{ "id": 6140471, "name": "Tommy STAFFORD v. ARKMO LUMBER COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Stafford v. Arkmo Lumber Co.", "decision_date": "1996-07-03", "docket_number": "CA 94-1373", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "298", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "54 Ark. App. 286" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "925 S.W.2d 170" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "30 Ark. App. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140738 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/30/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Ark. App. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/29/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ark. App. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/42/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. App. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6135992 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/44/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 S.W.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 8719130, 6649226 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/288/0237-01", "/ark-app/17/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ark. App. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6649226 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/17/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-508", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a) and (b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "871 S.W.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6655292 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/45/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ark. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1891994 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/45/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "918 S.W.2d 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9158123 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9158081 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141047 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Repl. 1996" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "15 Ark. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141059 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/15/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Ark. App. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141224 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" }, { "page": "946" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/12/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ark. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141746 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/4/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ark. App. 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140807 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Mayfield dissenting" }, { "parenthetical": "Mayfield dissenting" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/31/0215-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 973, "char_count": 26342, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1677487220101619e-07, "percentile": 0.5855281524135191 }, "sha256": "f26fdc63e30127ae7d69463ce91c171f8000883048ae33756044584b9b87d474", "simhash": "1:a4bdd02edd3c5318", "word_count": 4294 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:29.533878+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jennings, C.J., and Griffen, Neal, and Rogers, JJ., agree.", "Mayfield, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Tommy STAFFORD v. ARKMO LUMBER COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nTommy Stafford appeals from an order of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission denying additional temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits arguing lack of support by substantial evidence.\nAppellant sustained a compensable injury to his left shoulder on August 2, 1986, while working for Arkmo Lumber Company. He was treated by Dr. Joe W. Crow, an orthopedic surgeon, who performed an acromioplasty on appellant\u2019s left shoulder and assigned a 20 percent impairment rating when he released appellant on September 9, 1987, to return to work with lifting restrictions. On December 16, 1988, while working for Diamond Constructing Company, appellant sustained a compensable injury to his neck and back. Appellant stated that before the 1988 injury, his shoulder was \u201cstiff\u201d but he was able to work without problems. However, after the 1988 injury, he began having pain in his left shoulder. Appellant returned to Dr. Crow for treatment, who opined that the 1988 injury was a new injury rather than a recurrence. Appellant became dissatisfied with Dr. Crow\u2019s treatment. The administrative law judge appointed Dr. William F. Blankenship to be appellant\u2019s treating physician. Dr. Blankenship provided conservative treatment, physical therapy and injections, and conducted numerous diagnostic tests, such as an EMG and nerve conduction studies. On January 8, 1990, Dr. Blankenship released appellant to return to work with restrictions of no sweeping, mopping, lifting in excess of twenty pounds or overhead lifting. Dr. Blankenship thought that appellant could perform some limited work and that no further medical treatment was needed.