{ "id": 6137667, "name": "Jill Looney GREEN v. Diann Looney McAULEY", "name_abbreviation": "Green v. McAuley", "decision_date": "1997-10-22", "docket_number": "CA 97-83", "first_page": "114", "last_page": "120", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 Ark. App. 114" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "953 S.W.2d 66" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-48-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-48-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Ark. 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725396 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "173-74", "parenthetical": "releases which discharged all claims of heirs except their interest in real estate prevent their subsequent claim to certain common stock, even though the releases do not specifically mention the stock" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/256/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ark. 852", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1467046 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/213/0852-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ark. App. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137673 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/50/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. App. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137020 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/44/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Ark. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1681309 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/236/0676-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 534, "char_count": 10668, "ocr_confidence": 0.707, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1146904769136531e-07, "percentile": 0.5718406748810452 }, "sha256": "6544142485697db4ba686397a61306e26bd9120f9ba0f2201dbbbad56fc9c6ab", "simhash": "1:433ee5346327d827", "word_count": 1642 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:20.779016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jennings and Griffen, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jill Looney GREEN v. Diann Looney McAULEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "D. Franklin Arey, III, Judge.\nAppellant, Jill Looney Green, appeals from an order entered by the Crittenden County Probate Court that appoints appellee, Diann- Looney McAuley, successor co-executrix of their father\u2019s estate. Appellant argues that appellee\u2019s appointment is barred by a family settlement agreement; appellant also claims the probate court erred by limiting the hearing below to one hour. We reverse and dismiss the appellee\u2019s Petition for Appointment of Executrix, because it is barred by the family settlement agreement. This holding makes it unnecessary to address appellant\u2019s second point.\nJoe E. Looney, Sr., died testate; his widow and five children survived him. Besides appellant and appellee, these children were Joe E. Looney, Jr., Debbie Looney Wintersteen, and David Looney. The decedent\u2019s will nominated Joe, Jr., and Debbie to serve as co-executors. It further provided that if either co-executor discontinued his or her service, then the next-oldest child would be nominated to serve as successor co-executor.\nInitially, Joe, Jr., and Debbie both accepted appointment as co-executors. Debbie later resigned. Appellee, claiming to be the oldest child, petitioned to be appointed co-executrix pursuant to the terms of the will; her petition was filed on January 11, 1994. Shortly thereafter, appellee filed a supplement to her petition, praying for the removal of Joe, Jr.; she alleged that he labored under \u201cnumerous conflicts of interest.\u201d Joe, Jr., David, and the decedent\u2019s widow objected to this supplement; further, the widow objected to appellee\u2019s appointment as successor co-executrix. The record does not disclose a ruling on this petition.\nIn February of 1995, the decedent\u2019s five children signed a document entitled \u201cMutual Release and Settlement Agreement.\u201d Relevant provisions of this agreement are set forth in the margin. The agreement notes that \u201ccertain matters are in dispute between the parties\u201d; these disputes concern \u201cdisposition of assets of the Estate and other matters pertaining to the Estate. . . .\u201d For the consideration recited, appellee discharged and released the estate \u201cfrom any and all claims, demands, [and] actions,. . . of any kind or every nature whatever, whether known or unknown,. . . relating to the Estate, except as set forth herein.\u201d Paragraph six of the agreement excepted certain real estate from the agreement. The agreement does not contain a specific reservation of appellee\u2019s right to seek appointment as co-executrix.\nAppellee filed a petition in May of 1996, again seeking appointment as successor co-executrix of the estate. At the hearing on appellee\u2019s petition, appellant\u2019s counsel argued that the terms of the agreement barred appellee from pursuing her petition. Appellee testified that she signed the agreement; the agreement was admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the testimony, the probate judge appointed appellee successor co-executrix. He specifically ruled that the agreement did not disqualify appellee from appointment.\nOn appeal, appellant argues that the probate court erred by not recognizing that the agreement barred appellee from serving as executrix. Appellant contends that appellee\u2019s petition constitutes a claim against the estate that appellee surrendered for valuable consideration. Appellant further notes that appellee did reserve the right to certain assets of the estate, but otherwise released her claims fully, finally, and completely.\nThe agreement entered into by the decedent\u2019s children in February of 1995 constitutes a family settlement agreement. The agreement notes ongoing disputes, which the parties intended to settle and resolve; these disputes concerned disposition of the estate\u2019s assets and \u201cother matters. . . The parties\u2019 motive to amicably settle the estate constitutes sufficient consideration for a family settlement agreement. See Harris v. Harris, 236 Ark. 676, 370 S.W.2d 121 (1963); Jones v. Balentine, 44 Ark. App. 62, 866 S.W.2d 829 (1993). Execution of the agreement by appellant, appellee, and their siblings indicates their mutual intent to enter into a binding agreement. See Thurman v. Thurman, 50 Ark. App. 93, 900 S.W.2d 221 (1995).\nFamily settlement agreements are favorites of the law. Thurman, 50 Ark. App. at 97, 900 S.W.2d at 224. A common refrain of our supreme court\u2019s decisions concerning family settlement agreements is that they are favored and should be encouraged where no fraud or imposition is practiced. Pfaff v. Clements, 213 Ark. 852, 213 S.W.2d 356 (1948); see Harris, 236 Ark. at 685, 370 S.W.2d at 127.