{
  "id": 6139174,
  "name": "Eva Gail HALTER v. Dennis P. HALTER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Halter v. Halter",
  "decision_date": "1998-01-28",
  "docket_number": "CA 97-120",
  "first_page": "189",
  "last_page": "193",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "60 Ark. App. 189"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
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      "reporter": "S.W.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "314 Ark. 644",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "year": 1993,
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    {
      "cite": "53 Ark. App. 41",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
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        6136826
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:03:53.777728+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Bird and Crabtree, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Eva Gail HALTER v. Dennis P. HALTER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Judith Rogers, Judge.\nIn this appeal, appellant contests two adverse rulings with respect to claims concerning child support. She first contends that the chancellor abused his discretion in faffing to award a percentage of an inheritance that appellee received from his parents\u2019 estates. As her second issue, she argues that the chancellor erred in failing to hold appellee responsible for an arrearage in child support. We find no error and affirm.\nAppellant, Eva Gail Halter, and appellee, Dennis P. Halter, were divorced in March of 1988. In the decree, appellee was ordered to pay $60 a week in child support on behalf of their two children. The decree further provided that \u201c [a] t such time as [appellee] obtains employment, child support will be adjusted in accordance with [appellee\u2019s] income.\u201d After the decree, appellant filed several motions seeking an increase in support but did not pursue them to completion. As a result, appellee\u2019s obligation remained at $60 a week. The petition that led to this appeal was filed in October of 1995. In it, she requested an increase in child support and a percentage of a $66,000 inheritance appellee had received in 1994 upon the death of his parents. She also asked that appellee be held in contempt for his failure to increase the payment of child support commensurate with his increased income as provided in the decree. In this regard, she further contended that appellee\u2019s support obligation should be increased retroactively and that she was entitled to judgment for the arrearage that had accrued.\nA hearing was held on May 28, 1996. Afterwards, the chancellor ordered an immediate increase in child support to $600 a month, but he denied appellant\u2019s request for the claimed arrear-age. The chancellor took the question of appellee\u2019s inheritance under advisement, asking the parties to brief the issue. A final order was entered on October 11, 1996, wherein the court denied appellant\u2019s request for a lump-sum percentage of appellee\u2019s inheritance. This appeal followed.\nAppellant\u2019s first assignment of error concerns the denial of her claim for a lump-sum payment of twenty-two percent of appellee\u2019s inheritance. It is well settled that the amount of child support lies within the discretion of the chancellor, and his findings will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Creson v. Creson, 53 Ark. App. 41, 917 S.W.2d 553 (1996). Thus the question before us is whether the chancellor\u2019s ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion.\nAppellant\u2019s argument is based on the per curiam in effect, In Re: Guidelines for Child Support, 314 Ark. 644, 863 S.W.2d 291 (1993), wherein it is stated that, when the payor\u2019s income exceeds the amount shown on the extended support chart, the court should use a figure of 22% of the payor\u2019s monthly or weekly income, \u201cas defined hereinafter,\u201d when there are two dependents. Appellant\u2019s argument presupposes that an inheritance is considered as income for purposes of applying the percentage. However, \u201cincome\u201d in the family-support chart refers to the definition of income in the federal income tax laws. Under federal tax law, income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 102(a) (1997). Because the percentage relied upon by appellant applies to weekly or monthly income that exceeds the amounts shown on the extended chart, and because an inheritance does not fall within those parameters, we can find no abuse of discretion in the chancellor\u2019s refusal to award a lump-sum percentage of the inheritance as child support based on that provision of the per curiam.\nAlthough we can find no abuse of discretion, we do not mean to imply that the inheritance was entirely irrelevant to the issue of child support. For example, in Munn v. Munn, 315 Ark. 494, 868 S.W.2d 478 (1994), the appellant claimed entitlement to a percentage of the appellee\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation settlement. Instead, the chancellor applied a hypothetical investment yield to project an increase in the appellee\u2019s monthly income. He then applied that amount to the support chart in setting appellee\u2019s monthly support obligation. The supreme court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion. By analogy here, any earnings that might have been generated from appellee\u2019s inheritance could have been considered by the chancellor in determining the amount of support, since such earnings are considered income under the tax code. 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 102(b) (1997). Yet, appellant limited her claim to a flat percentage of the inheritance. It was appellant\u2019s duty to present sufficient evidence, argument, and citation of authority to prove her assertion that she was entitled to twenty-two percent of the inheritance. Munn v. Munn, id. This she has failed to do.\nAppellant\u2019s next argument is that the language of the original decree providing that \u201c[a]t such time as [appellee] obtains employment, child support will be adjusted in accordance with [appellee\u2019s] income,\u201d placed an affirmative obligation on appellee to increase the payment of child support. She argues that the chancellor erred by not enforcing this provision to retroactively increase appellee\u2019s child-support payments as his income increased during the intervening years. We cannot agree. One seeking the reversal of a chancellor\u2019s order has the burden of demonstrating error in the chancellor\u2019s findings, and we will not reverse such findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. In light of the wording of the decree, we cannot say that the chancellor\u2019s interpretation, that it did not place any burden on appellee to voluntarily seek modification, is clearly erroneous.\nAffirmed.\nBird and Crabtree, JJ., agree.\nThe family-support chart provides that for workers\u2019 compensation disability recipients, support is to be calculated based on those benefits. In Re: Guidelines for Child Support, supra.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Judith Rogers, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Winonia R. Griffin, for appellant.",
      "Dowd, Harrelson, Moore & Giles, by: Marshall H. Moore, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Eva Gail HALTER v. Dennis P. HALTER\nCA 97-120\n959 S.W.2d 761\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered January 28, 1998\nWinonia R. Griffin, for appellant.\nDowd, Harrelson, Moore & Giles, by: Marshall H. Moore, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0189-01",
  "first_page_order": 211,
  "last_page_order": 215
}