{ "id": 6136899, "name": "JONESBORO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CENTER v. Mary Jo TAYLOR", "name_abbreviation": "Jonesboro Human Development Center v. Taylor", "decision_date": "1998-02-25", "docket_number": "CA 97-800", "first_page": "42", "last_page": "48", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "61 Ark. App. 42" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "963 S.W.2d 617" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "60 Ark. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137579 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/60/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-514", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ark. App. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138061 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/13/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. App. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138011 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/6/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ark. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136288 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/50/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. App. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6135992 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/44/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ark. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/39/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Ark. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140470 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/7/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ark. App. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6653000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/16/0102-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 510, "char_count": 10452, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17485575413856175 }, "sha256": "b854f20fad3192e94e4356482522ad46b959b2c5c49b3b5c5d54f07ff7d629b7", "simhash": "1:2c2fc7638d5f453a", "word_count": 1709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:17.261540+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Alley, Neal, Rogers, and Stroud, JJ., agree.", "Pittman, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "JONESBORO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CENTER v. Mary Jo TAYLOR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge.\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission) ordered appellant Jonesboro Human Development Center (Center) to pay one-half the attorney\u2019s fees awarded to appellee Mary Jo Taylor, for controverting her change-of-physician request. The Center appeals from the finding that it controverted Taylor\u2019s request and from the award of attorney\u2019s fees. We agree that there is not sufficient evidence to support the Commission\u2019s finding and reverse.\nTaylor, an employee of the Center, suffered a compensable injury on February 14, 1996, and the Center paid benefits. On March 15, 1996, the Center apparently refused to pay certain medicals bills because they were not from the original treating physician. On March 20, 1996, Taylor requested a change of physician. The Center received a letter from the Workers\u2019 Compen-' sation Commission notifying it of Taylor\u2019s request. The Center responded by letter dated April 1, 1996, to the Commission and Taylor\u2019s attorney stating that there was no objection to her request provided that she gave the name of the new physician and the Commission approved the change. The Center received no response to this letter.\nOn May 6, 1996, Taylor requested a hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ) regarding her change-of-physician request. On May 31st, the Center sent another letter to Taylor\u2019s attorney, again stating that there was no objection to the change and again requesting the name of the physician. There was again no response to the letter. Finally, on June 10, 1996, the Center\u2019s attorney telephoned Taylor\u2019s attorney and, for the third time, requested the name of the physician. The Center\u2019s attorney was informed that the new physician was Dr. James Robinette, and on the same day sent a letter to the ALJ stating that there was no objection to the new physician. The ALJ conducted a pre-hear-ing telephone conference on June 14, 1996, regarding Taylor\u2019s request for a new physician. In this conference, the ALJ approved the change and awarded Taylor attorney\u2019s fees of $200, one-half to be paid by the Center because it had controverted the request. The ALJ\u2019s decision was affirmed by the Commission. In its opinion, the Commission stated that the Center \u201cknew, or should have known that [Taylor] requested an official change to Dr. Robi-nette.\u201d The Center appeals from the award of a fee.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the Commission\u2019s finding that the Center controverted Taylor\u2019s change-of-physician request is supported by substantial evidence.\nThe Center contends that it never controverted Taylor\u2019s request, but instead requested the name of the new physician three times before it was informed that Dr. Robinette was the new physician. The Center further states that the day it received this information, Taylor was sent a letter stating that there was no objection to the change.\nIn response, Taylor asserts that the Center was aware that Dr. Robinette was the new doctor because it completed an AR-E form, which listed Dr. Robinette as the physician she visited a few days after her accident. Furthermore, the Center had received bills since March 1996 from only two providers, Dr. Robinette and Mediquik, the company provider.\nThis court reviews decisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993). The issue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from that reached by the Commission or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995). If reasonable minds could reach the result shown by the Commission\u2019s decision, the court must affirm the decision. Id.\nAn award of attorney\u2019s fees is proper where a claimant\u2019s request for a change of physician is controverted by the employer. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-715(c)(l) (Repl. 1996). If there is substantial evidence to support a finding that a claim is controverted, there is no abuse of the Commission\u2019s discretion to award attorney\u2019s fees, and this court cannot reverse the Commission\u2019s finding in the absence of a gross abuse of discretion. Moro, Inc. v. Davis, 6 Ark. App. 92, 638 S.W.2d 694 (1982). Controversion is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of the particular case by the Commission. