{ "id": 6138461, "name": "W.D. v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "W.D. v. State", "decision_date": "1996-10-16", "docket_number": "CA 95-980", "first_page": "88", "last_page": "92", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "55 Ark. App. 88" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "931 S.W.2d 790" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "41 Ark. App. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/41/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Neb. 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2909397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/223/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898841 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ark. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137954 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/37/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ark. App. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/34/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0689-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 419, "char_count": 6632, "ocr_confidence": 0.816, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17488413417152893 }, "sha256": "a109057d33de4547d87df2c7df78f9c6b1b763b8b8252d8ea9e94b7dfb051a13", "simhash": "1:b977d1c45cadebcc", "word_count": 1125 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:16.845649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Neal and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "W.D. v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Steele Hays, Special Judge.\nThe appellant appeals from the judgment of the Juvenile Division of the Sebastian County Chancery Court adjudicating him a delinquent for committing the crime of rape and committing him to the Department of Human Services, Division of Youth Services. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his directed verdict motions. We affirm.\nA motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689, 899 S.W.2d 470 (1995). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and affirm if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence. LaRue v. State, 34 Ark. App. 131, 806 S.W.2d 35 (1991). Substantial evidence is evidence which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other without resort to speculation or conjecture. Kendrick v. State, 37 Ark. App. 95, 823 S.W.2d 931 (1992).\nThe appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish forcible compulsion pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-14-103(a)(l) (1995). He also argues, in the alternative, that he is not guilty of committing rape by engaging in sexual intercourse with a person less than fourteen years of age because the age of the victim was within two years of the appellant\u2019s age. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103(a)(3).\nThe appellant, who was twelve years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of raping a ten-year-old girl. Dr. Merle Edward McClain, a pediatrician, examined the victim approximately one month after the incident. Dr. McClain testified that the victim stated that her brothers let the appellant into their house on the night in question and that the appellant later \u201cgot on top of her and put his thing\u201d into her pudendum. The doctor testified that the victim complained of constipation and explained that it was not unusual for a child who had been sexually molested to complain of abdominal pain.\nThe victim testified that the appellant was friendly with her brothers. She testified that the appellant came into their house through a window in the bedroom in which she was sleeping with her brother, Tyrus. She testified that she was awakened at one point during the night to find that the appellant had taken off her clothes. She then felt something \u201cgoing into\u201d her. She testified that \u201cat first he would not let me up. He just kept on doing what he was doing. Then he stopped and I hurried up and got up.\u201d The victim spent the rest of the night in another room.\nThe victim\u2019s brother, Tyrus, testified that the appellant was present in the bedroom on the night in question. He testified that when he awoke the next morning, the appellant was sleeping next to him where his sister had previously been sleeping. Jennifer Campbell, the mother of the victim, testified that the victim began complaining of stomach aches. She stated that the victim subsequently told her that the appellant had raped her.\nWe do not address the appellant\u2019s argument regarding forcible compulsion because we find the evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction under \u00a7 5-14-103 (a) (3), which provides:\n(a) A person commits rape if he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person:\n(3) Who is less than fourteen (14) years of age. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this subdivision that the actor was not more than two (2) years older than the victim.\nThe appellant contends that he is not guilty of committing rape under this section because the age of the victim was within two years of his age. The appellant presented evidence that he was two years, four months, and one day older than the victim on the date of the offense. The trial court concluded that the affirmative defense was not applicable because the appellant was over two years older than the victim. The appellant argues that the two-year statutory language should be two years including any months and days which follow the two-year anniversary up to the three-year anniversary year.\nIn State v. Joshua, 307 Ark. 79, 818 S.W.2d 249 (1991), overruled on other grounds in Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992), our Supreme Court held that \u201c12 years of age or younger\u201d as used in Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-13-202(a)(4)(C) defining second degree battery refers to persons whose age is less than or under 12 years as well as persons who have reached and passed their twelfth birthday but have not yet reached their thirteenth birthday. The Court, in Joshua, agreed with the following reasoning set out in State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 394 N.W.2d 669 (1986):\nIf \u201cless than fourteen years of age\u201d or \u201cunder fourteen years of age\u201d had been used in [the statute], the protection of that statute would terminate when a child reached the 14th birthday. Because \u201cless than\u201d or \u201cunder\u201d is absent from [the statute], while fourteen years of age or younger\u201d appears in the statute, the compelled logical conclusion is that the statute\u2019s protection extends into and throughout the year immediately following a person\u2019s 14th birthday. When the plain and unambiguous language of [the statute] is considered, to the ordinary person \u201cfourteen years of age\u201d means that one has passed the 14th birthday but has not reached the 15th birthday. Thus, \u201cfourteen years of age\u201d is a temporal condition existing on the 14th birthday and continuing until the 15th birthday. Any other construction of \u201cfourteen years of age\u201d would be a perversion of popular parlance.\n(Citations omitted.)\nWhen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the language is given its plain and ordinary meaning. Smith v. Smith, 41 Ark. App. 29, 848 S.W.2d 428 (1993). Unlike the statutory language in Joshua or Carlson, the plain wording of \u00a7 5-14-103(a)(3) uses the limiting language of \u201cnot more than\u201d so that any months or days beyond twenty-four months takes the defendant out of the affirmative-defense period. Thus, because the appellant was more than two years older than the victim, he could not avail himself of the affirmative defense. Therefore, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant committed the crime of rape by engaging in sexual intercourse with another person who was less than fourteen years of age.\nAffirmed.\nNeal and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Steele Hays, Special Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jo Ellen Carson, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Sandy Moll, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "W.D. v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA 95-980\n931 S.W.2d 790\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered October 16, 1996\nJo Ellen Carson, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Sandy Moll, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0088-01", "first_page_order": 114, "last_page_order": 118 }