{
  "id": 6140936,
  "name": "Dave Allen COX v. CFSI TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cox v. CFSI Temporary Employment",
  "decision_date": "1997-05-28",
  "docket_number": "CA 96-959",
  "first_page": "310",
  "last_page": "313",
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      "cite": "57 Ark. App. 310"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
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          "page": "(5)(D)"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:06.660800+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Pittman and Meads, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Dave Allen COX v. CFSI TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Judith Rogers, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s order affirming and adopting the administrative law judge\u2019s decision. The ALJ found that appellant failed to establish that he had sustained a compensable injury supported by objective findings as required by Ark. Code Ann..\u00a7 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996). On appeal, appellant argues that the Commission erred in not considering deficits in range of motion and mobility as \u201cobjective findings.\u201d Also, appellant contends, in the alternative, that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision. We affirm the Commission\u2019s decision.\nThe record reveals that appellant worked for appellee for one month lifting table tops which weighed between twenty-five and forty pounds. On January 4, 1995, between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., appellant\u2019s back began to hurt. He saw Dr. Michael W. Cal-laway who diagnosed lumbar strain. Appellant visited doctors from January 1995, through August 1995. Appellant\u2019s overall diagnosis was lumbar strain with no positive, objective tests results. The only sign of appellant\u2019s back strain was the assessment that appellant was unable to bend over more than ninety degrees. There were signs of disc bulges, but the disc problems were said to be unrelated to appellant\u2019s work activity or his back strain.\nOn appeal, appellant argues that the Commission erred in not considering his inability to bend more than ninety degrees as an \u201cobjective finding.\u201d Appellant admits that a range of motion test is not to be considered an \u201cobjective finding\u201d when determining impairment ratings as set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9-102(16)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996). However, appellant reasons that a range of motion test should be considered an \u201cobjective finding\u201d when determining compensability. We disagree.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 ll-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(b) (Repl. 1996) provides:\n(5) (A) \u2018Compensable injury\u2019 means:\n(ii) An injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body and arising out of and in the course of employment if it is not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence, if the injury is:\n(b) A back injury which is not caused by a specific incident or which is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-102(5)(D) provides that a com-pensable injury \u201cmust be established by medical evidence, supported by \u2018objective findings\u2019 as defined in \u00a7 11-9-102(16).\u201d \u201cObjective findings\u201d are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 102(16)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996).\nConstruing the Act strictly, it is apparent that appellant\u2019s inability to bend more than ninety degrees is not an \u201cobjective finding\u201d within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(16)(A)(i). Appellant\u2019s limitation could clearly have come under his voluntary responses, his manipulation, and control. See Duke v. Regis Hairstylists, 55 Ark. App. 327, 935 S.W.2d 600 (1996). The Commission, in determining the compensability of appellant\u2019s claim, proceeded under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(16)(A)(i), which was a correct application of the law. Consequently, we cannot say that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that appellant\u2019s lack of range of motion was not an \u201cobjective finding.\u201d\nAppellant also argues that even if appellant\u2019s inability to bend ninety degrees is found not to be objective, there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s denial of benefits. We disagree.\nA compensable injury must be established by \u201cmedical evidence supported by \u2018objective findings\u2019 as defined in \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 102(16).\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(5)(D) (Repl. 1996). The record reveals that the only positive finding associated with appellant\u2019s injury was his inability to bend over ninety degrees. As we discussed above, this is not an \u201cobjective finding.\u201d The record does not indicate any other objective tests which rendered a positive result indicating that appellant had sustained a compensable injury.\nSubstantial evidence is that evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Crawford v. Pace, 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996). A decision by the Commission should not be reversed unless it is clear that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusions if presented with the same facts. Id. Based on the record and the evidence before us, we cannot say that there is no substantial basis to support the Commission\u2019s denial of benefits.\nAffirmed.\nPittman and Meads, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Judith Rogers, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield P.L.L.C, by: Eldon F. Coffman, for appellant.",
      "Shaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: James. A. Arnold, II, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Dave Allen COX v. CFSI TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT\nCA 96-959\n944 S.W.2d 856\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered May 28, 1997\nDaily, West, Core, Coffman & Canfield P.L.L.C, by: Eldon F. Coffman, for appellant.\nShaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: James. A. Arnold, II, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0310-01",
  "first_page_order": 346,
  "last_page_order": 349
}