{ "id": 6137087, "name": "Raphael FARMER v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Farmer v. State", "decision_date": "1996-06-12", "docket_number": "CA CR 95-398", "first_page": "66", "last_page": "69", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 Ark. App. 66" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "923 S.W.2d 876" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 Ark. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1900887 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/306/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445720 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447542 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205331 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882803 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912733 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0628-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 399, "char_count": 6015, "ocr_confidence": 0.79, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1748590361831906 }, "sha256": "ae9710853ec7648b4733097dbb0bc071a690eaf109732f7210bb81816cce8fcb", "simhash": "1:c37a353a7b8c0a90", "word_count": 987 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:29.533878+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins and Stroud, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Raphael FARMER v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JAMES R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant was convicted in a jury trial of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to eleven years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the State failed to disclose that its sole material witness had filed a false police report and had resigned from the police department prior to trial. We agree and reverse and remand.\nAt the appellant\u2019s trial on October 27, 1994, the State\u2019s witness, Officer Elliott Johnson, testified that the appellant sold him crack cocaine. Johnson testified that he was investigating narcotics activity in a housing project area on March 9, 1994. He testified that at approximately 5:15 p.m., he and a confidential informant were flagged down by the appellant who was driving a Chevrolet truck with license plate number TWY 553. He testified that he purchased $20.00 worth of crack cocaine from the appellant.\nJohnson testified that he saw the appellant driving the same truck again on April 12, 1994. He radioed other officers to stop the appellant\u2019s vehicle in order to identify and photograph him. Johnson testified that there was no doubt that the appellant was the person who sold him the cocaine. Three alibi witnesses testified on the appellant\u2019s behalf. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:\nCan he [Johnson] make an identification after just looking at somebody for five minutes? Well, yes, I think he can. He\u2019s a detective, a professional at that. . . . This is a police officer who is making a buy of cocaine. . . . He would pay attention to that kind of thing. That\u2019s what he\u2019s trained to do.\nThe appellant filed a motion for a new trial on December 1, 1994, after discovering that Johnson was not, in fact, a police officer at the time of the trial. Captain Sam Williams of the Little Rock Police Department testified during the hearing on the appellant\u2019s motion for a new trial. He testified that on September 11, 1994, Officer Johnson informed a supervisor that his city-supplied car had been stolen out of the driveway of his home in Little Rock. Captain Williams testified that approximately three to four weeks later it was determined that the car had not been stolen but that Johnson had wrecked it in Tunica, Mississippi, and had been unable to return the vehicle to Little Rock. Captain Williams explained that taking the car to Tunica was a violation of police department rules. Captain Williams further testified that Johnson had filed a false police report. Johnson resigned from the Police Department on October 4, 1994, and thus was not employed as a police officer at the time of the trial. The prosecuting attorney admitted at the hearing that it had been discussed prior to trial that Johnson should not be asked at trial where he was employed.\nThe appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the State\u2019s failure to disclose that Johnson had filed a false police report and had resigned from the police department because he was prevented from using that information to attack Johnson\u2019s credibility. He also argues that the State\u2019s failure to disclose this information amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. This second argument, however, was not made to the trial court and hence, it is not preserved for appeal. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Walker v. State, 314 Ark. 628, 864 S.W.2d 230 (1993).\nHere, the appellant filed a discovery motion on September 7, 1994. The State did not disclose any information regarding Johnson\u2019s resignation although it had knowledge of it prior to trial. Rule 17.1(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporates the due process requirement that evidence favorable to a defendant on issues of guilt or punishment be disclosed by the prosecutor. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Yates v. State, 303 Ark. 79, 794 S.W.2d 133 (1990). Insofar as the rule requires pretrial disclosure, it represents an extension of the Brady mandate. Yates, supra. The Brady rule has been interpreted to include impeachment, as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). Rule 19.2 further imposes a continuing duty on the prosecutor to disclose this information.\nIf the State fails to provide information pursuant to pretrial discovery procedures, the burden is on the appellant to establish that the omission was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Bray v. State, 322 Ark. 178, 908 S.W.2d 88 (1995). The key in determining whether a reversible discovery violation exists is whether the appellant was prejudiced by the prosecutor\u2019s failure to disclose. Mosley v. State, 323 Ark. 244, 914 S.W.2d 731 (1996).\nIn the case at bar, the State\u2019s case was based upon Johnson\u2019s testimony and his identification of the appellant as the person who sold him the crack cocaine. Consequently, the importance of the evidence that would have been used to attack Johnson\u2019s credibility cannot be minimized. The appellant\u2019s defense depended on bringing into question Johnson\u2019s credibility. Furthermore, the evidence of the appellant\u2019s guilt is not overwhelming absent Officer Johnson\u2019s testimony, see Hall v. State, 306 Ark. 329, 812 S.W.2d 688 (1991), and given the close proximity ofjohnson\u2019s resignation to the time of trial, we cannot say that the appellant was not diligent in attempting to discover this information during his own investigation prior to trial. We conclude that the appellant was prejudiced by the State\u2019s failure to disclose the information regarding Johnson\u2019s resignation, and thus find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nRobbins and Stroud, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "JAMES R. Cooper, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Webb & Wyatt, by: James W. Wyatt, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Gil Dudley, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Raphael FARMER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 95-398\n923 S.W.2d 876\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered June 12, 1996\nWebb & Wyatt, by: James W. Wyatt, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Gil Dudley, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0066-01", "first_page_order": 92, "last_page_order": 95 }