{ "id": 6141837, "name": "Charles Gregory SPICER v. ESTATE of Charles Nelson SPICER", "name_abbreviation": "Spicer v. Estate of Spicer", "decision_date": "1996-12-18", "docket_number": "CA 95-941", "first_page": "267", "last_page": "271", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "55 Ark. App. 267" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "935 S.W.2d 576" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "553 So.2d. 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7532966 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/553/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ark. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1619117 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "brothers and sisters of testator were not interested persons where testator had adopted son living" }, { "parenthetical": "brothers and sisters of testator were not interested persons where testator had adopted son living" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/259/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935014 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" }, { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ark. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1611974 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "735" }, { "parenthetical": "just any collateral heir is not necessarily an \"interested person\" with a right to contest the probate of a will under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113 (1987)" }, { "parenthetical": "just any collateral heir is not necessarily an \"interested person\" with a right to contest the probate of a will under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113 (1987)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/218/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-214", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)", "parenthetical": "heritable estate passes first to the children of the intestate" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 455, "char_count": 9972, "ocr_confidence": 0.812, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8591662004228935e-08, "percentile": 0.3637015130997985 }, "sha256": "b177077c8d39e153dff34cbf6aea76ff96fca04d4be973b96af122d4dd9aadae", "simhash": "1:b37e6555a3ce903a", "word_count": 1710 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:16.845649+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stroud and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree.", "Robbins, J., concurs.", "Mayfield and Neal, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Charles Gregory SPICER v. ESTATE of Charles Nelson SPICER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nThis appeal arises from a will contest brought by appellant. The probate court found that appellant did not have standing to contest the will of Charles Nelson Spicer, appellant\u2019s grandfather, because he was not an \u201cinterested person\u201d as defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-102 (1987). On appeal, appellant argues that the probate court\u2019s decision is clearly erroneous because he has a legal interest in the estate. We agree and reverse and remand.\nCharles Nelson Spicer left a holographic will, holographic codicil, and typewritten codicil. Charles Spicer bequeathed to his surviving son, Don Charles Spicer, his personal residence and to his surviving daughter, Donna Sue Spicer Meredith, properties of equal value. The will also created a trust for the benefit of Charles Spicer\u2019s grandchildren. Appellant was listed as one of four grandchildren entitled to one-eighth of the distribution of the trust, and three other grandchildren were also listed and entided to one-sixth of the distribution of the estate. Appellant was to receive $750 per month. Charles Spicer\u2019s first codicil amended his will to create out of his properties a memorial foundation in the memory of his parents. In his second codicil, Charles Spicer added his daughter, Sue Meredith, as a beneficiary of the trust. This change reduced appellant\u2019s share in the trust to $600 per month.\nThe issue before us is whether appellant is an \u201cinterested person\u201d as defined at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-l-102(a)(ll) (1987), thus having standing to contest Charles Spicer\u2019s will. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 28-l-102(a)(ll) defines \u201cinterested persons\u201d as \u201cany heir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right, interest in, or claim against the estate being administered, and a fiduciary.\u201d An interested person may contest the probate of a will, or any part thereof, by stating in writing the grounds of his objection and filing them in the court. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113(a) (1987). The probate court reasoned that appellant had no standing to contest the will because he would not take as an heir if no will existed. However, the court erroneously overlooked the portion of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-l-102(a)(ll) which defines \u201cinterested persons\u201d as those having an interest in the estate. The evidence is undisputed that appellant is specifically named in Charles Spicer\u2019s will as a beneficiary of a trust which would have distributed $750 per month to appellant. The second codicil affected appellant\u2019s interest in the trust by reducing his share to $600 per month. The facts that appellant was a beneficiary of the trust and that the second codicil affected his beneficial interest clearly establish that appellant has an interest in the estate of Charles Spicer. Therefore, we reverse the probate court\u2019s decision that appellant does not have standing to contest Charles Spicer\u2019s will.\nReversed and remanded.\nStroud and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree.\nRobbins, J., concurs.\nMayfield and Neal, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge." }, { "text": "JOHN B. Robbins, Judge,\nconcurring. I agree to reverse and remand because, as noted in the majority opinion, appellant has an interest in the estate and is, therefore, an \u201cinterested person\u201d who has standing to contest the decedent\u2019s will. I do not, however, believe it is significant that the extent of the appellant\u2019s interest in the testamentary trust was reduced by the second codicil. Insofar as the majority opinion relies on the change made by the second codicil in holding that appellant has standing, I must disagree, but concur in the result.