{
  "id": 6139183,
  "name": "Richard E. SHULTS v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT",
  "name_abbreviation": "Shults v. Pulaski County Special School District",
  "decision_date": "1998-10-07",
  "docket_number": "CA 98-314",
  "first_page": "171",
  "last_page": "174",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:43.559988+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Crabtree and Roaf, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Richard E. SHULTS v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Margaret Meads, Judge.\nAppellant, Richard E. Shults, filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim for an injury he sustained on June 26, 1995. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that appellant was not entitled to benefits because he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was performing employment services at the time he was injured. The Commission affirmed the denial of benefits, stating that merely because appellant was on his employer\u2019s premises at the time an accident occurs does not mean the accident is compensable and that appellant\u2019s injury was not inflicted at a time when employment services were being performed. On appeal to this court, appellant contends that the Commission erred in finding that he was not performing employment services at the time of his injury. We agree with appellant; therefore, we reverse.\nThe standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases is well-settled. On appeal, this court must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision. Weaver v. Whitaker Furniture Co., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and is given its strongest probative value in favor of the Commission\u2019s decision. Barrett v. Arkansas Rehabilitation Servs., 10 Ark. App. 102, 661 S.W.2d 439 (1983). The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different conclusion from the one found by the Commission, or even whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding, but if reasonable minds could arrive at the same decision as the Commission, the decision must be upheld. Harvest Foods v. Washam, 52 Ark. App. 72, 914 S.W.2d 776 (1996).\nAppellant was employed by the Pulaski County Special School District as a building custodian at Tolleson Elementary School in Jacksonville, Arkansas. On June 26, 1995, appellant\u2019s son had taken him to work because appellant\u2019s truck was not working. Appellant\u2019s co-worker, Leonard Holder, usuahy rode to work with appellant, but appellant had told him that he would have to find another way to work that day. Appellant and his son arrived at the school between 6:30 and 6:45 a.m. Appellant fell while entering the building, fracturing his right patella. This injury required surgery, and appellant was off work for seven weeks. His surgeon assessed a five percent permanent partial impairment of the lower extremity.\nOne of appellant\u2019s duties upon arriving at work was to disarm the alarm system when he entered the building. At the hearing, appellant testified, \u201cI opened the door, and the alarm system is right on the right. And on the uprising when I went in the building, I seen the alarm had been disarmed, so I started running in the building . . . And the uprising, it was a fan cord on my left, and I don\u2019t know whether I tripped on the uprising or the fan cord, but that\u2019s where I fell at.\u201d On cross-examination, appellant stated that the building doors were already opened when he arrived, and he knew his co-worker, Leonard Holder, was already at work because the doors were open and the alarm system was disarmed. He said, \u201cAfter I walked in, yes sir, I could tell the alarm system was off.\u201d\nAct 796 of 1993, which applies to all workers\u2019 compensation injuries incurred after July 1, 1993, requires that the provisions of the workers\u2019 compensation statutes be strictly construed. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 1996). This act excludes from the definition of \u201ccompensable injury\u201d any injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(5) (B) (iii) (Supp. 1997). We have held that an employee was performing \u201cemployment services\u201d when he \u201cwas engaging in an activity that carried out the employer\u2019s purpose or advanced the employer\u2019s interests.\u201d Hightower v. Newark Pub. Sch. Sys., 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997).\nIn denying appellant\u2019s claim, the Commission stated that merely entering upon the premises of one\u2019s employer was not sufficient to bring one within the employment services provision of Act 796. Although that is a correct statement of the law, we disagree that appellant was \u201cmerely entering upon\u201d the employer\u2019s premises. Upon appellant\u2019s arrival at Tolleson Elementary School, his first duty as building custodian was to check the alarm system. We believe this duty was an activity that carried out the employer\u2019s purpose or advanced the employer\u2019s interests, and therefore constitutes employment services. Whether or not the alarm system had already been disarmed on the day of appellant\u2019s accident is not dispositive, because appellant did not know this until he stepped into the building to check the system for himself. Therefore, we find that appellant did sustain a compensable injury because he sustained an injury to his knee at a time when employment services were being performed. We reverse and remand for an award of benefits.\nReversed and remanded.\nCrabtree and Roaf, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Margaret Meads, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rice & Adams, by: Ben E. Rice, for appellant.",
      "Thomas W. Mickel, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Richard E. SHULTS v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT\nCA 98-314\n976 S.W.2d 399\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered October 7, 1998\nRice & Adams, by: Ben E. Rice, for appellant.\nThomas W. Mickel, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0171-01",
  "first_page_order": 199,
  "last_page_order": 202
}