{
  "id": 6139870,
  "name": "Ronald COLDING d/b/a Ronald Colding Motors v. Betty WILLIAMS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Colding v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1996-05-01",
  "docket_number": "CA 95-174",
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      "year": 1991,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:24.662479+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Robbins and Stroud, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Ronald COLDING d/b/a Ronald Colding Motors v. Betty WILLIAMS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JAMES R. COOPER, Judge.\nThe appellee in this civil case purchased a 1986 Lincoln Town Car from the appellant\u2019s used car lot in April 1991. She subsequently brought an action alleging, inter alia, that the appellant intentionally misrepresented the automobile\u2019s mileage at the time of the sale. After a bench trial the trial court entered judgment for the appellee in the amount of $5,000.00, plus costs and attorney\u2019s fees. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that he violated the mileage disclosure requirement of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-90-206(a) (Repl. 1991), and that the trial court erred in awarding $5,000.00 in damages. We find no error, and we affirm.\nIn his first point for reversal, the appellant argues that there is no substantial evidence to support the trial judge\u2019s finding that the appellant intentionally violated the statute, and that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-90-206 cannot be satisfied by a showing of mere negligence. We address only the first part of this argument because it is dispositive of the entire issue.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 4-90-206(a) (Repl. 1991) provides that:\nNo person shall transfer a motor vehicle without disclosing in writing to the transferee the true mileage registered on the odometer reading or that the actual mileage is unknown if the odometer reading is known by the transferor to be different from the true mileage.\nAs used in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-90-206(a), \u201cperson\u201d is defined as \u201can individual, firm, partnership, incorporated or unincorporated association, or any other legal or commercial entity.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-90-201(3) (Repl. 1991).\nIn the case at bar, the record shows that the appellant was the owner of Ronald Colding Motors and that the appellant\u2019s brother was employed as a salesman. Both the appellant and his brother dealt with the appellee at the time the automobile was purchased. The appellee testified that the appellant told her that the automobile was a \u201cgood, low-mileage\u201d car, and that she noticed that the odometer reading was approximately 9,800 miles. The record further shows that the car was sold to the appellee after execution of an \u201cOdometer Disclosure Statement\u201d certifying that, to the best of the seller\u2019s knowledge, the odometer reading of 9,892 miles reflected the actual mileage of the vehicle.\nAlthough the appellant testified at trial that he knew at the time of the sale that the actual mileage of the vehicle was approximately 109,000 miles, he claims the error was caused by negligence. On these facts, we cannot say that the trial judge clearly erred in finding that the appellant intentionally misrepresented the vehicle\u2019s mileage. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a).\nNext, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in awarding damages in the amount of $5,000.00. We do not agree. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 4-90-203 (Repl. 1991) provides that any person injured by violation of the odometer provisions shall recover the actual damages, together with costs and a reasonable attorney\u2019s fee. At trial, the appellant himself testified that a 1986 Lincoln Town Car with 9,000 actual miles would be worth $6,000.00 more than an identical vehicle with 109,000 miles. The difference in value between the vehicle as warranted and its actual value is an appropriate measure of damages, see Currier v. Spencer, 299 Ark. 182, 772 S.W.2d 309 (1989), and on this record we cannot say that the trial judge clearly erred in setting damages at $5,000.00.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins and Stroud, JJ., agree.\nAlthough not argued by the parties, we note that this definition of \u201cperson\u201d is broad enough to encompass the acts of both the salesman and the appellant.\nGiven our holding that sufficient evidence exists to support the finding of intentional misrepresentation, discussion of lesser levels of intent is not required to resolve the issues before us. Nevertheless, we refer the reader to Hinson v. Eaton, 322 Ark. 331, 908 S.W.2d 646 (1995) for a comprehensive discussion of the level of intent necessary to satisfy the statute.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JAMES R. COOPER, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Christopher C. Mercer, Jr., for appellant.",
      "William A. McLean, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ronald COLDING d/b/a Ronald Colding Motors v. Betty WILLIAMS\nCA 95-174\n920 S.W.2d 507\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered May 1, 1996\n[Petition for rehearing denied June 5, 1996.]\nChristopher C. Mercer, Jr., for appellant.\nWilliam A. McLean, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0173-01",
  "first_page_order": 191,
  "last_page_order": 194
}