{ "id": 6138545, "name": "Vernon WOODALL v. HUNNICUTT CONSTRUCTION", "name_abbreviation": "Woodall v. Hunnicutt Construction", "decision_date": "1999-07-07", "docket_number": "CA 98-1519", "first_page": "196", "last_page": "201", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ark. App. 196" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "994 S.W.2d 490" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141047 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 Ark. App. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138946 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/26/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ark. App. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/40/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ark. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141162 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/54/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ark. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/59/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889918 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ark. App. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137407 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/36/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139108 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ark. App. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6143473 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/55/0400-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 554, "char_count": 10245, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2605279692223306e-07, "percentile": 0.6123424570312787 }, "sha256": "eba461088a9c3e48b7b39bb061c04b18e3655587a3a633f4750bafcbe58809e3", "simhash": "1:17a1601429ee9bbe", "word_count": 1645 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:03.568570+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.", "Rogers and Hart, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Vernon WOODALL v. HUNNICUTT CONSTRUCTION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.\nVernon Woodall appeals the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s denial of benefits to him, arguing on appeal that (1) there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision and (2) the fact that appellant\u2019s co-worker was not injured is not evidence of appellant\u2019s impairment. We agree with appellant\u2019s arguments and reverse and remand for an award of benefits.\nOn June 5, 1997, while assisting in the construction of a roof, appellant fell when a scaffold collapsed. Appellant, a thirty-seven-year-old carpenter, sustained bilateral calcaneal fractures to both of his heels as a result of the fall. When appellant went to the emergency room for treatment, his urine sample was tested for the presence of illegal drugs. That screen showed the presence of cocaine metabolites. At the hearing on December 16, 1997, appellant admitted that he smoked a rock of crack cocaine at approximately 6 p.m. the night before the accident.\nAppellant testified that he and his co-worker, James Sum-merhill, were in the process of framing a house on June 5, 1997. According to appellant\u2019s testimony, he told Summerhill to put together scaffolding so that they could \u201cfly the ridge\u201d and proceed in putting the roof together. Appellant testified that he did not check the scaffolding to make sure Summerhill had built it strong enough to support appellant\u2019s weight because Summerhill has \u201calways built good scaffolding and we never had . . . problems.\u201d Summerhill testified that he had nailed down one side of the scaffolding to the wall but not the other side when appellant said it would be all right. At that point, appellant and Summerhill proceeded to \u201cfly the ridge.\u201d Summerhill testified that, in his opinion, he felt it was safe to do. When the board that the two workers were standing on fell off the scaffolding, appellant fell down to the ground, but Summerhill, being on the other side of the board, was thrown up eleven feet. Summerhill was thrown to the ceiling, where he landed uninjured.\nIn reversing the Administrative Law Judge\u2019s finding that appellant had rebutted the presumption set out in Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 ll-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Repl. 1996), the Commission found that, on de novo review of the testimony, it believed that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that his accident and injury were not substantially occasioned by the use of cocaine. The Commission stated that the greater weight of the credible evidence established that appellant\u2019s accident was attributable to his impaired judgment. The Commission opined that appellant\u2019s \u201cactions of climbing up on the scaffolding which was not nailed down on his end was a sheer disregard for his own personal safety which strongly suggests impairment resulting from drug use.\u201d\nArkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) provides that \u201cThe presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician\u2019s orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician\u2019s orders.\u201d Whether the rebuttable presumption is overcome by the evidence is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. Weaver v. Whitaker Furniture Co., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996). Further, when reviewing findings of fact made by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we must affirm if the Commission\u2019s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id.\nOn appellate review of workers\u2019 compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Johnson v. Hux, 28 Ark. App. 187, 772 S.W.2d 362 (1989). We should affirm the Commission\u2019s ruling if there is any substantial evidence to support the findings made. Shaw v. Commercial Refrigeration, 36 Ark. App. 76, 818 S.W.2d 589 (1991). It is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh\u2019s, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989). From our review of the record, we should affirm the Commission if we can find any substantial evidence to support the findings made by the Commission. Johnson, supra.