\nSubsequent to being released by Dr. Blankenship, appellant continued to have complaints and in 1990 sought treatment at UAMS. There, appellant was treated by several physicians. Dr. Samuel Agnew performed a second acromioplasty on November 4, 1992, which alleviated appellant\u2019s symptoms. Following the surgery, appellant sought additional temporary total disability benefits from January 1, 1990, to April 1993, medical benefits for treatment from UAMS, and a retroactive change of physician to Dr. Agnew.\nThe Commission found that appellant failed to prove that his treatment from UAMS was causally related to either compensable injury or to the surgery following the 1986 injury. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the fight most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and will affirm if the Commission\u2019s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission\u2019s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 Ark. App. 168, 856 S.W.2d 30 (1993). Moreover, the Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989).\nDr. Agnew\u2019s December 9, 1992, report stated: (1) that a May 9, 1991, examination revealed recurrent impingement syndrome of appellant\u2019s left shoulder, (2) that a repeat acromioplasty was performed November 4, 1992, and (3) that there was no indication that the acromioplasty performed by Dr: Crow after the 1986 injury was inadequate. He further stated, \u201cIt cannot be determined with any degree of reasonable certainty as to what event caused the recurrent or persistent symptoms.... Specifically, one cannot determine whether the accident of August 1986, December 16, 1988, or the surgery of Dr. Crow specifically is the event. One can state with reasonable assurity that all three play in some part to [appellant\u2019s] overall complaints.\u201d Dr. J. M. Grunwald, a physician at UAMS who treated appellant, stated in a September 19, 1990, report that \u201cthere is no way to decide if the orthopedic problem which [appellant] has is related to or caused by his work related injury or if they were caused by Dr. Crow\u2019s treatment surgery. I do not feel that Dr. Crow\u2019s surgery was inadequate or substandard.\u201d He further said, \u201cThere is no way to decide which part of the symptoms that [appellant] is presenting with is related to his first and which part is related to his second accident.\u201d Lastly, Dr. James Blankenship, a UAMS physician, said in a March 23, 1993, report that appellant has two cysts which are almost certainly congenital and which are believed to be causing some of appellant\u2019s complaints.\nAppellant argues that Dr. Agnew\u2019s opinion should be interpreted to mean that both compensable injuries and the first surgery played a part in his need for the second surgery although Dr. Agnew could not say which one precipitated his condition. He also contends that causation was established because the second surgery in November 1992 alleviated his problems.\nThe interpretation of medical opinion was for the Commission, and we cannot say that the Commission\u2019s finding that a causal connection between his medical treatment and the compensable injuries was not established is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we decline to address appellant\u2019s arguments concerning a change of physician to Dr. Agnew.\nAppellant also argues that he is entided to temporary total disability benefits from January 1, 1990. The Commission found that appellant failed to prove that he was unable to perform employment subsequent to January 1990 and that the medical and lay testimony indicated that appellant had reached a plateau of recovery and was performing some gainful employment.\nTemporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which an employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. J. A. Riggs Tractor Co. v. Etzkorn, 30 Ark. App. 200, 785 S.W.2d 51 (1990). After Dr. William Blankenship\u2019s release to return to work with restrictions on January 8, 1990, appellant testified that he returned to his employer who did not have any work available within the restrictions. Appellant said that had there been a job available, he would have tried to do it. Appellant stated that he has not sought employment anywhere since his second injury in December 1988. However, the record shows that from at least 1990 to 1992, appellant operated a lawn care business. Appellant said that he could do only two or three yards each week, never worked more than four hours a day, only did a dozen yards in 1991 and earned less than $600 a year in the business. Our review indicates that the Commission\u2019s findings and decision to deny temporary total disability benefits is supported by substantial evidence.\nAffirmed.\nJennings, C.J., and Griffen, Neal, and Rogers, JJ., agree.