{ "id": 6136789, "name": "Eleanor MATTHEWS v. JEFFERSON HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION", "name_abbreviation": "Matthews v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n", "decision_date": "1999-06-08", "docket_number": "CA 98-1308", "first_page": "55", "last_page": "60", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ark. App. 55" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "991 S.W.2d 629" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "960 S.W.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 377681, 6138433 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0370-01", "/ark-app/60/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ark. App. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138433 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/60/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 Ark. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ark. App. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/55/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/58/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703814 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0335-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 582, "char_count": 11313, "ocr_confidence": 0.725, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.338558541443922 }, "sha256": "56f455f886a3ebdf4fd16e4ce6202a835f04097ea33825c914feedf6f9cb5eb4", "simhash": "1:e62d28b1aa673abd", "word_count": 1777 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:03.568570+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Pittman and Bird, JJ., agree.", "Hart, Neal, and Griffen, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Eleanor MATTHEWS v. JEFFERSON HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation case, the appellant, Eleanor Matthews, seeks benefits from the appellee, Jefferson Hospital Association, for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The Commission affirmed the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and denied benefits. The Commission found that appellant\u2019s injury was not compensable because she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it arose out of and in the course of her employment with appellee and because it was not the major cause of her disability and need for 'medical treatment. For reversal, appellant contends that the Commission\u2019s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.\nOn March 1, 1981, appellant became employed at Jefferson Hospital in Pine Bluff. After that date, appellant held a number of administrative positions for appellee and began to experience bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms in February 1996. Appellant came under the care of Dr. John Lytle, an orthopedist, and he performed a carpal tunnel release surgery on appellant\u2019s right wrist on December 31, 1996.\nThe Commission reviewed appellant\u2019s work history with appellee and found that she performed several duties from day to day, including answering incoming telephone calls, maintaining all personnel records for employees, handling all filing, interviewing applicants for employment and performing reference checks, completing paperwork and record-keeping for new hires, performing inquiries with nurses\u2019 aide registry for prospective employees, keeping daily attendance records for employees, working with Medicaid and Medicare forms, keeping minutes of meetings, handling payroll, traveling to the hospital\u2019s main facility, running errands, performing productivity studies, and handling the mail and photocopying. In light of appellant\u2019s testimony regarding her job responsibilities, the Commission believed that appellant\u2019s typing duties \u201crepresented a relatively minor component of her overall work duties.\u201d\nOn appeal, appellant asserts that the Commission lacked substantial evidence to support its decision. In this instance, appellant\u2019s argument portion of her brief consisted of only two paragraphs. Within it she offers no convincing argument or relevant citation of authority. We do not consider an assignment of error presented in the brief not supported by convincing argument or authority. Weeks v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 270 Ark. 151, 604 S.W.2d 566 (Ark. App. 1980).\nFurthermore, in her brief, appellant relies upon the ALJ\u2019s decision rather than the Commission\u2019s findings. On an appeal of a workers\u2019 compensation proceeding, the appellate court reviews only the findings of the Commission and ignores those of the ALJ. Graham v. Turnage Employment Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 960 S.W.2d 453 (1998).\nAffirmed.\nPittman and Bird, JJ., agree.\nHart, Neal, and Griffen, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge." }, { "text": "Olly Neal, Judge,\ndissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s determination that the Commission\u2019s decision must be affirmed because in the majority\u2019s opinion appellant \u201coffers no convincing argument or citation of authority.\u201d While the brevity of the appellant\u2019s argument causes some concern, such concern is overshadowed by the glaring error present in the Commission\u2019s decision. I believe appellant made the most convincing argument in her sole argument on appeal, i.e., that the Commission erred in finding that she failed to meet her burden of proof.\nThe Commission wrote that it was deciding the merits of appellant\u2019s claim pursuant to the standard set forth in Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 969 S.W.2d 190 (1998). Prior to the Kildow opinion, the decisions of this court required that a claimant who alleged work-related carpal tunnel syndrome prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the work engaged in consisted of rapid repetitive motion. We held that the repetitive requirement was satisfied where multiple tasks were performed. See Lay v. United Parcel Serv., 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997). The supreme court rejected our analysis in Kildow, and concluded that carpal tunnel syndrome is specifically categorized as a compensable injury and not as a type of rapid repetitive motion. The court also listed the factors that a claimant must satisfy to be awarded benefits for his/her injury: (1) that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment; (2) objective medical evidence that the injury is compensable; and, (3) that the injury is the major cause of the disability or need for treatment. The Commission held that the appellant did not show that she sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. However, the Commission supplied the following rationale for its decision:\nIn the present case, we find that the claimant failed to show by the greater weight of the evidence that she sustained carpal tunnel syndrome arising out of and in the course of her employment