{
  "id": 6139463,
  "name": "Ruby COOSENBERRY v. McCROSKEY SHEET METAL and TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CARRIER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Coosenberry v. McCroskey Sheet Metal",
  "decision_date": "1982-09-29",
  "docket_number": "CA 82-165",
  "first_page": "177",
  "last_page": "179",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "6 Ark. App. 177"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "639 S.W.2d 518"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "6 Ark. App. 92",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6138011
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1982,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark-app/6/0092-01"
      ]
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:52:26.378972+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ruby COOSENBERRY v. McCROSKEY SHEET METAL and TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CARRIER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Judge.\nThis case is another in a series of Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission decisions concerning our rehabilitation law, Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1310 (\u00a3) (Supp. 1981). Here, the appellant appeals the Commission\u2019s decision denying her entitlement to a rehabilitation evaluation.\nOn February 6,1980, appellant sustained a compensable injury. Her healing period ended on March 11,1981, leaving her with a 10% physical impairment to the body as a whole. In May, 1981, appellant\u2019s employer asked her to return to work, offering her a higher paying job that was tailored to her physical limitations. She declined the new job and instead requested an evaluation for rehabilitation purposes.\nThe Commission found that the medical and other evidence submitted by the appellant had failed to prove that her injury and resulting impairment prevented her from returning to her previous job, to the new job offered by her employer, or to other employment similar to her prior job.\nThe thrust of appellant\u2019s argument is that since she sustained a permanent disability and duly filed her request for rehabilitation, the Commission was compelled to order a rehabilitation evaluation. We cannot agree. Such an interpretation of our rehabilitation law would mean that the Commission has no discretion to determine whether a claimant is a bona fide candidate for rehabilitation. Obviously, there are employees who have sustained permanent-partial disabilities yet are not viable candidates for rehabilitation. When these situations arise, the Commission is not automatically required to order an evaluation at the employer\u2019s expense merely because the employee requests it.\nAlthough \u00a7 81-1310 (f) does not specifically mention evaluation reports, it does provide for the Commission to determine if a proposed program of vocational rehabilitation is reasonable in relation to the disability sustained by the employee. The statute also alludes to a period of time during which the parties may explore rehabilitation potential. The Commission\u2019s role, as defined in \u00a7 81-1310 (f), requires the exercise of its discretion when approving or disapproving a rehabilitation program. Before doing so, the Commission must first decide if the claimant is a candidate for rehabilitation.\nThis case is distinguishable from our recent case of Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982). In Moro, the claimant requested a rehabilitation evaluation. At the time of the initial request, no evidence was presented to substantiate that he was a candidate for rehabilitation. Later, the claimant did establish he was a candidate, but the employer continued to categorically deny claimant\u2019s need for rehabilitation. Therefore, we upheld the Commission\u2019s finding that the employer had controverted all rehabilitation benefits.\nAs was true in Moro, an employer risks the controversion of all rehabilitation benefits when the evidence substantiates the need for a rehabilitation evaluation, but the employer assumes an inflexible position against it. Here, appellant never established that she was a candidate for rehabilitation. In fact, she had been psychologically and medically released to return to work, but she refused to work under any conditions. The evidence shows that if she had returned to work, she would have received a 20% increase in wages. Therefore, we find there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding that appellant failed to show entitlement to a vocational rehabilitation evaluation.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cortinezfc-Lamb, by: Robert R. Cortinez, for appellant.",
      "Hall, Tucker hr Lovell, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ruby COOSENBERRY v. McCROSKEY SHEET METAL and TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE CARRIER\nCA 82-165\n639 S.W.2d 518\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 29, 1982\n[Rehearing denied October 27, 1982.]\nCortinezfc-Lamb, by: Robert R. Cortinez, for appellant.\nHall, Tucker hr Lovell, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0177-01",
  "first_page_order": 205,
  "last_page_order": 207
}