{
  "id": 6137883,
  "name": "Russell DANIEL v. FIRESTONE BUILDING PRODUCTS and Gallagher Bassett",
  "name_abbreviation": "Daniel v. Firestone Building Products",
  "decision_date": "1997-04-23",
  "docket_number": "CA 96-1119",
  "first_page": "123",
  "last_page": "125",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "57 Ark. App. 123"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "942 S.W.2d 277"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1996,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1996,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "(5)(D)"
        }
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      "opinion_index": 0
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:06.660800+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Rogers and Meads, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Russell DANIEL v. FIRESTONE BUILDING PRODUCTS and Gallagher Bassett"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "James R. Cooper, Judge.\nThe appellant in this workers\u2019 compensation case filed a claim after he slipped and was injured while pulling extremely heavy sheets of rubber over rollers in the course of his employment with the appellee. The Commission denied the claim because it found no evidence to satisfy the \u201cobjective findings\u201d requirement of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996). For reversal, the appellant contends that the Commission erred in concluding that the medical evidence was not based on objective findings. We agree, and we reverse.\n\u201cObjective findings\u201d are defined at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 102(16) (Repl. 1996) as follows:\n(16)(A)(i) \u201cObjective findings\u201d are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.\n(ii) When determining physical or anatomical impairment, neither a physician, any other medical provider, an administrative law judge, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, nor the courts may consider complaints of pain; for the purpose of making physical or anatomical impairment ratings to the spine, straight-leg-raising tests or range-of-motion tests shall not be considered objective findings.\n(B) Medical opinions addressing compensability and permanent impairment must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . .\nThe Commission found that the appellant was injured and had physical difficulties as he related at the hearing but concluded that the strict construction required of the new Workers\u2019 Compensation Act' mandated a finding that there was no medical evidence that satisfied the \u201cobjective findings\u201d requirement.\nThe Commission correctly noted that the legislature has mandated that our new workers\u2019 compensation law, Act 796 of 1993, must be strictly and literally construed by the Commission and the courts. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996). We think it apparent that the Commission is making every effort to comply with the legislative mandate, a difficult task that requires that a fine balance be struck between the legislature\u2019s prohibition against broadening the scope of the workers\u2019 compensation statutes and the legislature\u2019s express statement that the controlling purpose of workers\u2019 compensation is to pay benefits to all legitimately injured workers. Id. Nevertheless, we think that the Commission erred in the case at bar. In its opinion, the Commission noted that Dr. Green testified regarding the appellant\u2019s injuries, stating that:\nHe has had no surgeries. X-rays dated July 8, 1994 of the pelvis and hip were normal. These were the only x-rays.\nOn physical examination, he has 5 cm by 5 cm fibrous mass on the right iliac crest, probably from the contusion, fibrous from the fall. He has pain on flexion over this area. Range of motion of his lumbar spine was within normal limits, as well as the lower extremities. He had no loss of strength against resistance. He could heel and toe walk. He is able to squat. He had no sensory deficits. His patella and ankle reflexes were normal.\nHis diagnosis is probably sprain, but I do feel (MRI should be taken) to rule out any pathology. He should have a therapy program of stretching and isometric strengthening of his lumbar and abdominal muscles and possibly a trigger point injection. . . .\nWe hold that Dr. Green\u2019s direct observation of a \u201c5 cm by 5 cm fibrous mass\u201d constituted an objective finding pursuant to \u00a7 11-9-102(16), and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nRogers and Meads, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "James R. Cooper, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kinard, Crane & Butler, P.A., by: Steve R. Crane, for appellant.",
      "Dunn, Nutter, Morgan & Shaw, by: Nelson V. Shaw, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Russell DANIEL v. FIRESTONE BUILDING PRODUCTS and Gallagher Bassett\nCA 96-1119\n942 S.W.2d 277\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered April 23, 1997\nKinard, Crane & Butler, P.A., by: Steve R. Crane, for appellant.\nDunn, Nutter, Morgan & Shaw, by: Nelson V. Shaw, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0123-01",
  "first_page_order": 159,
  "last_page_order": 161
}