{
  "id": 6137474,
  "name": "IN the MATTER of the ADOPTION OF K.M.C.",
  "name_abbreviation": "In re the Adoption of K.M.C.",
  "decision_date": "1998-05-13",
  "docket_number": "CA 97-1221",
  "first_page": "95",
  "last_page": "98",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "62 Ark. App. 95"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "969 S.W.2d 197"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "359 S.E.2d 315",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "4 Va. App. 530",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Va. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        4391600
      ],
      "year": 1987,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/va-app/4/0530-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "10 Ark. App. 128",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6138758
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/10/0128-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "27 Ark. App. 167",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6139763
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1989,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ark-app/27/0167-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 390,
    "char_count": 6043,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.751,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.1810051545041235e-07,
      "percentile": 0.864523375687154
    },
    "sha256": "fcb3394c60ed1f7c5df7dbb78ff3cc79744f4775f2d102ed1ce37b18578e8f15",
    "simhash": "1:1bf721060eabff53",
    "word_count": 991
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:37.997804+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Arey and Griffen, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "IN the MATTER of the ADOPTION OF K.M.C."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "John JVLauzy Pittman, Judge.\nThis case involves the adoption of an infant born to a sixteen-year-old mother. No significant relationship existed between the mother and the biological father, who was himself a teenager, either before or after the child\u2019s conception. The mother put the child up for adoption. Appellants (the prospective adoptive parents) filed a petition to adopt the child; however, appellee (the biological father) then established his paternity and withheld his consent. The petition to adopt was dismissed after a hearing in which it was held that the appellee did not unreasonably withhold his consent to the adoption contrary to the best interest of the child. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, appellants contend that the probate judge erred in ruling that evidence of appellee\u2019s actions prior to the birth of the child, and evidence of psychological studies performed on appellee, were inadmissible in determining whether appellee unreasonably withheld his consent to adoption contrary to the best interests of the child. We agree, and we reverse.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 9-9-220 (Supp. 1995) provides, in pertinent part:\n(a) . . . [T]he rights of a parent with reference to a child, including parental right to control the child or to withhold consent to an adoption, may be relinquished and the relationship of parent and child terminated in or prior to an adoption proceeding as provided in this section.\n(c) In addition to any other proceeding provided by law, the relationship of parent and child may be terminated by a court order issued under this subchapter on any ground provided by other law for termination of the relationship, or on the following grounds:\n(3) That in the case of a parent not having custody of a child, his consent is being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the child.\nThe probate judge refused to admit the challenged evidence on the grounds that it lacked relevance. The determination of the relevance of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that determination will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse thereof. Waeltz v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 27 Ark. App. 167, 768 S.W.2d 41 (1989). The record reflects that the child was born in December 1996. The hearing was held approximately four months later, in April 1997. The evidence in the case at bar showed that, in the years immediately before the child was born, appellee had been involved in organizing street gangs, in illegal drug use, and in assaults and other violent behavior. It also depicted him as marginally self-sufficient, unmotivated, underemployed, and generally lacking stability. The probate judge ruled that this evidence was inadmissible, stating that the inquiry was restricted to appellee\u2019s conduct after the birth of the child.\nThe probate judge cited no rifle or reason for thus limiting the inquiry, and we think he was clearly wrong. In making a decision of whether to terminate the parental rights of a party, the trial court had a duty to look at the entire picture of how that parent discharged his duties as a parent, the substantial risk of serious harm the parent imposed, and whether or not the parent was unfit. Waeltz v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, supra. Any evidence having probative value as to the present or prospective fitness of a parent is admissible to determine whether consent has been unreasonably withheld. Lindsey v. Ketchum, 10 Ark. App. 128, 661 S.W.2d 453 (1983). The Lindsey court itself recited evidence concerning the mother\u2019s habits and behavior prior to the birth of her child. A Virginia appellate court reviewing a similar case dealing with the reasonableness of a father\u2019s refusal to consent to adoption attached great weight to that father\u2019s antisocial behavior prior to the birth of the child, noting that past actions over a meaningful period serve as good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold. Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315 (1987). In the case at bar, only four months passed between the child\u2019s birth and the hearing: limiting the evidence to that four-month period, as the probate judge did here, prevents consideration of past actions over anything remotely approaching a \u201cmeaningful period.\u201d The probate judge, whose duty it is to \u201cpeer into the future to make a projection\u201d bearing on the future welfare of the child, 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adoption \u00a7 90 (1994), has rendered himself blind and incapable of making an accurate prediction of the future by needlessly limiting his consideration to a statistically insignificant period of time.\nThe probate judge\u2019s refusal to consider the psychological evidence was likewise in error. The excluded evidence included an assessment of appellee\u2019s ability to provide a safe and nurturing environment for a child, and of the likelihood of appellee\u2019s continued involvement with violence, drugs, and antisocial behavior. The probate judge refused to consider this evidence because he believed that his decision needed to be based on \u201cwhether or not in the opinion of the court that [appellee] has done anything to forfeit his right to consent to the adoption.\u201d The question, however, is not fault but is instead fitness, see Lindsey, supra, and the excluded psychological evidence is relevant to appellee\u2019s fitness as a parent.\nWe reverse and remand to the probate court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This case involves the adoption of an infant, and it needs to be expeditiously resolved. We do not limit the scope of the probate judge\u2019s inquiry on remand, but we direct that it be concluded as quickly as is prudent, and we order that the mandate from this court be issued immediately.\nReversed and remanded.\nArey and Griffen, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "John JVLauzy Pittman, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kelley Law Firm, by: Eugene T. Kelley and Glenn E. Kelley, for appellants.",
      "Jim Johnson, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "IN the MATTER of the ADOPTION OF K.M.C.\nCA 97-1221\n969 S.W.2d 197\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered May 13, 1998\nKelley Law Firm, by: Eugene T. Kelley and Glenn E. Kelley, for appellants.\nJim Johnson, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0095-01",
  "first_page_order": 119,
  "last_page_order": 122
}