\nMayfield, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge." }, { "text": "MELVIN MAYFIELD, Judge,\ndissenting. This case has been in this court before. In an opinion styled Stafford v. Diamond Construction Co., et al., 31 Ark. App. 215, 793 S.W.2d 109 (1990) (Mayfield dissenting), we granted the appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the order the appellant attempted to appeal was not a final, appealable order. Although the style of that case does not specifically name \u201cArkmo Lumber Company\u201d as an appellee, that appellee was included in the designation \u201cet al.\u201d\nThus, there are two appellees in this case. This results from the fact, as the majority opinion points out, that the appellant sustained a compensable injury in August 1986, while working for Arkmo Lumber Company, and sustained another compensable injury in December 1988, while working for Diamond Construction Company. The notice of appeal from the decision of the Commission in this case names both companies as appellees, and both of them have filed briefs.\nIn order to focus on the points that are involved in this appeal, it is not necessary to recite all of the details of the long and complex history of the case. A short summary, taken from the helpful \u201cIntroduction\u201d to the \u201cArgument\u201d in the brief of the appellee Diamond Construction Company, discloses that after appellant\u2019s compensable injury in August 1986, he was treated and had surgery on his left shoulder by Dr. Crow, was paid temporary total benefits for some period, and was paid for a permanent partial disability of 20 percent to the arm. And on December 16, 1988, while working for Diamond Construction Company, the appellant sustained a compensa-ble aggravation of his left shoulder. As a result of this disability, he was paid temporary total disability benefits from December 17, 1988, until January 8, 1990, when he was released by Dr. Blankenship. In addition to these benefits, the medical expenses associated with the care of Dr. Crow and Dr. Blankenship have been paid.\nThe appellant, however, contends in this appeal (1) that he should be paid temporary total benefits for the period from January 8, 1990, to April 1993, (2) that the administrative law judge erred in selecting Dr. Blankenship as appellant\u2019s one-time-only change of physician, and the Commission should have allowed a change to UAMS, and (3) that the medical bills of UAMS and all the physicians who rendered medical services to the appellant should be paid.\nThe issue concerning the change of physician to Dr. Blankenship is the issue that appellant attempted to appeal in Stafford v. Diamond Construction Co. et al., supra. The majority opinion in that case stated:\nThe appellant . . . petitioned the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission for a change of physician. The petition was granted and a new physician was appointed by the administrative law judge (ALJ). Apparendy dissatisfied with ALJ\u2019s choice of physician, the appellant appealed to the full Commission contending that he never agreed to the procedure by which the new physician was selected, and the Commission affirmed the ALJ\u2019s decision. . . .\n. . . Here, the appellant obtained the relief he sought before the Commission . . . and we consider the dispute concerning the method by which the new physician was selected to be interlocutory and incidental in nature. Without expressing an opinion on the finality or appealability of an order denying a change of physician,. we hold that, bn these facts, the order granting a change of physician is not appealable by the petitioning party at this time.\n31 Ark. App. at 216, 793 S.W.2d at 110.\nThis point, therefore, is now before this Court in this appeal. Prior to the first appeal, which we dismissed, the full Commission had held that the ALJ\u2019s order was appealable on the basis that it raised an issue to a \u201cseparable branch of the litigation,\u201d and the ALJ\u2019s order was affirmed. However, after this court held that the Commission\u2019s order affirming the ALJ\u2019s decision was not appealable, the Commission in the decision now before this court again passed on the change-of-physician issue and again affirmed the ALJ\u2019s order on that point. The Commission treated the issue as involving a request for a \u201cretroactive change of physician,\u201d and held that \u201cclaimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he is entided to another change of physician ...\u201d\nThis issue is not discussed by the majority opinion; however, it is fully argued in the appellant\u2019s brief which points out that on April 19, 1989, the appellant requested a change of physician from Dr. Crow; that on May 9, 1989, the ALJ suggested that the necessity of a hearing could' be obviated by allowing him to select an independent examiner; that on June 12, 1989, appellee Diamond Construction, through its attorney, wrote the ALJ and suggested that he enter an order granting a change of physician to a \u201cdoctor selected by you\u201d; that on June 16, 1989, appellant\u2019s attorney wrote the ALJ that he was in the process of attempting to ascertain the appellant\u2019s wishes regarding the ALJ\u2019s suggestion, but in a postscript to the letter, the attorney stated, \u201cSince dictating this letter, I have now talked with my client and I now have the authority to agree that you may select the physician to be the change of physicians for [the appellant].