{ "id": 6139322, "name": "Laurie CLEEK v. GREAT SOUTHERN METALS", "name_abbreviation": "Cleek v. Great Southern Metals", "decision_date": "1998-05-27", "docket_number": "CA 97-1138", "first_page": "177", "last_page": "182", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "62 Ark. App. 177" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "970 S.W.2d 304" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "260 Ark. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616820 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1665037 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when the will of the General Assembly is clearly expressed, the appellate court is required to adhere to it without regard to consequences" }, { "parenthetical": "when the will of the General Assembly is clearly expressed, the appellate court is required to adhere to it without regard to consequences" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ark. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it will be given its plain meaning" }, { "parenthetical": "when the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it will be given its plain meaning" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369371 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "words in a statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning and if there is no ambiguity a statute is given effect just as it reads" }, { "parenthetical": "words in a statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning and if there is no ambiguity a statute is given effect just as it reads" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)(B)(ii)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ark. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138946 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/26/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137601 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 Ark. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6656650 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/16/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/58/0035-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 514, "char_count": 8988, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.505882454708161e-08, "percentile": 0.519625275450422 }, "sha256": "656315e2d4cb018ff211e29aecaf7d4009fc5f1cbec49b85d8d662f62b3f27ab", "simhash": "1:6505f56054d6741a", "word_count": 1475 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:37.997804+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jennings and Stroud, JJ., agree.", "Crabtree, Rogers, and Neal, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Laurie CLEEK v. GREAT SOUTHERN METALS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Margaret Meads, Judge.\nAppellant, Laurie Cleek, suffered an admittedly compensable injury on March 22, 1994, when she slipped and fell on a staircase at work, landing on her buttocks and her lower back. She was seen at the Medi-Quick Clinic on March 24, 1994. She was seen by Drs. Lundeen and Kendrick after her initial Medi-Quick visit, and she continued to see Dr. Kendrick through February 1996.\nAppellee paid all of appellant\u2019s medical expenses after her March 24, 1994, visit to Medi-Quick, with the exception of her last visit to Dr. Kendrick in February 1996; however, it contended that all expenses paid after March 24, 1994, approximately $2,339.25, were paid in error because the medical treatment rendered by Drs. Lundeen and Kendrick was not reasonable and necessary. Appellee did not request reimbursement from appellant of these monies but asked that if it were determined that appellee owed the amounts already paid, the administrative law judge (ALJ) allow a credit to appellee for such payments.\nThe ALJ found that the medical treatment rendered to appellant was reasonable and necessary, and that appellee was responsible for such expenses, including the $35.00 expense of appellant\u2019s last visit to Dr. Kendrick in February 1996. The ALJ also awarded appellant\u2019s attorney a one-half fee based on a recovery of $35.00, reasoning that appellant had previously been paid for all other expenses and \u201cthere was no gain to the claimant with the exception of an unpaid bill in the amount of $35.00.\u201d The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ\u2019s opinion and awarded appellant\u2019s attorney an additional $250.00 fee pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-715(b) (Repl. 1996). It is from this decision that appellant brings her appeal, arguing that there is not substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s award of an attorney\u2019s fee based only on $35.00.\nOn appeal to this court, the evidence regarding a workers\u2019 compensation claim is viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Lay v. United Parcel Serv., 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997). The question of whether a claim is controverted is one of fact to be determined from the circumstances of each particular case, and the Commission\u2019s finding will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence to support it. Masonite Corp. v. Mitchell, 16 Ark. App. 209, 699 S.W.2d 409 (1985). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996). There may be substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision although we might have reached a different conclusion from the one found by the Commission if we were sitting as the trier of fact or reviewing the case de novo. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988).\nArkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii) (R.epl. 1996) provides that \u201cthe [attorney\u2019s] fees shall be allowed only on the amount of compensation controverted and awarded.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The American Heritage Dictionary (3rd Ed.) defines \u201cand\u201d as \u201ctogether with or along with; in addition to; as well as.