{ "id": 6140749, "name": "AMLEASE, INC. v. Ronald KULIGOWSKI", "name_abbreviation": "Amlease, Inc. v. Kuligowski", "decision_date": "1997-12-17", "docket_number": "CA 97-495", "first_page": "261", "last_page": "266", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "59 Ark. App. 261" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "957 S.W.2d 715" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "54 Ark. App. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141915 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/54/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ark. L. Rev. 1", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Ark. L. Rev.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "16-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-113", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236184 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-704", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935117 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "720" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922652 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0407-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 547, "char_count": 8988, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.021147979749158e-08, "percentile": 0.46474929619448857 }, "sha256": "ecbfb30ead1b72e679eeba800ad9ce502c1db7edf8e830745a715bb8421f2a52", "simhash": "1:e0c7a5978919164e", "word_count": 1459 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:20.779016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jennings, J. agrees.", "Crabtree, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "AMLEASE, INC. v. Ronald KULIGOWSKI" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Bird, Judge.\nAmlease, Inc., appeals a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission awarding the appellee, Ronald Kuligowski, benefits for treatment of his post-traumatic stress disorder.\nOn August 3, 1995, the claimant, a truck driver, was involved in an accident in which the brakes on the truck he was driving locked, he skidded into oncoming traffic, and was hit broadside in the passenger-side door by a van. The driver of the van was killed, and a teenager in the van was seriously injured. Appellant had several physical injuries, and he also experienced depression, diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder. The appellant controverted liability for the treatment related to post-traumatic stress disorder.\nDr. Galen Hutcheson testified that appellee sustained cervical strain and post-traumatic stress disorder related to \u201can affiliation of all the things that happened during the accident,\u201d and that \u201cthe death of the individual just made it more significant.\u201d He treated appellee physically and with medication for his depression, and he referred appellee to Dr. James A. Chaney, a psychologist, for counseling. Dr. Hutcheson said appellee was physically released to resume light duties on September 13, 1995. Dr. Chaney released appellee from his care on November 2, 1995.\nAppellee has had a tragic family history: a brother was killed while riding an all-terrain vehicle; a house burned while appellee was moving in; appellee\u2019s grandfather ran over and killed his mother\u2019s two-year-old son; appellee\u2019s trailer burned; a truck fell on appellee\u2019s grandfather and killed him when appellee was eleven; appellee\u2019s aunt died in a head-on collision; appellee\u2019s uncle was a prisoner of war in Vietnam; and another brother was hit and dragged by a car.\nDr. Chaney testified that the previous events probably contributed to appellee\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder after his August 3, 1995, accident. Dr. Chaney said, \u201cI think it made him more likely to have that.\u201d He said it was his opinion that appellee\u2019s post-traumatic stress disorder was caused by the sudden, unexpected, and unusual death of the other person in the traffic accident. He also said that while he was treating appellee, appellee was totally disabled from returning to work.\nOn this evidence the administrative law judge held that the appellee was entitled to payment for all medical expenses, including the treatment by Dr. Chaney, and temporary total disability benefits commencing with his last day of work through November 2, 1995. The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the law judge.\nAppellant argues that the Commission\u2019s finding that appellee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that his post-traumatic stress disorder was causally related to his compensable injury of August 3, 1995, is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. We agree, and therefore reverse.\nArkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-113 (Repl. 1996), provides in pertinent part:\n(a)(1) A mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless it is caused by physical injury to the employee\u2019s body, and shall not be considered an injury arising out of and in the course of employment or compensable unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence [.]\nThis language was the result of a complete legislative revision of our workers\u2019 compensation law in Act 796 of 1993. This language has not yet been reviewed by this court. Therefore, we must determine the meaning of the phrase \u201ccaused by\u201d as it relates to compensable psychological injury. Although we are construing an act of the General Assembly, our jurisdiction is proper under Rule l-2(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 407, 939 S.W.2d 280 (1997); Bill Fitts Auto Sales, Inc. v. Daniels, 325 Ark. 51, 55, 922 S.W.2d 718, 720 (1996). The basic rule of statutory construction to which all other interpretive guides defer is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Vanderpool, supra; Bill Fitts Auto Sales, supra.