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JOHN B. Robbins, Judge," }, { "text": "Melvin Mayfield, Judg,\ndissenting. I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case. The majority has reversed the probate court\u2019s finding that the appellant did not have standing to contest the will of his grandfather because he was not an \u201cinterested person\u201d as defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-l-102(a)(ll) (1987). In doing so, the majority, without any citation to authority, has simply held that appellant has an interest in the estate because he is named in the will as a beneficiary of a trust and the second codicil affected his beneficial interest. The probate judge did not think that was sufficient to make appellant an interested party and neither do I.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 28-l-102(a)(ll) defines \u201cinterested person\u201d as any \u201cheir, devisee, spouse, creditor, or any other having a property right, interest in, or claim against the estate being administered, and a fiduciary.\u201d\nIn the case at bar, the decedent did not leave a surviving spouse, and was survived by his only two children, Don Spicer and Donna Meredith. Therefore, the appellant, who is Don Spicer\u2019s son and the decedent\u2019s grandson, will take nothing if the will is denied probate. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-214(1) (heritable estate passes first to the children of the intestate). Thus, the appellant\u2019s claim to the estate arises solely as a result of the will under which the trust is created and depends entirely upon the validity of the will. Without the will, the appellant gets nothing, and has no property right, interest in, or claim against the estate. Neither is he an heir, devisee, spouse, or creditor.\nIn 3 Bowe & Parker, Page On The Law of Wills, \u00a7 26.57 at 129 (Revised Treatise 1961), it is said that \u201cone who is not benefitted by having the will set aside, either as heir or next of kin, or by asserting a right to administer in case of intestacy, cannot contest the will.\u201d Citation to cases from many states are given to support that statement. One citation is to the Arkansas case of Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951). In that case the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the appellants were not interested parties under the same provision of the 1949 Probate Code that is involved in this case. There, the appellants were the brothers and sisters of the deceased who had made a will leaving one dollar to an adopted son and the remainder of his property to his wife. His brothers and sisters filed a petition to set aside the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of mental capacity on the part of the deceased and that the will was invalid because of undue influence. The trial court held that the appellants did not establish either lack of mental capacity or undue influence; therefore, it was not necessary to decide the question of whether the appellants were \u201cinterested\u201d persons eligible to contest the probate of the will.\nOn appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court did decide the question of whether the appellants were interested persons. It found that the adopted son, even though he was later adopted again by other adoptive parents, was still the adopted son of the deceased. The court said that having come to the conclusion that the son was an heir to the estate of the deceased \u201cas if he were a natural son it must naturally follow that appellants, who are the brothers and sisters of the [deceased], cannot be interested persons in the sense that they can maintain a suit to contest the validity of [the deceased\u2019s] will.\u201d 218 Ark. at 427, 236 S.W.2d at 735.\nThe above case seems to settle the issue in this case. The grandson who is attempting to contest the will in this case is in the same legal position as were the brothers and sisters of the deceased in the Hawkins case.\nIn the 1996 cumulative supplement to \u00a726.57, Page On the Law of Wills, the treatise cites the case of Hardie v. Hardie, 312 Ark. 189, 848 S.W.2d 417 (1993), for support of the same proposition. In Hardie the court said:\nThe central issue in this case is whether the remote heirs have the power to attack a court-approved settlement agreement. It should be noted that at the time the settlement agreement was executed, these remote heirs were not \u201cinterested persons\u201d entitled to contest a will under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113(a) (1987) because they would not have taken by intestate succession at that time since Mrs. Davis\u2019 two daughters were still living. See Mabry v. Mabry, 259 Ark. 622, 535 S.W.2d 824 (1976) (brothers and sisters of testator were not interested persons where testator had adopted son living); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W.2d 733 (1951) (just any collateral heir is not necessarily an \u201cinterested person\u201d with a right to contest the probate of a will under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-113 (1987)).\n312 Ark. at 196, 848 S.W.2d at 420.\nIt is also interesting to note that the very first citation in the 1996 supplement to \u00a7 26.57 of Page On the Law of Wills is to the Alabama case of Ames v. Parker, 553 So.2d. 570 (Ala. 1989). The summary describes the holding of the case as follows:\n[W]here grandchild of testatrix had only an expectancy interest under prior will and could have received nothing under that will, but had a vested interest in estate under final will, grandchild had no real, beneficial interest under prior will that could be harmed by establishment of later will, and therefore grandchild had no standing to contest later will as an \u201cinterested person\u201d.\nThere is no question in my mind about the issue in the instant case. Under the law, the grandson of the deceased grandfather is not an \u201cinterested\u201d person who can contest the will in this case. There also seems to be no logical reason to reach a contrary result. If one is allowed to dispose of property by will, why should someone who has no claim to an interest in that property if the will is set aside be allowed to contest the will? If there is a rational reason to allow this, it escapes me. And if the grandchild does not want what he is given by the will in this case, he certainly does not have to take it.\nI would affirm the trial court; therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion.\nNeal, J., joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Melvin Mayfield, Judg," } ], "attorneys": [ "Plastiras, Hyden, & Miron, for appellant.", "Green, Henry, & Green, by: J. W. Green, Jr., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Charles Gregory SPICER v. ESTATE of Charles Nelson SPICER\nCA 95-941\n935 S.W.2d 576\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc\nOpinion delivered December 18, 1996\nPlastiras, Hyden, & Miron, for appellant.\nGreen, Henry, & Green, by: J. W. Green, Jr., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0267-01", "first_page_order": 293, "last_page_order": 297 }