{ "id": 6139722, "name": "Ennie B. COBB v. ESTATE of Bennie C. KEOWN", "name_abbreviation": "Cobb v. Estate of Keown", "decision_date": "1996-05-01", "docket_number": "CA 95-317", "first_page": "171", "last_page": "173", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "53 Ark. App. 171" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "920 S.W.2d 501" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 Ark. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-115", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ark. App. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136576 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/37/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 275, "char_count": 3814, "ocr_confidence": 0.796, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.2981532900180667 }, "sha256": "edb739225431d1986d78d9dc6bc9c293ab7f8d7f4cd2701aa951d5bdbb9f46ce", "simhash": "1:67b68c48d13a39e1", "word_count": 656 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:24.662479+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Stroud, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Ennie B. COBB v. ESTATE of Bennie C. KEOWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JAMES R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this probate case was the administratrix of the estate of her brother, Bennie C. Keown. Wilma Pat\u00f3n filed a motion for an order determining her to be the biological daughter of Bennie C. Keown. After a hearing, the probate judge entered an order on August 15, 1991, finding that Bennie C. Keown executed documents recognizing that Wilma Pat\u00f3n is his natural daughter; that Wilma Pat\u00f3n was in fact the natural daughter of Bennie C. Keown; and that Wilma Pat\u00f3n was therefore entitled to inherit from the estate pursuant to the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209(d)(2) (1987). The appellant filed a motion to set aside the order, alleging that newly discovered evidence existed which tended to prove Wilma Pat\u00f3n was not the natural daughter of the decedent. The appellant also filed a motion to disqualify Henry N. Means III as attorney for the estate. After a hearing, the probate judge denied both motions. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant contends that the probate judge abused his discretion in refusing to set aside the order entered on August 15, 1991, and in denying the motion to disqualify Henry N. Means III as attorney for the estate. We affirm.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 28-1-115(a) (1987) allows a probate court to vacate or modify its orders at any time before the time for appeal has elapsed after the final termination of the estate. White v. Toney, 37 Ark. App. 36, 823 S.W.2d 921 (1992). By its terms, this statute permits such modification or vacation upon a showing of \u201cgood cause.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-115(a), supra. The initial question in the case at bar is, therefore, whether the probate judge erred in failing to find good cause to vacate the order. We hold that he did not. The appellant\u2019s present attorney argues that there is newly discovered evidence consisting of a burial instruction sheet in which the space to list children was left blank, and evidence to show that the decedent had a test revealing a low sperm count several years after Wilma Paton\u2019s birth. The appellant\u2019s new attorney filed a motion to compel Wilma Pat\u00f3n to submit to a blood test, suggesting to the probate judge that the decedent\u2019s body could be exhumed so that tissue samples could be obtained for genetic testing. Although this zeal on behalf of new counsel is perhaps laudable, it nevertheless appears from the record that no satisfactory explanation was offered to show why this evidence could not have been obtained prior to entry of the order that the appellant seeks to have set aside. Accordingly, we hold that the probate judge did not err in failing to find good cause for vacation of the order determining Wilma Pat\u00f3n to be the daughter of the decedent. See Brantley v. Davis, 305 Ark. 68, 805 S.W.2d 75 (1991).\nNext, the appellant contends that the probate court erred in denying her motion to disqualify Henry N. Means III as attorney for the estate. This motion was based on the fact that Mr. Means had previously represented the appellant in a highway condemnation suit in 1983.\nRule 1.9 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct precludes a lawyer who has formerly represented a client from representing another person in \u201cthe same or a substantially related matter.\u201d On this record, we cannot say that the probate judge erred in failing to find that the highway condemnation suit of 1983 was \u201cthe same or substantially related\u201d to the determination of heirship at issue in the case at bar and, consequently, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins and Stroud, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "JAMES R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Tona M. DeMers, for appellant.", "Henry N. Means, III, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ennie B. COBB v. ESTATE of Bennie C. KEOWN\nCA 95-317\n920 S.W.2d 501\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered May 1, 1996\n[Petition for rehearing denied May 29, 1996.]\nTona M. DeMers, for appellant.\nHenry N. Means, III, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0171-01", "first_page_order": 189, "last_page_order": 191 }