{ "id": 6139335, "name": "Teresa SPAINHOUR v. DOVER SCHOOL DISTRICT", "name_abbreviation": "Spainhour v. Dover School District", "decision_date": "1997-05-07", "docket_number": "CA 96-519", "first_page": "195", "last_page": "203", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "57 Ark. App. 195" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "943 S.W.2d 610" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "25 Ark. App. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139931 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/25/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916788 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1503", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895757 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455789 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1509", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 Ark. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1876599 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1506", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1503", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455789 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1509", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 646, "char_count": 14879, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.380125665320789e-08, "percentile": 0.39209621873707695 }, "sha256": "c13420a48d04ccc76cb3a5145ba0d9320e26dd33470a97ab1b306687bafa40ff", "simhash": "1:15c54520e99456d0", "word_count": 2365 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:06.660800+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Cooper and Bird, JJ., agree.", "Rogers, Stroud, and Meads, JJ., dissent.", "Rogers and Stroud, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Teresa SPAINHOUR v. DOVER SCHOOL DISTRICT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nThis appeal is from a judgment of the Pope County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice appellant Teresa Spainhour\u2019s appeal from a decision of the Dover School Board not to renew Spainhour\u2019s teaching contract for the 1994-1995 school year. Spainhour argues that the board\u2019s decision failed to comply with either the notice requirements of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act (Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1501, et seq. (Repl. 1993)) or the school district\u2019s reduction- in-force policy.\nThe facts are not in serious dispute. In March of 1988, appellant began working for appellee, the Dover School District, as a migrant clerk and a Chapter One aide. Appellant was certified to teach grades one through six. She became a full-time teacher in the fall of 1988 and worked as a Chapter One High School Teacher and as the coordinator for the Coordinated Compensatory Vocational Educational Program (CCVE). Both programs were partially funded on a yearly basis with federal monies.\nIn April of 1994, appellant received a letter from Dr. Richard Paul, appellee\u2019s superintendent, advising her that he would recommend to the board at its next meeting that her teaching contract for the 1994-1995 year not be renewed. This letter was the last of five letters that began in June of 1993 advising appellant of possible cuts in federal funds that could eliminate her program.\nOn May 9, 1994, the school board held a regular meeting and adopted the superintendent\u2019s recommendation to eliminate the Chapter One program. Appellant was not present at this meeting. As a result of the board\u2019s decision to terminate the Chapter One program due to cuts in federal funding, appellant\u2019s position was eliminated, and her contract was not renewed.\nOn May 12, 1994, appellant, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1509, requested a hearing before the board. The board scheduled a hearing for May 18, 1994. Appellant and her representative appeared and presented evidence concerning the elimination of the Chapter One program and the application of the reduction-in-force policy. At the beginning of the hearing, appellant\u2019s counsel polled the board members to determine whether they would be open to the information that would be presented and whether they could be fair and impartial without any preconceived ideas concerning the elimination of the Chapter One program. The board members stated that the purpose of the hearing was to reconsider their previous decision, that they unanimously agreed to be open to the information presented, and that they would be fair and impartial without preconceived ideas concerning the elimination of the Chapter One program. Thereafter, Dr. Paul testified regarding the financial condition of the school district and the basis for his earlier recommendation. Appellant then presented evidence concerning the performance of the Chapter One program and information about her funding source. She also testified regarding her interpretation of the reduction-in-force policy and its provision regarding seniority. After the superintendent\u2019s rebuttal and closing arguments, the board retired into executive session and deliberated for fifty-five minutes before returning to open session and voting not to renew appellant\u2019s contract.\nSpainhour appealed the board\u2019s decision to the circuit court claiming that the nonrenewal of her contract was in violation of the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act and the district\u2019s personnel policies. Testimony was taken from various witnesses regarding the financial condition of the district, and the application of the staff reduction-in-force policy. After reviewing the board\u2019s May 18 proceedings and all of the testimony and exhibits introduced at trial, the court found that the action of the Dover Public School District in not renewing appellant\u2019s teaching contract was not in violation of the Arkansas Teacher Fair Dismissal Act. We find no error and affirm.