\nWe construe a family settlement agreement by seeking the real intent of the parties as revealed in the agreement. See Gannaway v. Godwin, 256 Ark. 834, 511 S.W.2d 171 (1974); cf. 96 C.J.S. Wills \u00a7 1113 (1957) (as to compromise agreements between beneficiaries, \u201c[i]f there is no ambiguity apparent in the terms of the contract, its meaning must be determined from the words used, and from no other source.\u2019\u2019(footnote omitted)). In the absence of fraud or mistake, we must adhere strictly to the terms of the family settlement agreement. Gannaway, 256 Ark. at 838, 511 S.W.2d at 174.\nA review of the agreement\u2019s preamble reveals the parties\u2019 intent to bar the appellee\u2019s petition. Appellee\u2019s first petition to be appointed successor co-executrix predated the execution of the agreement; this first petition was contested. The agreement makes reference to certain disputes concerning asset disposition \u201cand other matters pertaining to the Estate. ...\u201d The parties noted their intent to settle and resolve these disputes without further legal proceedings.\nThe substantive language of the agreement also evidences an intent to bar this petition. The will\u2019s provision allowing for the appointment of the next-oldest child as a successor co-executor gave appellee a preference in appointment. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-48-101 (a)(1)(1987). Upon Debbie\u2019s resignation, appellee had the right to request appointment as a successor co-executrix, by motion or petition. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-48-107(a). However, in paragraph number one, appellee discharges and releases the estate \u201cof and from any and all claims, demands, [and] actions. . . of any kind or every nature whatever,. . . relating to the Estate, except as set forth herein.\u201d The type of claim, demand, or action discharged is not limited to property claims; as long as the petition relates to the estate, it is barred. There is no specific reservation of appellee\u2019s right to seek appointment as successor co-executrix. Thus, appellee discharged and released the estate from her right to seek appointment that she otherwise had pursuant to our probate code and the terms of the will.\nAppellee argues that the agreement\u2019s reservation of her interest in certain real estate suffices to allow her pursuit of this claim. The agreement cannot be read in this fashion. It releases and discharges the estate from all claims, demands, and actions, \u201cexcept as set forth\u201d therein. There is no specific reservation of the ability to seek appointment as successor co-executrix; without this specific reservation, the agreement releases and discharges the claim. Cf. Gannaway, 256 Ark. at 838, 511 S.W.2d at 173-74 (releases which discharged all claims of heirs except their interest in real estate prevent their subsequent claim to certain common stock, even though the releases do not specifically mention the stock).\nBecause appellee\u2019s petition for appointment is barred by the family settlement agreement, we reverse the probate court\u2019s decision to appoint appellee successor co-executrix, and dismiss appellee\u2019s petition. Appellant\u2019s remaining point is moot in light of this disposition, so it will not be addressed.\nReversed and dismissed.\nJennings and Griffen, JJ., agree.\nWHEREAS, certain matters are in dispute between the parties hereto, which disputed matters the parties desire and intend to settle and resolve without admission of fault nor liability by either of them;\nWHEREAS, disputes arose between the parties hereto concerning disposition of assets of the Estate and other matters pertaining to the Estate;\nWHEREAS, the Estate and Mrs. McAuley mutually desire now to resolve their differences as to this matter without further legal proceedings, and without any admission of fault or liability by either of them;\n1. Release of Estate by Mrs. McAuley. For and in consideration of the promises and considerations set forth herein, and the release contained herein, and other good and valuable considerations, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Mrs. McAuley on behalf of herself, her attorneys, administrators, beneficiaries, wards, heirs, executors, assigns, business entities, successors, trustees, affiliates, subsidiaries and any and all related entities, does hereby fully, finally and forever discharge and release the Estate and its Executor, their present and former officers, directors, related companies, agents, attorneys, business entities, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, parent corporations, employees and assign, of and from any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, charges and/or expenses of any kind or every nature whatever, whether known or unknown, contingent or matured, relating to the Estate, except as set forth herein. Mrs. McAuley agrees to accept the considerations and promises set forth herein in place and stead of any assets which she might otherwise receive from the Estate, both in her own right and as Trustee for her minor children, and disclaims all interest in and to such assets and the Estate, except as otherwise provided herein. Mrs. McAuley agrees to dismiss and/ or withdraw and/or waive her objections to various actions for which the Estate has sought approval in the Probate Court of Crittenden County and to the Executor\u2019s First Annual Accounting.\n6. Estate Lands. It is expressly agreed and understood by the parties hereto that this Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement does not apply to any land or real estate in which the Estate owns or claims an interest, other than the cabin at Greer\u2019s Ferry Lake and tenant houses and other than pursuant to the Contact [sic], and, specifically, that Mrs. McAuley does not release her right as Trustee for her minor children to share in the distribution of real estate or the proceeds of real estate. ....", "type": "majority", "author": "D. Franklin Arey, III, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sloan, Rubens & Peeples, by: Kent J. Rubens and Cristina M. Flechas, for appellant.", "Rees Law Firm, by: Tom Young, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jill Looney GREEN v. Diann Looney McAULEY\nCA 97-83\n953 S.W.2d 66\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered October 22, 1997\nSloan, Rubens & Peeples, by: Kent J. Rubens and Cristina M. Flechas, for appellant.\nRees Law Firm, by: Tom Young, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0114-01", "first_page_order": 142, "last_page_order": 148 }