\u201d\nBut the appellant\u2019s argument goes on to point out that on the day after appellant\u2019s attorney received the ALJ\u2019s order filed June 15, 1989, which said that the appellant would be evaluated and treated by Dr. Blankenship and that this would be the one-time-only change under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-514(a)(2) (1987), the appellant\u2019s attorney hand delivered a letter to the ALJ stating that the earlier letter of the attorney mailed on June 16, 1989, should be ignored because it \u201chas been superseded by this letter.\u201d\nThen on June 29, 1989, a hearing was held on this issue by the ALJ who held on July 11, 1989, that the evidence established that the appellant\u2019s attorney agreed to the procedure by which a change of physician was made and only objected when he found out that Dr. Blankenship had been selected by the ALJ. Finding that the selection had been made in accordance with the law, and that Dr. Blankenship was a licensed and qualified orthopedic surgeon, the ALJ refused to change his selection.\nAppellant argues that there was no agreement that the ALJ could select a one-time-only change of physician; that the full Commission should have allowed appellant to present evidence on this issue; that Dr- Blankenship was a \u201cconservative\u201d physician; and that the appellant was entitled to \u201creasonable medical care.\u201d\nBecause the above point is closely connected with appellant\u2019s other two points in this appeal, I want to discuss the other points now and then come back to the change-of-physician point.\nThe majority opinion relies upon a report by Dr. Agnew \u2014 a doctor at the University of Arkansas For Medical Sciences (UAMS) to whom appellant went after he stopped seeing Dr. Blankenship \u2014 to support the holding by the majority that the Commission\u2019s decision in this case should be affirmed. The majority opinion states that because the \u201cCommission\u2019s finding that a causal connection between [Agnew\u2019s] medical treatment and the compensable injuries was not established\u201d is supported by substantial evidence, \u201cwe decline to address appellant\u2019s arguments concerning a change of physician to Dr. Agnew.\u201d\nOf course, as the appellant points out in his brief, it should make no difference in evaluating the testimony of Dr. Agnew whether or not his treatment was authorized by the ALJ. See Markham v. K-Mart Corp., 4 Ark. App. 310, 630 S.W.2d 550 (1982), citing 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 61.12 (j), at 10-902 (1996), where it is said that \u201cthe reports of an unauthorized doctor must be considered in determining extent of disability.\u201d\nTherefore, putting this matter in proper perspective, we have a worker who admittedly has received two compensable injuries to his left shoulder and has been paid compensation benefits for both of them. After the last injury on December 16, 1988, he received temporary total disability until January 8, 1990, when he was released by Dr. Blankenship. He then goes to see Dr. Agnew who in a report of December 9, 1992, traces the appellants medical history and the fact that a left acromioplasty was performed in 1988 while appellant was under the care of Dr. Crow. Dr. Agnew\u2019s report also points out that this procedure gave appellant some relief for a period but that he came to UAMS in 1990 complaining of shoulder and parascapular pain. He was started, the report continues, \u201con local modalities and shoulder girdle strengthening exercises\u201d and that, on or about May 9, 1991, a repeat clinical evaluation was consistent with findings of \u201crecurrent impingement syndrome of his left shoulder and possible AC joint arthritis.\u201d\nWithout setting out the complete report of Dr. Agnew, we quote the following pertinent statements:\nAt that time, he was seen by other members of the trauma service, whereby a distal clavicle resection and possible repeat acromioplasty was recommended. Attempts to aid Mr. Stafford with this surgical procedure were unsuccessful due to the inability to obtain hospital admission for Mr. Stafford because of the lack of available hospital beds.\nOn September 10, 1992 Mr. Stafford was seen back in the orthopaedic clinic after having successfully completed an arthrogram which revealed a rotator cuff tear. It was based on his clinical findings and the arthrogram report that repeat acromioplasty was recommended and scheduled.