with the respondent. In reaching that decision, we note that Dr. Lytle has opined that the claimant\u2019s injury is causally related to a long-term history of employment as a typist. However, in assessing the weight to be accorded Dr. Lytle\u2019s opinion in this regard, we understand Dr. Lytle to be under the impression that the claimant engaged in some form of hand intensive job duties (as a typist) for the respondent. However, our review of the claimant\u2019s work history as brought out by her hearing testimony indicates that since some time in 1992, the claimant has actually been assigned as a receptionist/assistant to the administrator of the Davis Life Care Facility. In that capacity, claimant\u2019s work activities have included (1) answering all incoming telephone calls to the Davis Facility; (2) maintaining all personnel records for the employees at the Davis Facility; (3) handling all filing for the Davis Facility; (4) interviewing applicants and performing reference checks on applicants seeking employment at the Davis Facility; (5) completing all paper work and record keeping for new hires at the Davis Facility; (6) performing inquiries with the nurses\u2019 aide registry for prospective employees; (7) keeping daily attendance records for employees at the Davis Facility; (8) working with Medicaid and Medicare forms required by the Davis Facility; (9) keeping minutes of all meetings conducted at the Davis Facility; (10) handling payroE for the employees at the Davis Facility; (11) traveling by automobile to the hospital\u2019s main facility to pick up and drop off items on a regular basis; (12) regularly \u201crunning errands\u201d also consisting of traveling by automobile to doctor\u2019s offices or other locations; (13) performing the productivity studies for the Davis FaciEty; and (14) handling the maE and photocopying requirements for the Davis Facility. Moreover, we understand from the claimant\u2019s testimony that typing duties actuaEy represented a relatively minor component of her overaU work duties (the claimant testified that typing duties actu-aEy represented 25% to 40% of her time), and we therefore find that Dr. Lyde\u2019s opinion is based on a misunderstanding of the claimant\u2019s actual work duties at the Davis FacEity. Moreover, we find that the greater weight of the credible evidence indicates that the claimant\u2019s work-related duties were not hand intensive to a sufficient degree to establish that the fourteen duties indicated above caused an injury arising out of and in the course of the claimant\u2019s employment for the respondent.\nIt is this portion of the Commission\u2019s opinion that reflects the manner in which the Commission reached its decision that gives me great cause for concern. The Commission\u2019s reasoning bears a striking resemblance to that employed by this court in decisions prior to the supreme court\u2019s Kildow opinion. See, e.g., Baysinger v. Air Systems, Inc., 55 Ark. App. 174, 934 S.W.2d 230 (1996). As stated earlier, since Kildow, claimants no longer have to show that their work involved rapid repetitive motion in claims for disability related to carpal tunnel syndrome. My concern is that the Commission appears to have applied the incorrect standard for evaluating the compensability of a carpal tunnel syndrome claim, where it lists appellant\u2019s various duties in determining whether her condition arose out of and in the course of her duties. The manner in which the Commission chose to analyze the compensability of appellant\u2019s claim bears more than striking resemblance to the multiple-tasks analysis this court applied to carpal tunnel claims prior to Kildow.\nI am also puzzled as to why the Commission would conclude that Dr. Lytle\u2019s opinion should be afforded little weight because he related the appellant\u2019s carpal tunnel to her history of being a typist. Dr. Lytle made the following findings regarding appellant\u2019s carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis:\nThis is, in my opinion, a work related problem from her long-term history of being a typist. This is a classic example of a problem developed insidiously that she did not recognize nor. have a cause or reason for. She did not understand or know the diagnosis of carpal tunnel prior to these findings. She realized that there was something wrong with her hand and had not made all of the appropriate connections.\nThe Commission\u2019s findings accurately reflect the testimony given by appellant that 25% to 40%, or two to three hours a day of her time was spent typing. Appellant testified that she did not engage in any activities outside of work, such as knitting, crocheting, or anything other than her work for appellee. Here, the Commission seems to once again focus on the repetitive nature of appellant\u2019s work activities in suggesting that the percentage of time she spent typing in a typical work day was not sufficiently hand-intensive to produce carpal tunnel syndrome. That is simply not what the law requires a claimant to prove.\nEven more puzzling to me is the following finding of the Commission:\nConsequently, we find that the claimant failed to establish that her carpal tunnel syndrome arose out of and in the course of her employment. In reaching this conclusion, we also note that the claimant participated in exercise at the health club known as the \u201cWellness Center\u201d in 1994, and at that time experienced numbness in her fingers similar to the numbness experienced as a result of the alleged work-related carpal tunnel syndrome that was diagnosed in 1996. In this regard, we note that Dr. Lytle\u2019s opinion makes no reference whatsoever to the claimant\u2019s 1994 symptoms which she experienced while exercising at a health club.\nWith regard to this finding, appellant testified that she \u201cwalked\u201d on a track at the Wellness Center. She did not testify, nor was there any evidence presented, that she performed exercises that required the use of her hands while at the Wellness Center.\nBecause I believe that the Commission evaluated the com-pensability of appellant\u2019s claim using the incorrect standard, I would reverse and remand this matter.\nHart and Griffen, JJ., join in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Olly Neal, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Philip M. Wilson, for appellant.", "Ramsay, Bridgforth, Harrelson & Starling LLP, by: William M. Bridgforth, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Eleanor MATTHEWS v. JEFFERSON HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION\nCA 98-1308\n991 S.W.2d 629\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions III and IV\nOpinion delivered June 8, 1999\nPhilip M. Wilson, for appellant.\nRamsay, Bridgforth, Harrelson & Starling LLP, by: William M. Bridgforth, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0055-01", "first_page_order": 85, "last_page_order": 90 }