\nWhen, as here, the Commission denies coverage because the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof, the substantial evidence standard of review requires that we affirm the Commission\u2019s decision if its opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. McMillian v. U.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 953 S.W.2d 907 (1997); see also Shaw, supra. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence. Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 54 Ark. App. 344, 925 S.W.2d 179 (1996). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. City of Fort Smith v. Brooks, 40 Ark. App. 120, 842 S.W.2d 463 (1992). The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988).\nIn Hubley v. Best Western-Governor\u2019s Inn, 52 Ark. App. 226, 916 S.W.2d 143 (1996), we reversed the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, holding that the Commission\u2019s analysis was \u201cboth factually inaccurate and logically flawed.\u201d Id. at 230, 916 S.W.2d at 145. In Hubley, the Commission chose to believe the testimony of two dentists but to discount the testimony of another dentist, deeming the testimony of the third dentist lacking in probative weight because he was a dentist and not a medical doctor. We held that when the Commission discounted the third dentist\u2019s testimony but believed the other two dentists\u2019 testimony, it employed the \u201csort of arbitrary reasoning that the substantial evidence rule was never intended to insulate from judicial review.\u201d Id. at 231, 916 S.W.2d at 146. We find a similar situation here. The Commission chose to discount the testimony of appellant and found his actions lacking in presence of mind and judgment while praising the presence of mind and judgment of appellant\u2019s co-worker. Both workers, however, got on the faulty scaffolding knowing it was not nailed down on both sides. Summerhill was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time. The Commission\u2019s conclusion \u25a0 \u2014 \u25a0 that appellant\u2019s decision to get on the scaffolding was so illogical that it must have been made as a result of the influence of the drugs that appellant took the prior evening \u2014 is based on inconsistent logic. Therefore, we must reverse.\nIn Weaver v. Whitaker Furniture Co., Inc., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996), we affirmed the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s denial of benefits to the claimant, holding that he did not overcome the statutory rebuttable presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs. In Weaver, the claimant was injured when he stepped from a forklift and fell. In a drug test performed that day when Weaver went to the doctor for medical assistance, the presence of cannabinoids was found in his blood. A co-worker testified that he had slipped on the forklift, which leaked brake fluid, two or three times. The coworker also testified that there was brake fluid on the concrete floor where Weaver slipped. In affirming the Commission\u2019s finding that Weaver had not overcome the presumption that his injury was substantially occasioned by the use of drugs, we noted that there was substantial evidence to support the denial of benefits. We noted that the Commission weighed Weaver\u2019s evidence, including his testimony that he had not used marijuana in three years, against the medical testimony indicating that Weaver had used marijuana shortly before his accident at work. We can distinguish Weaver from the case at bar in two ways. First, Woodall\u2019s testimony concerning the drugs found in his body was forthright and not in contradiction with the medical evidence, unlike that of the claimant in Weaver. Second, Woodall\u2019s co-worker Sum-merhill\u2019s testimony was more pertinent to the accident at work than the co-worker\u2019s testimony in Weaver. Summerhill was involved in the accident in question, but the co-worker in Weaver was not. The Weaver co-worker merely stated that in times past, he had slipped in the same way that Weaver did.\nThe fact that Summerhill climbed on the scaffolding that he knew was not nailed down on both sides demonstrates that Summerhill and appellant exercised the same judgment. That the Commission chose to find that appellant\u2019s judgment was impaired by the use of drugs while finding that Summerhill displayed \u201cpresence of mind\u201d and \u201cquick judgment\u201d in keeping himself from harm when the scaffolding collapsed is, we believe, indicative of inconsistent logic. Both workers climbed on the scaffolding. Both worked there until it collapsed. It may be reasonably concluded that neither worker exercised good judgment or that both co-workers exercised poor judgment. But it cannot be fairly concluded, consistent with logic, that appellant\u2019s behavior in stepping onto the scaffolding that Summerhill constructed was so different in fact or in its effects as to be distinguishable from Summerhill\u2019s judgment. Thus, the Commission erred when it inconsistently reasoned appellant\u2019s injury to be substantially occasioned from illegal drug use based on conduct that it commended when engaged in by Summerhill, a co-employee not shown to have taken illegal drugs, who acted the same way.\nReversed and remanded.\nRogers and Hart, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel E. Wren, for appellant.", "Michael E. Ryburn, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Vernon WOODALL v. HUNNICUTT CONSTRUCTION\nCA 98-1519\n994 S.W.2d 490\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered July 7, 1999\nDaniel E. Wren, for appellant.\nMichael E. Ryburn, for appellee.\nWendell L. Griffen, Judge." }, "file_name": "0196-01", "first_page_order": 226, "last_page_order": 231 }