\nOn November 4, 1992 Mr. Stafford underwent a repeat or revision acromioplasty with [debridement] of his muscular rotator cuff and repair of an erosive type defect in his rotator cuff. On clinical exam at the time of surgery there was no overt evidence of significant pathology and the acromi-oclavicular joints of this was not addressed surgically. At the present time, Mr. Stafford has been followed on a consistent basis by both myself and the orthopaedic office as well as members of the physical therapy rehabilitation service [and] continues to make increasing gains in his strength and motion.\nAnd in answers to specific questions that the appellant\u2019s attorney had addressed to Dr. Agnew, the following answers from his report are quoted:\nItem 2: It cannot be determined with any degree of reasonable certainty as to what event caused the recurrent or persistent symptoms that Mr. Stafford sought our medical attention. Specifically, one cannot determine whether the accident of August 1986, December 16, 1988, or the surgery of Dr. Crow specifically is the event. One can state with reasonable assurity that all three play in some part to Mr. Stafford\u2019s overall complaints.\nItem 6: Mr. Stafford is still in the healing, recuperative, or rehabilitative phase of his most recent surgery. It is anticipated that with continued rehabilitation that Mr. Stafford should regain approximately 90% function in a painless manner to his entire arm. . . .\nThe opinion of the Commission, the briefs of both appellees, and the majority opinion all rely heavily upon one statement made in Dr. Agnew\u2019s report to support the finding of the Commission that the evidence does not show that the care and treatment rendered by UAMS (which includes Dr. Agnew) was causally connected to the appellant\u2019s work-related injury. That one statement is the answer quoted above in \u201cItem 2.\u201d I do not believe, however, that a common-sense reading of that statement could reach the conclusion that Dr. Agnew either said or believed that there was no causal connection between the appellant\u2019s work-related injuries and the treatment by Dr. Crow and the treatment and the surgical procedure afforded appellant by UAMS.\nThe report of Dr. Agnew reasonably and logically traces the factual history of the appellant\u2019s injuries and medical treatment. The report explains why and how a repeat acromioplasty was recommended and performed and the anticipated recovery and 90 percent \u201cfunction in a painless manner\u201d that will likely result from the treatment provided by UAMS. This' surgical procedure was performed in November 1992. At the hearing before the ALJ on June 1, 1993, the appellant testified that after this surgery the stinging, burning pain he had in his arm and hand was gone; that the popping he had in his arm and shoulder was gone; that his shoulder is now fine; and that he is now able to work and is trying to \u201cdraw me up\u201d a business working on yards and landscaping.\nSo the appellant, who admittedly sustained compensable injuries to his left shoulder in 1986 and 1988, had a left acromioplasty in 1988 while under the care of Dr. Crow; was in the care of Dr. Blankenship from July 1989 to January 1990; was released to return to work with some lifting and arm-raising restrictions; and was terminated by his employer because there was no work available with those restrictions. At that point, the appellant went to the University Hospital where he saw Dr. J.M. Grunwald. This eventually resulted in the repeat acromioplasty, relief from previous symptoms, and a much brighter outlook for this now forty-three-year-old manual laborer.\nBut the majority opinion holds that the appellant loses his claim for temporary disability payments because Dr. Blankenship thought his healing period ended in January 1990, and because Dr. Agnew said in \u201cItem 2\u201d of his report that he could not determine \u201cwhether the accident of August 1986, December 16, 1988, or the surgery of Dr. Crow\u201d Was the specific \u201cevent\u201d that \u201ccaused the recurrent or persistent symptoms\u201d for which appellant sought treatment at UAMS. Overlooked by the Commission and this court\u2019s majority opinion \u2014 and skipped over lightly by the appellees \u2014 is Dr. Agnew\u2019s concluding sentence in \u201cItem 2,\u201d that \u201cOne can state with reasonable assurity that all three play in some part to Mr. Stafford\u2019s overall complaint.\u201d Actually, Dr. Agnew\u2019s statements in \u201cItem 2\u201d of his report lend much more support to a finding that the care and treatment rendered to appellant by UAMS was casually connected to his work-related injuries then they do to the contrary finding made by the Commission. And it is obvious that Dr. Blankenship who testified by deposition that he last saw the appellant on January 29, 1990, could not dispute the findings and surgical procedure described in Dr. Agnew\u2019s report of December 9, 1992, and could not deny that the appellant\u2019s symptoms have dramatically improved since he has been under UAMS care and treatment.\nAs a legal matter \u201cit is not essential that the causal relationship between the accident and the disability be established by medical evidence ... or that the evidence be medically certain.