{
  "id": 6135958,
  "name": "Sheila ROHRER v. HART'S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rohrer v. Hart's Manufacturing Co.",
  "decision_date": "1996-03-20",
  "docket_number": "CA 95-312",
  "first_page": "4",
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      "cite": "917 S.W.2d 180"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1991,
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1994,
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      "cite": "306 Ark. 198",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1991,
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    {
      "cite": "306 Ark. 239",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
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      "year": 1991,
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:24.662479+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Robbins and Griffen, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Sheila ROHRER v. HART\u2019S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JOHN E. Jennings, Chief Judge.\nSheila Rohrer, the appellant, was employed by the appellee, Hart\u2019s Manufacturing Company, Inc. In November 1990, she sustained an on-the-job injury and subsequendy filed a claim with the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission. In December 1991 she was fired. The parties settled appellant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim in December 1993 by way of joint petition. In August 1994 appellant filed suit in Clay County Circuit Court, alleging that she had been discharged in retaliation for the filing of her workers\u2019 compensation claim and seeking damages. In January 1995 the circuit court granted summary judgment for the appellee, holding that the suit was barred by the language of the earlier joint petition and barred by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107. We disagree and reverse and remand.\nIn 1991 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991). There the court held that an employee has a common-law action against his employer who fires him for claiming workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The court has since followed its decision in Baysinger. See e.g., Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); Leggett v. Centro, Inc., 318 Ark. 732, 887 S.W.2d 523 (1994).\nIn 1993 the General Assembly passed Act 796, which eliminated the cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The Act, as codified in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-107 (Supp. 1995) provides, in part:\nAny employer who -willfully discriminates in regard to the hiring or tenure of work or any term or condition of work of any individual on account of the individual\u2019s claim for benefits under this chapter, or who in any manner obstructs or impedes the filing of claims for benefits under this chapter, shall be subject to a fine of up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as determined by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission.\nA purpose of this section is to preserve the exclusive remedy doctrine and specifically annul any case law inconsistent herewith, including but not necessarily limited to: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239, 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991); Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991); and Thomas v. Valmac Industries, Inc., 306 Ark. 228, 812 S.W.2d 673 (1991).\nSection 41 of the Act provides that \u201cthe provisions of this Act shall apply only to injuries which occur after July 1, 1993.\u201d The Act also declared its effective date to be July 1, 1993.\nIn Tackett v. Crain Automotive, 321 Ark. 36, 899 S.W.2d 839 (1995), the supreme court was faced with the question of the meaning of the word \u201cinjuries\u201d as used in section 41 of Act 796. A majority held that the date of the injury was the date the worker was discharged from employment. The dissenting justices argued that the date of injury was the date the employee suffered a compensable injury at work.\nIn the case at bar, appellant was discharged in December 1991, long before the effective date of the Act. Therefore, by its terms, it is not applicable to her cause of action. The fact that her suit for damages was not filed until after the effective date of the Act is not determinative.\nWe also agree with the appellant that her claim is not barred by the language of the joint petition filed in the workers\u2019 compensation proceeding. The language in the joint petition relied upon by the appellee as a bar states: \u201cIt is further expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that if this joint petition be approved by the Commission, Claimant will have no other claim against Hart\u2019s of Arkansas or Wassau Insurance Companies under the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act of any nature[.]\u201d The short answer to the appellee\u2019s contention is that appellant\u2019s suit in circuit court is not a \u201cclaim under the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\u201d Appellant\u2019s cause of action for retaliatory discharge is not barred by the language of the joint petition. For the reasons stated the decision of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and Remanded.\nRobbins and Griffen, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JOHN E. Jennings, Chief Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Keith Blackman, for appellant.",
      "Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Cantrell, by: Valerie Barnes Speakman, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Sheila ROHRER v. HART\u2019S MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation\nCA 95-312\n917 S.W.2d 180\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered March 20, 1996\nKeith Blackman, for appellant.\nJackson, Shields, Yeiser & Cantrell, by: Valerie Barnes Speakman, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0004-01",
  "first_page_order": 28,
  "last_page_order": 31
}