\u201d Thus, it is not enough that only one component or the other be present, i.e., either controverted or awarded; rather, both components must be present. Here, although the ALJ found that appellee had controverted over $2,300.00 in medical treatment, he awarded appellant $35.00, which was the only medical expense that appellee had not paid. Our legislature\u2019s use of the word \u201cand\u201d between \u201ccontroverted\u201d and \u201cawarded\u201d in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii) clearly and unambiguously means that attorney\u2019s fees in workers\u2019 compensation cases are contingent upon not only the amount controverted but also the amount awarded, and we cannot hold otherwise. See Nichols v. Wray, 325 Ark. 326, 925 S.W.2d 785 (1996) (words in a statute must be given their usual and ordinary meaning and if there is no ambiguity a statute is given effect just as it reads); Life Ins. Co. v. Ashley, 308 Ark. 335, 824 S.W.2d 393 (1992) (when the wording of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it will be given its plain meaning); and Hatcher v. Hatcher, 265 Ark. 681, 580 S.W.2d 475 (1979) (when the will of the General Assembly is clearly expressed, the appellate court is required to adhere to it without regard to consequences).\nAppellant contends that Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Henning, 260 Ark. 699, 543 S.W.2d 480 (1976), is controlling and mandates that an attorney\u2019s fee be awarded based on the entire amount controverted. We disagree. In Henning, appellant-employer had notified appellee that it considered his heart attack to be \u201cpersonal\u201d and not causally related to his employment duties, and declined to pay any workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Only after appellee had consulted an attorney and a workers\u2019 compensation claim had been filed did appellant accept responsibility for the claim and begin to pay benefits. Our supreme court ruled that appellee\u2019s attorney was entitled to the statutory attorney\u2019s fee authorized by Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1332 (Repl. 1960) (the predecessor to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715), finding that appellant had denied liability and clearly refused to pay any benefits. Here, with the exception of the one $35.00 bill, all medical expenses which appellee incurred had been paid by her employer, and appellee sought legal counsel solely to recover the $35.00.\nFor these reasons, we affirm the award of attorney\u2019s fees based upon the controverted and awarded amount of $35.00.\nAffirmed.\nJennings and Stroud, JJ., agree.\nCrabtree, Rogers, and Neal, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Margaret Meads, Judge." }, { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge,\ndissenting. I agree with the majority opinion\u2019s recitation of facts but disagree with its analysis that culminates in denying attorney fees for the full amount controverted. The appellees in this case admittedly controverted the entire amount of the claim because of a $35.00 bill. The appellees asserted to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that they were not asking for reimbursement of the amount they paid, but wanted credit for the amount paid if the ALJ found in favor of the appellees.\nThe majority opinion cites Ark. Code Ann. section 11 \u2014 9\u2014 715(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Repl. 1996) as authority for denying the amount of fees on the entire amount controverted. That section provides in part: \u201cthe [attorney\u2019s] fees shall be allowed only on the amount of compensation controverted and awarded\u201d (Emphasis added.) The majority places great emphasis on the conjunction \u201cand,\u201d and goes further into the analysis that the fee must be both controverted, which is admitted in this case, and awarded. Though the majority opinion defines the conjunction \u201cand,\u201d it does not define the words \u201ccontroverted and awarded.\u201d Controvert is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as \u201cdispute, deny,\u201d and award is defined as \u201cgive or order to be given as payment, compensation, or prize. Grant, assign.\u201d\nThere is no question but that the payment of benefits by the employer was controverted. The question is whether or not there was an award. The majority opinion holds that the only award made in this case was for the $35.00 medical bill. I cannot agree. The appellee stated to the ALJ that it did not seek reimbursement but a set-off for the amount of medical expenses already paid if the ALJ found that the injury was compensable. Under the plain meaning of the word \u201caward,\u201d the appellant was granted workers\u2019 compensation benefits in a specific amount, including the $35.00 medical expense. The amount of the medical expenses was then set off against the amount already paid by the appellee in the amount of several thousand dollars. In effect, the appellant was \u201cawarded\u201d her workers\u2019 compensation benefits in the full amount. To find to the contrary would allow employers to controvert the last medical expense, have a full trial on the merits, and attempt to bar any future medical expenses or disability benefits without paying the cost associated with controverting the claim in the beginning. In my opinion, the majority opinion does not fulfill the intent of the legislature and has a chilling effect on the ability of claimants to obtain legal counsel when the employer controverts a small medical bill at the end of the claimant\u2019s healing period. The majority opinion goes beyond what is fair and reasonable and potentially could open the floodgates to litigation at the expense of claimant and emasculate the ability of the worker to obtain adequate legal counsel to insure that future benefits remain intact.\nI dissent.\nNeal and Rogers, JJ., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Tolley & Brooks, P.A., by: Jay N. Tolley, for appellant.", "Bassett Law Firm, by: Angela M. Doss, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Laurie CLEEK v. GREAT SOUTHERN METALS\nCA 97-1138\n970 S.W.2d 304\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions III and IV\nOpinion delivered May 27, 1998\n[Petition for rehearing denied July 1, 1998.]\nTolley & Brooks, P.A., by: Jay N. Tolley, for appellant.\nBassett Law Firm, by: Angela M. Doss, for appellee.\nRogers, Neal, and Crabtree, JJ., would grant." }, "file_name": "0177-01", "first_page_order": 205, "last_page_order": 210 }