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 6-17-1509(a) and (b) provide in part that a teacher who receives a notice of recommended termination or nonrenewal may file a written request with the board of directors of the district for a hearing within thirty days after the written notice of proposed termination or nonrenewal is received by the teacher.\nAppellant first argues that notwithstanding the school board\u2019s statement that it would reconsider its May 9 decision without any preconceived ideas, this case should be reversed because the board violated the Arkansas Fair Teacher Dismissal Act when it did not renew the contract of appellant on May 9 prior to providing proper notice and an opportunity to be heard as required by law.\nAppellant correctly argues that since 1989 the General Assembly has required strict compliance with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 6-17-1503 reads as follows:\nA nonrenewal, termination, suspension, or other disciplinary action by a school district shall be void unless the school district stricdy complies with all provisions of this subchapter and the school district\u2019s applicable personnel policies.\nFailure to strictly comply with the Act renders action by the school district void. Lester v. Mount Vernon-Enola School District, 323 Ark. 728, 917 S.W.2d 540 (1996); Western Grove School District v. Terry, 318 Ark. 316, 885 S.W.2d 300 (1994).\nIn Murray v. Altheimer-Sherrill Public Schools, 294 Ark. 403, 743 S.W.2d 789 (1988), the board rescinded its vote made in an earlier hearing regarding whether Murray\u2019s teaching contract should be renewed for the reasons stated in the superintendent\u2019s recommendation. The board president opened the meeting with an admonition that that was the only issue before the board and that only information pertinent to that issue would be allowed. The board president cautioned the board: \u201c[You] should not vote based on any preconceived notions, indeed, if you have any, but should make your decision solely on what has been brought before you and will be brought before you during this hearing.\u201d 294 Ark. at 408, 743 S.W.2d at 791. At the conclusion of the hearing, the board again voted not to renew Murray\u2019s teaching contract. The circuit court upheld that decision. The supreme court held that this cautionary instruction, coupled with the board\u2019s formal rescission of its original vote, cured any error resulting from the earlier hearing and stated that \u201cwe presume that the board members are fair-minded and resolve matters presented to them on an impartial basis.\u201d It held that the trial court\u2019s conclusions that the board substantially complied with the notice and hearing provisions of the Act were not clearly erroneous.\nAlthough Murray was decided when the law required only \u201csubstantial\u201d compliance with the Act, we find it controlling and dispositive in the case before us. We find that the board\u2019s May 18 hearing afforded appellant all of her rights under the Act and that the actions of the board strictly complied with the Act.\nAppellant\u2019s final argument concerns the school district\u2019s failure to adhere to and strictly comply with the applicable provisions of its reduction-in-force policy as required by law. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1503. The staff reduction-in-force policy states in part: \u201cWhen it is necessary to reduce the number of permanent employees, consideration will be given to the following factors: (1) Performance, (2) Ability and Skill, and (3) Seniority. ...\u201d Seniority is defined in the policy as \u201cthat period of time an employee has worked for the Dover School District.\u201d The policy further states:\nShould two or more employees have equal ability, skill, and performance, seniority shall govern which employee shall be retained. Should there be a difference in performance, ability, and skill between two or more employees sufficiently great in the judgment of the supervisor to outweigh seniority, performance, ability and skill shall govern.\nIn the Spring of 1994, the district\u2019s funds available for the Chapter One programs were reduced. Dr. Paul testified that the reduction in funding required that he request that the principals evaluate the high school and elementary Chapter One programs and to report their findings to him. After receiving their reports, it was determined that the most significant gains were in the elementary level. Based on the reports, Dr. Paul testified that he made a decision to recommend to the board at its regular meeting on May 9, 1994, that the high school Chapter One program be eliminated. Appellant interprets the reduction-in-force policy to mean that because she held a teaching certificate for the elementary level and had been employed longer than three of the elementary teachers, she should have been retained on the basis of seniority without regard to the position held by those three teachers. Dr. Paul testified that appellant\u2019s six years of experience in the district was at the high school level. He stated that in his opinion, when a comparison was made with those elementary teachers over whom appellant held seniority, the elementary teachers possessed more skills and ability than appellant and that although appellant\u2019s experience at the high school level had been acceptable, it did not follow that she could successfully transfer those skills to the elementary level where she had never taught during the normal school year. Dr. Paul testified that at the high school level, appellant taught in a one- on-one computer-generated laboratory focusing on areas of individual needs. He stated that this was totally different from an elementary teacher who was responsible for establishing reading groups, diagnosing reading skills, teaching math, science, social studies, health, and art, and dealing with the daily demands that would occur with twenty-five students. Appellant presented no evidence of the abilities and skills of the three teachers with whom she sought comparison.