\nWhere the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the legislative intent is determined from the ordinary meaning of the language used. American Casualty Co. v. Mason, 312 Ark. 166, 848 S.W.2d 392 (1993). We also note that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-704 (Repl. 1996) requires administrative law judges, the Commission, and any reviewing courts to construe the provisions of the Act strictly.\nWebster\u2019s College Dictionary 216 (1996) defines \u201ccause\u201d as \u201cbring about,\u201d or \u201creason.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 220 (6th ed. 1990) has several definitions, among them are: \u201cTo be the cause or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; something that precedes and brings about an effect or a result; a reason for an action or condition.\u201d\nIn The Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 329 Ark. 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997), the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-113(a)(1) (Repl. 1996), provides that a mental injury or illness is not a compensable injury unless it is caused by physical injury to the employee\u2019s body. Clearly, these statutes set out a requirement that a physical injury precede and cause the mental injury in order for the mental injury to be com-pensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. See generally John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum Swing Too Far?, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 16-19 (1994).\nAlthough this statement was dictum, we find it enlightening, and we agree that this is what the plain language of the statute mandates.\nAppellant contends that appellee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his post-traumatic stress disorder was caused by the physical injuries he sustained in the compensable vehicle accident. In fact, the evidence is clear that appellee\u2019s psychological distress was not caused by his physical injuries.\nAppellant cites Dugan v. Jerry Sweetser, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996), but that case did not require us to determine the precise issue presented here. The issue on appeal in Dugan was whether or not the appellant had sustained the requisite \u201cphysical injury\u201d so that his psychological injury was compensa-ble. We did say in that opinion that Act 796 clearly provides that proof of a physical injury is now required before a psychological injury can be compensable in Arkansas.\nIn the instant case, the testimony of Dr. Chaney and appel-lee\u2019s own testimony indicate that appellee\u2019s mental anguish was not the result of his physical injuries, but rather, was the result of the death of the man driving the van. When Dr. Chaney was asked if the \u201cdeath of the deceased in the other vehicle\u201d caused the appellee to suffer the post-traumatic stress disorder, he replied, \u201cI believe so.\u201d Dr. Chaney also said, \u201cI believe the trauma was that the person died.\u201d Appellee admitted that \u201cpart of\u201d him felt responsible for the man\u2019s death. He said, \u201cAnother man was killed, and a teenager, . . . was hurt and may have messed up a soccer career, and I don\u2019t feel good about that, just because I was involved in it.\u201d He was asked, \u201cIs it the death of the occupant of the vehicle and the teenager\u2019s injuries that, in your opinion, caused you to be depressed to the degree that you were?\u201d Appel-lee answered, \u201cI guess.\u201d\nInterpreting the statute as we have, that the mental distress must be the result of the claimant\u2019s own physical injuries, we must reverse the decision of the Commission.\nReversed.\nJennings, J. agrees.\nCrabtree, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Bird, Judge." }, { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge,\nconcurring. I concur in the result reached in this case but write separately to note that Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 11-9-113 (Repl. 1996) makes a distinction between victims of criminal offenses and victims in cases such as this where appellant apparently suffered emotional problems after being involved in a traffic accident that resulted in the death of another driver. The purpose of the most recent Workers\u2019 Compensation Act has been recited many times, and I need not recite it again. However, I cannot see the distinction between this case and another case where the employee has suffered post-traumatic-stress disorder as a result of being the victim of a criminal offense. It is difficult to identify a rational basis for the distinction between the two groups if both suffer a verifiable injury with resulting trauma, but because the distinction does exist and was not challenged below, I concur with the majority opinion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Christopher Gom-licker, for appellants.", "Bartels Law Firm, by: Anthony W. Bartels, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMLEASE, INC. v. Ronald KULIGOWSKI\nCA 97-495\n957 S.W.2d 715\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered December 17, 1997\n[Petition for rehearing denied January 14, 1998.]\nBarber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Christopher Gom-licker, for appellants.\nBartels Law Firm, by: Anthony W. Bartels, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0261-01", "first_page_order": 289, "last_page_order": 294 }