death of her stepparent as a matter of law. The holding in Doyle Concrete Finishers shows that dependency is not a question of law, but a fact issue to be determined by the circumstances existing when the compensable injury occurs. It is based on proof of either actual support from the decedent, as was shown in that case, or a showing of a reasonable expectation of support, as was shown in Roach. Our decision does not address whether a stepchild may always, or never, have a reasonable expectation of support from a deceased worker where there is evidence that she is being actually supported by her natural parent, or where she has a right to expect support from the natural parent even if it is not actually provided. Each case will turn on its facts. On the facts presented in this case, however, we are unable to conclude that fair-minded persons presented with the same evidence could not have reached the conclusion that the Commission made, namely, that appellant was not \u201cwholly and actually dependent\u201d upon Leonard Jack Slate when he died.\nAffirmed.\nJennings, C.J., and Robbins, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert S. Blatt and Timothy C. Sharum, for appellant.", "Barber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Robert L. Henry III and Christopher Gomlicker, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Shea HOSKINS v. ROGERS COLD STORAGE\nCA 95-187\n916 S.W.2d 136\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered March 6, 1996\nRobert S. Blatt and Timothy C. Sharum, for appellant.\nBarber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Robert L. Henry III and Christopher Gomlicker, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0219-01", "first_page_order": 247, "last_page_order": 253 }