\u201d Crain Button Ford Co. v. Rogers, 12 Ark. App. 246, 248, 674 S.W.2d 944, 946 (1984). See also Gerber Products v. McDonald, 15 Ark. App. 226, 691 S.W.2d 879 (1985). (It should be noted that the change made by Act 796 of 1993, which modified Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102 (16) (Repl. 1996) to require that medical opinions be stated with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, does not apply to the present case where the last injury occurred in 1988.) Moreover, we have also held that \u201cif the original injury is compensable, every natural consequence from it is also compensable.\u201d Hubley v. Best Western Governor\u2019s Inn, 52 Ark. App. 226, 232, 916 S.W.2d 143, 146 (1996).\nAnd in simple fact, the Commission\u2019s finding that the care and treatment rendered to appellant by UAMS was not causally connected to his work-related injuries is not supported by substantial evidence because fair-minded persons with the same evidence before them could not have reached the same conclusion. In that situation it is our duty to reverse the Commission\u2019s finding. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 162 (1996); see also Morgan v. Desha County Tax Assessor\u2019s Office, 45 Ark. 95, 871 S.W.2d 429 (1994).\nTherefore, I would reverse the Commission\u2019s decision that appellant is not entitled to temporary total benefits during the healing period that followed the surgical procedure he received at UAMS in November 1992. The number of days of temporary total disability within that healing period is not a matter that we can determine from the record on appeal, and I would remand to the Commission for a determination of that issue.\nAs to payment of the medical bills of UAMS and the physicians who performed services for appellant after he was released by Dr. Blankenship, the appellees argue that under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-514(a)(l) and (2) (Supp. 1996) the appellant had a one-time-only change of physician from Dr. Crow to Dr. Blankenship, and that to require the payment of the UAMS bills (including the physicians) would constitute a retroactive change of physician contrary to section 11-9-514. I think this argument, under my view of this case, is not on point. Neither is the appellant\u2019s argument on point in contending that the ALJ erred in selecting Dr. Blankenship as the physician to replace Dr. Crow. Of course, the appellees are not obligated to pay the medical bills of UAMS and Dr. Agnew unless those bills are for medical care and attention causally connected to appellant\u2019s compensable injuries. But having decided that such a connection exists, then the only question left is whether the bills are for medical care and attention that was reasonable and necessary for the treatment of the compensable injuries.\nIn my view, after Dr. Blankenship released the appellant to return to work and saw appellant for the last time on January 8, 1990, the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-514(a) (1) and (2) no longer applied. At that point the statute that applied was Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-508(a) and (b), which on the date of appellant\u2019s compensable injuries, as well as on January 8, 1992, provided that the employer shall provide for the medical services that are \u201creasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee,\u201d and if the employer fails to provide such services within a reasonable time after knowledge of such injuries the Commission may direct that they be paid by the employer; and that the employer is also liable for emergency treatment rendered an employee as is reasonably necessary in connection with a compensable injury.\nThe case of Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Bussey, 17 Ark. App. 47, 703 S.W.2d 459 (1986), deals with the situation discussed in the preceding paragraph of this opinion and is authority for the position I take with regard to what is referred to in this case as the UAMS bills. Of course, it would be necessary to remand for the Commission to determine the amount of the medical bills that should be paid for the care and treatment of the appellant after January 8, 1990.\nTherefore, I would reverse and remand for the purposes indicated in this opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "MELVIN MAYFIELD, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "William F. Sherman, for appellant.", "Walter A. Murray, for appellee.", "Barber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, FA., by: Robert L. Henry, III and Christopher Gomlicker, for appellee Diamond Constr. Co." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Tommy STAFFORD v. ARKMO LUMBER COMPANY\nCA 94-1373\n925 S.W.2d 170\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered July 3, 1996\nWilliam F. Sherman, for appellant.\nWalter A. Murray, for appellee.\nBarber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, FA., by: Robert L. Henry, III and Christopher Gomlicker, for appellee Diamond Constr. Co." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 312, "last_page_order": 324 }