{ "id": 6140145, "name": "Amelia EVANS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Evans v. State", "decision_date": "1999-03-03", "docket_number": "CA CR 98-457", "first_page": "232", "last_page": "239", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "65 Ark. App. 232" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "987 S.W.2d 741" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "804 P.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10381268 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that the contents of a purse or wallet are of an extremely personal nature, the warrantless search of which can be justified only under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/804/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "804 P.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "631 P.2d 143", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139428 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "954 S.W.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 236250, 236172 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0499-01", "/ark/329/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236172 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 8", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298586 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that, under the \"emergency exception,\" a warrantless entry may be upheld if the intruding officer had \"reasonable cause\" to believe that someone inside a home was \"in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm\"" }, { "page": "20-21" }, { "page": "652-53", "parenthetical": "noting that an emergency may cease, thereby removing any justification for a warrantless entry into a home" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0008-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 627, "char_count": 13070, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.740406676291886e-08, "percentile": 0.5308168545733747 }, "sha256": "b770daff8adef61ca0c215ca6e4f3d5ae0ef39141a0303a66c8374cfd260e93a", "simhash": "1:bceb8502ceca003f", "word_count": 2106 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:05:27.101250+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart, Jennings, Bird, Roaf, and Meads, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Amelia EVANS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.\nThe Poinsett County Circuit Court denied appellant Amelia Evan's motion to surpassthe results of an officer\u2019s warrantless search of her purse. Appellant then entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, pursuant to Rule 24.3(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand this case.\nWhen we review a ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997); Reyes v. State, 329 Ark. 539, 954 S.W.2d 199 (1997). We reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Wofford, supra; Reyes, supra.\nAt 7:30 a.m. on July 9, 1996, Trooper Darwin Adams of the Arkansas State Police received a dispatch that there was a one-car accident on Highway 63 north of Marked Tree. When Trooper Adams arrived on the scene, ambulance personnel were already helping appellant out of her car, which was on its side. He testified that appellant was screaming incoherently and appeared to be suffering from severe injuries.\nBecause Trooper Adams was unable to speak to appellant, he looked inside her car for something to help in determining her identity. The trooper testified that he saw a purse with a green wallet sitting on top of it on the driver\u2019s side floorboard. He opened the wallet and discovered hypodermic needles, a black container with what appeared to be methamphetamine inside, and a clear plastic bag containing a brown powdery substance. The wallet did not contain any identification; however, he discovered a second wallet containing the appellant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. After learning her identity, he gave appellant\u2019s purse and its contents to the ambulance personnel. At the hospital, a nurse discovered the contraband in appellant\u2019s purse and gave it to the officer.\nTrooper Adams testified that when investigating an accident, he has been trained to first assure the safety of the driver, and then to establish the driver\u2019s identity. He explained that he searched appellant\u2019s purse to complete his investigation of the accident; he knew that the ambulance personnel were administering aid to appellant. Trooper Adams testified that he could have called in the car license number to the dispatcher, which would have produced a current and valid registration; however, he testified that he did not do so in this case. He also testified that he did not inventory the vehicle.\nRelying on Kirk v. State, 38 Ark. App. 159, 832 S.W.2d 271 (1992), appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. The State responds that the search can be justified under the exigent circumstances present: appellant was injured, and the officer\u2019s search was necessary to determine appellant\u2019s identity for the purpose of rendering medical treatment and notifying her relatives. In the alternative, the State argues that the officer\u2019s search was reasonable in fight of his legal duty to investigate and report on all accidents occurring on the state\u2019s highway system.\nThe Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV. When police officers conduct a search without a warrant, we begin our review with the basic premise that a warrantless search is unauthorized. Reyes, supra. All searches conducted without a valid warrant are unreasonable unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a valid warrant. Kirk, supra. When a search is made without a warrant, the burden of proof rests on those who seek to justify it. Id.\nHere, appellant objects to Trooper Adams\u2019s warrantless search of her purse. \u201cThe purpose of a purse or handbag is to carry personal things. An individual\u2019s expectation of privacy in a purse is probably greater than in any other property except the clothing worn by a person.\u201d State v. Newman, 631 P.2d 143, 146 (Or. 1981); see also People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1991) (noting that the contents of a purse or wallet are of an extremely personal nature, the warrantless search of which can be justified only under one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement). Thus, unless Trooper Adams\u2019s warrandess search of appellant\u2019s purse and its contents falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, appellant\u2019s motion to suppress should have been granted. See Kirk, supra.\nWe are persuaded that the warrantless search of appellant\u2019s purse cannot be justified under the exceptions to the warrant requirement argued by the State. We held in Kirk v. State, supra, that a deputy sheriff who investigated a one-vehicle accident in which the driver-appellant (Kirk) was rendered unconscious violated that appellant\u2019s right under the Fourth Amendment when the deputy opened a closed black box found in the front seat in what he termed was a search for papers that might have identified the driver. In Kirk, we rejected the State\u2019s argument that intrusion into the interior of the wrecked vehicle and the eventual opening of the closed black box was pursuant to the \u201ccommunity caretak-ing functions\u201d of the State so that the search was in the nature of an inventory. We rejected that argument because there was no proof that the deputy was following standard police procedures regulating the opening of closed containers. Although the \u201ccommunity caretaking\u201d rationale asserted in Kirk is not made in this case, Trooper Adams\u2019s explanation for opening and searching appellant\u2019s purse at the accident scene violated the same Fourth Amendment interests that were addressed in Kirk.