\nThe determination not to renew a teacher\u2019s contract is a matter within the school board\u2019s discretion, and the circuit court cannot substitute its opinion for that of the board in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Murray v. Altheimer-Sherrill Public Schools, supra. It is not the appellate court\u2019s function to substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court or the school board; the appellate court will reverse only if it finds on review of the trial court\u2019s decision that the court\u2019s findings are clearly erroneous. Id.\nA trial court\u2019s findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Tovey v. City of Jacksonville, 305 Ark. 401, 808 S.W.2d 740 (1991). Here the testimony was conflicting, and we cannot determine that the circuit court erred in its determination that the school board did not violate the Teacher Pair Dismissal Act or misapply the personnel policy. Whitfield v. Little Rock Public Schools, 25 Ark. App. 207, 756 S.W.2d 125 (1988).\nAffirmed.\nCooper and Bird, JJ., agree.\nRogers, Stroud, and Meads, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge." }, { "text": "Margaret Meads, Judge,\ndissenting. I disagree with the prevailing opinion in this case because I believe it completely disregards the strict compliance requirement of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act as well as precedent established by our supreme court in Western Grove School District v. Terry, 318 Ark. 316, 885 S.W.2d 300 (1994).\nUnder present law, the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act requires notice of recommended nonrenewal to a teacher, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1506 (Repl. 1996), and authorizes a teacher so notified to request in writing a hearing before the school board on the nonre-newal, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1509(a) (Repl. 1996). The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that notice and a hearing must be afforded to the teacher before the board\u2019s decision on nonre-newal, Green Forest Public School v. Herrington, 287 Ark. 43, 696 S.W.2d 714 (1985). The question in Green Forest was whether the board substantially complied with the notice requirement by conducting a hearing on a teacher\u2019s nonrenewal after the board had met and decided against renewing his contract, and the court held it did not.\nAfter the decision in Green Forest, the General Assembly amended the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act with Act 625 of 1989, which provides:\nA nonrenewal, termination, suspension, or other disciplinary action by a school district shall be void unless the school district stricdy complies with all provisions of this subchapter and the school district\u2019s applicable personnel policies.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-17-1503 (Repl. 1996). Thus, under current law, a teacher must be notified of a nonrenewal recommendation prior to board action and, absent strict compliance, a school district\u2019s action to nonrenew shall be void.\nIn this case, the Dover School Superintendent sent a letter dated April 12, 1994, to appellant notifying her that he would recommend to the school board, at its regular meeting on May 9, 1994, that her contract not be renewed for the 1994-95 school year. The school board met on May 9 and voted in favor of the Superintendent\u2019s recommendation to eliminate both the high school Chapter One program which appellant taught, and appellant\u2019s position. By letter dated May 12, 1994, appellant requested a hearing before the school board, unaware of the board\u2019s May 9 action. She was granted a hearing on May 18. At the conclusion of the May 18 hearing, the board again voted not to renew appellant\u2019s contract.\nThe prevailing members of this court believe that by polling the board members at the beginning of the May 18 hearing and verifying that they could be fair and impartial, before listening to appellant, her counsel, and her evidence, strict compliance has been achieved. I disagree. I believe that the board\u2019s impartiality was tainted by its original decision-making process when it met again on May 18, heard the Superintendent\u2019s recommendation and reasoning, and acted thereon. I agree completely with the supreme court\u2019s logic in Western Grove School District v. Terry, 318 Ark. 316, 322, 885 S.W.2d 300, 302 (1994): \u201cAfter a board has made its decision, the teacher is confronted with the much more daunting task of reversing formed opinions and formal action by the board members. The prejudice to the teacher under such circumstances is obvious and real.\u201d\nBecause the Dover School District failed to stricdy comply with the notice provision of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, its action to nonrenew appellant\u2019s contract should have been held void and her contract reinstated. I would reverse and remand this case.\nI respectfully dissent.\nRogers and Stroud, JJ., agree.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Margaret Meads, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Raochell Law Firm, by: Travis N. Creed, for appellant.", "David H. McCormick, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Teresa SPAINHOUR v. DOVER SCHOOL DISTRICT\nCA 96-519\n943 S.W.2d 610\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions III & IV\nOpinion delivered May 7, 1997\nRaochell Law Firm, by: Travis N. Creed, for appellant.\nDavid H. McCormick, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0195-01", "first_page_order": 231, "last_page_order": 239 }