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Logan, 13 Ark. App. 116, 680 S.W.2d 720 (1984). The Commission\u2019s finding should not be reversed if there is substantial evidence to support it, or unless it is clear that there has been a gross abuse of discretion. Id.\nIn the present case, the Commission considered the following facts. Two letters from the Center were quoted in the opinion. The April 1st letter, written by Otis Palmer, a claims manager, acknowledged the compensability of the claim and stated that,\n[c]oncerning the change of physician request, we do not object to a change to the desired physician provided we know the name of the desired physician and provided the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission approves the change.\nThe May 31st letter from the Center\u2019s attorney stated:\nRespondents are not denying the claimant\u2019s petition for a change of physician if the selected physician is acceptable and it is treated as claimant\u2019s one time petition for a change of physician per Ark[.] Code Ann. [\u00a7] 11-9-514. Please advise the name of the physician to whom the claimant wants to change.\n(Emphasis in original.)\nOn May 6, 1996, Taylor requested an immediate hearing before an ALJ regarding her change of physician. The Commission also noted that prior to this request, the Center had refused to pay medical bills from Dr. Robinette. Based on these facts, the Commission found that the Center knew or should have known that Taylor wanted to change to Dr. Robinette, and therefore sufficiently controverted her request so as to warrant an award of fees.\nWe do not agree that reasonable minds could reach this conclusion based on the evidence before the Commission. Neither the April 1st or May 31st letter from the Center objected to Taylor\u2019s request for a change of physician. On the contrary, both letters specifically stated that there was no objection to the request and asked for the name of the new physician. Moreover, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-514(e) (Repl. 1996) encourages both the employer and the employee-claimant to cooperate in an effort to select another physician. Here, there was no cooperation on Taylor\u2019s part. Instead of simply providing the name of the doctor (after three requests), she opted to go forward with a hearing.\nMoreover, the Center was within its rights to refuse payment of Dr. Robinette\u2019s bills submitted before Taylor requested a change of physician on March 20, 1996. The procedure for obtaining a change of physician is contained in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-514, and provides in pertinent part:\nthe claimant may petition the commission one (1) time only for a change of physician, and, if the commission approves the change, with or without a hearing, the commission shall determine the second physician and shall not be bound by the recommendations of the claimant or respondent.\nIt is clear from the Center\u2019s letters that it was merely seeking to insure that Taylor follow the statutory procedure for obtaining a one-time change of physician, and it is unreasonable to find that the Center should know, from bills sent prior to the request for change, who that new physician was to be. It is not uncommon for claimants to obtain medical services from several physicians and medical providers for treatment of their injuries. Moreover, referrals to specialists by the treating physician are authorized without making a change of physician. See Department of Parks and Tourism v. Helms, 60 Ark. App. 110, 959 S.W.2d 749 (1998). Finally, neither the bills in question, the AR-E form, nor the letter of March 15, 1996, denying payment for Dr. Robinette\u2019s bills referred to in Taylor\u2019s argument, were made part of the record. Consequently, we determine that the Commission\u2019s finding is not supported by substantial evidence, and that it could not reasonably conclude from the evidence of record that the Center controverted the change of physician. We therefore reverse the award of attorney\u2019s fee to Taylor.\nReversed.\nAlley, Neal, Rogers, and Stroud, JJ., agree.\nPittman, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge." }, { "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge,\ndissenting. I respectfully dissent. The appellant in this case is a state agency. The appellant argues that it did not controvert appellee\u2019s request for a change of physicians, and that it merely wanted to know the name of the new doctor. The Commission found that the agency knew or should have known who the new doctor was, and concluded that the agency had in fact controverted the request for change of physicians.\nWhether or not a claim has been controverted is a question of fact, Electro-Air v. Villines, 16 Ark. App. 102, 697 S.W.2d 932 (1985), and it is not a question to be determined mechanically. Ridgeway Pulpwood v. Baker, 7 Ark. App. 214, 646 S.W.2d 711 (1983). To my mind, the real issue in the case at bar is whether the state agency has used its vastly superior resources to confront the injured employee with formally correct but practically pointless legal obstacles to overcome in order to obtain medical care.\nReduced to its essential terms, we have before us a case where the employee was required to retain an attorney to obtain a routine change of physician. The Commission, finding that the agency has been needlessly obstructionist, awarded the employee attorney\u2019s fees in the amount of $100.00. The Public Employee Claims Division, apparently intent on demonstrating that it was neither underfunded nor reasonable, filed this appeal.\nI think that the Commission should be praised for its sensitivity to the potential for abuse that arises when the legitimate requests of an injured employee are opposed by the overwhelming resources of a state agency, and I would affirm.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Nathan C. Culp, for appellants.", "McDaniel & Wells, P.A., by: Bill Stanley, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JONESBORO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CENTER v. Mary Jo TAYLOR\nCA 97-800\n963 S.W.2d 617\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I and IV\nOpinion delivered February 25, 1998\nNathan C. Culp, for appellants.\nMcDaniel & Wells, P.A., by: Bill Stanley, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0042-01", "first_page_order": 66, "last_page_order": 72 }