\nThe reasoning of the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Wright, supra, is especially instructive. In that case, the defendant was involved in a two-car accident. An ambulance and paramedics were at the accident site when the officer arrived; as they administered aid to the defendant, one of the paramedics handed the officer the defendant\u2019s purse. The officer put the purse in his vehicle without opening it. Wright, 804 P.2d 867-68. After the defendant was taken by ambulance to a hospital, the officer completed his investigation and determined that the defendant was not at fault and would not be charged with any traffic violation. He took the defendant\u2019s purse to the hospital, and was informed that the defendant would be in an x-ray room for some time. Rather than attempting to contact the defendant, he went into a break room and searched the defendant\u2019s purse. He testified that he was looking for the defendant\u2019s license and other documents in order to complete his accident report. He found marijuana, methamphetamine pills, and drug paraphernalia. He then found the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. After the defendant came out of the x-ray room approximately thirty minutes later, the officer informed her of the materials seized from her purse. Id. at 868.\nThe State in Wright attempted to justify the search based upon the \u201cmedical emergency exception.\u201d\nThe medical emergency exception will support a warrantless search of a person\u2019s purse or wallet when the person is found in an unconscious or semi-conscious condition and the purpose of the search is to discover evidence of identity and other information that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance to the person.\nWright, 804 P.2d at 869 (citations omitted); cf. Wofford, supra (noting that, under the \u201cemergency exception,\u201d a warrantless entry may be upheld if the intruding officer had \u201creasonable cause\u201d to believe that someone inside a home was \u201cin imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm\u201d). The Supreme Court of Colorado rejected this argument. It observed that the officer was not confronted with a situation that posed a threat to the life or safety of the defendant. The defendant was not seriously injured, was conscious and receiving treatment, and was able to disclose information that might be used in her diagnosis and treatment. Further, the Court noted that the officer\u2019s purpose in searching the defendant\u2019s purse was not to obtain information that might be used in treating the defendant; rather, he was attempting to obtain her driver\u2019s license and other information for inclusion in his investigative report. Wright, 804 P.2d at 870.\nThe State also attempted to justify the officer\u2019s search based upon his \u201cadministrative duty to complete a traffic accident report. . . .\u201d Id. at 870. While acknowledging the possibility that such a search may be justified, the Supreme Court of Colorado cautioned that \u201c[s]uch a search, however, must be limited to those situations in which there is no reasonable alternative available to the officer. Only in this way can the general proscription against warrantless searches be given its intended effect.\u201d Id. at 870-71. The court noted several alternatives available to the officer: he could have given the purse to a nurse, and asked her to take it to the defendant so that the defendant could retrieve her driver\u2019s license for him; he could have asked to visit with the defendant in the x-ray room; or he could have sought the information at a later date. \u201cSimply stated, the officer was not confronted with a situation in which there was no other reasonable alternative other than to search the defendant\u2019s purse for the information necessary for a completed report.\u201d Id. at 871.\nIn the case before us, the State\u2019s argument that Trooper Adams was seeking appellant\u2019s identity for the purpose of administering medical treatment is not supported by the testimony. Ambulance personnel were already on the scene of the accident when he arrived; they were administering aid to the appellant. Moreover, Trooper Adams testified that his purpose in searching for appellant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was to complete his investigative report. Given this testimony, the warrantless search cannot be justified as an attempt to secure information in order to provide medical treatment to the appellant. Cf. Wofford, 330 Ark. at 20-21, 952 S.W.2d at 652-53 (noting that an emergency may cease, thereby removing any justification for a warrantless entry into a home).\nLikewise, Trooper Adams\u2019s search cannot be justified as an attempt to secure information for his required investigative report. The car\u2019s license number was available to Trooper Adams; he testified that calling this number in to his dispatcher would have produced appellant\u2019s name and address without looking in her purse. Other alternatives were available to Trooper Adams: he could have accompanied appellant to the hospital, and sought information from her there; or, he could have sought this information from a nurse or other medical personnel. Cf. Wright, supra (noting reasonable alternatives to a search of a defendant\u2019s purse).\nThe State does not contend that the contraband would have been inevitably discovered by Trooper Adams at the hospital, but argues that his search of appellant\u2019s purse at the accident scene was lawful. For reasons already discussed, that argument is unpersuasive. And, although the trial court concluded that discovery of the contraband was inadvertent, that conclusion cannot be sustained given the plain evidence that the contraband was discovered only after Trooper Adams removed appellant\u2019s purse from her vehicle and opened it. The contraband was not in plain view so that Adams could inadvertently see it; it was in a wallet, a place Adams had no lawful reason to look when he opened the wallet. Even if we accept the argument that appellant\u2019s purse and wallet were in plain view when Adams looked inside her vehicle, the contents of the closed wallet were not.\nThe State has not met its burden of justifying Trooper Adams\u2019s warrantless search of the appellant\u2019s purse. The trial court\u2019s ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence; based on the totality of the circumstances appellant\u2019s motion to suppress should have been granted.\nReversed and remanded.\nHart, Jennings, Bird, Roaf, and Meads, JJ., agree.\nThe State cites Wagner v. Hedrick, 383 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1989) in support of its second argument to justify the warrantless search. However, in upholding the warrandess search of a defendant\u2019s pants pockets for identification, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that the officer first tried to obtain the defendant\u2019s identification information \u201cthrough other less intrusive measures before he removed [the defendant\u2019s] pants from the basket underneath his [hospital] bed . . . Wagner, 383 S.E.2d at 292.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gregory E. Bryant, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Amelia EVANS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 98-457\n987 S.W.2d 741\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions II and III\nOpinion delivered March 3, 1999\nGregory E. Bryant, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0232-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 261 }