{ "id": 6138966, "name": "Dwayne SMITH and Rebecca Smith v. Otis PARKER, Pauline Parker, and J-Dog, Inc.", "name_abbreviation": "Smith v. Parker", "decision_date": "1999-09-01", "docket_number": "CA 98-1316", "first_page": "221", "last_page": "226", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ark. App. 221" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "998 S.W.2d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 Ark. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1652849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/222/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ark. App. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/36/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488156 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744823 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ark. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1882741 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/303/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-15-404", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ark. App. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6143098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/5/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 B.R. 212", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "B.R.", "case_ids": [ 6101305 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/108/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ark. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/197/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719906 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 S.W.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ark. 838", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726010 ], "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/186/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 18-12-403", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ark. App. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140693 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/62/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ark. App. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/62/0208-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 9287, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.27807939325612e-07, "percentile": 0.8706011431554503 }, "sha256": "37cb1b425d771ce3bb707b2363a2cff9aeb7d2500a0aa908ce8bdaaeb87ea3b3", "simhash": "1:b3140405546c089e", "word_count": 1594 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:03.568570+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart and Griffen, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Dwayne SMITH and Rebecca Smith v. Otis PARKER, Pauline Parker, and J-Dog, Inc." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Judith Rogers, Judge.\nThis appeal concerns a farm lease entered into between appellee J-Dog, Inc., and Billy Jim Smith, the father of appellant Dwayne Smith. The issues on appeal are whether the lease is enforceable against appellants, who were deeded part of the subject property after the execution of the lease, and whether the lease has priority over an easement owned by appellants. The chanceEor ruled against appellants on both questions. We find no error and affirm.\nBilly Jim Smith and Lillie Rose Smith were the owners of 160 acres of land in Lonoke County. Their home was located on a forty-acre tract on the north side of a county road. Mr. Smith farmed the land until approximately 1987. In that year, he entered into a crop-share lease with a Mr. Underwood. The lease was in force, on a year-to-year basis, through 1992. Beginning in 1993 and ending in 1995, Mr. Smith entered into a series of yearly leases with appellee J-Dog, Inc. Rent was payable on a crop-share basis, seventy-five percent to J-Dog and twenty-five percent to Mr. Smith. On February 28, 1996, Mr. Smith and J-Dog entered into the lease that is the subject of this case. The lease was for the same land and for the same crop-share percentages as the prior leases, but the term of the lease was seven years rather than one year. The lease was not signed by Mr. Smith\u2019s wife, Lillie Rose Smith. However, she became aware of the lease several days after it was executed.\nOn April 11, 1997, the Smiths deeded forty acres of the leased property to Circle S Farms, a partnership comprised of their four sons, including appellant Dwayne Smith. They also deeded a separate tract of land to Dwayne and his wife, Rebecca. That conveyance included a twenty-foot easement across the leased property. On April 14, 1997, Circle S sent a letter to Jacques Parker of J-Dog, Inc., informing him that the lease \u201chas been assigned to Circle S Farms, a partnership, who is now the owner of the farm.\u201d\nOn June 28, 1997, Circle S Farms and Lillie Rose Smith attempted to terminate the lease that had been entered into between J-Dog and Billy Jim Smith. They sent separate letters to Jacques Parker asserting that they were not parties to the lease. The final paragraph of each letter read: \u201cYour rights, if any, are hereby terminated as of December 31, 1997 and you are hereby notified to quit and remove yourself from the property at that time.\u201d\nOn July 25, 1997, as part of a boundary-dispute action that is not relevant to this case, appellants and Circle S Farms filed a third-party complaint against J-Dog asking that the 1996 multi-year lease be declared null and void: They alleged that the lease was invalid because it was not signed by Lillie Rose Smith and that, because the lease was not recorded, it did not have priority over Dwayne and Rebecca Smith\u2019s easement.\nAfter a hearing, the chancellor ruled that the doctrine of estoppel precluded appellants from arguing that the lease was void for want of Mrs. Smith\u2019s signature. He also found that, even though the lease was not recorded, Dwayne and Rebecca had actual knowledge of the lease at the time they acquired their easement. Therefore, J-Dog\u2019s rights under the lease were superior to their rights under the easement. It is from these findings that appellants bring their appeal.\nChancery cases are reviewed de novo on appeal. Lammey v. Eckel, 62 Ark. App. 208, 970 S.W.2d 307 (1998). However, a chancellor\u2019s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. Adkinson v. Kilgore, 62 Ark. App. 247, 970 S.W.2d 327 (1998). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.\nWe first address appellants\u2019 contention that the 1996 deed was void because it was not signed by Lillie Rose Smith. Ordinarily, an instrument affecting the homestead of a married person is invalid unless the person\u2019s spouse joins in the instrument. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 18-12-403 (Supp. 1997). Therefore, when a husband leases homestead property without his wife\u2019s joining in the execution of the lease, the lease is void. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Smith, 186 Ark. 838, 56 S.W.2d 420 (1933); George v. George, 267 Ark. 823, 591 S.W.2d 655 (Ark. App. 1979). However, despite the dictates of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 18-12-403, a spouse may be estopped to deny the validity of an instrument in which he or she did not join. See Edwards v. Jones, 197 Ark. 229, 123 S.W.2d 286 (1938). See also First Fed. Sav. of Ark. v. Beard, 108 B.R. 212 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1989).\nWe agree with the chancellor that the doctrine of estoppel precludes the application of section 18-12-403 in this case. The doctrine of estoppel is applicable when the following four elements are present: (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting estoppel had a right to believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must rely on the former\u2019s conduct to his injury. Wells v. Everett, 5 Ark. App. 303, 635 S.W.2d 294 (1982). At trial, Lillie Rose Smith testified that she had been aware since the days of the Underwood leases that her husband had leased their land for farming purposes. She knew about the one-year leases between her husband and J-Dog in 1993, 1994, and 1995, and accepted the monetary benefits of those leases. Regarding the 1996 lease, she was aware of its existence several days after it was executed. She expressed no objection to J-Dog that her name was not on the lease. She testified that she drove her husband to the USDA office \u201ca lot\u201d to transact business with regard to the lease. Additionally, she and her husband received the monetary benefits of the lease in 1996.\nUnder these circumstances, we cannot say that the chancellor\u2019s application of the estoppel doctrine was clearly erroneous. Mrs. Smith was aware of the lease\u2019s existence prior to her conveyance of the leased property to her sons. She had acquiesced for many years in her husband\u2019s unilateral lease of their property. She received the benefits of the leases, including the 1996 lease, without objection to the lessee. Further, there was evidence that J-Dog, in rebanee on the long-term nature of the lease, expended funds on pipe and irrigation equipment. Based upon the forgoing, we affirm the chancellor\u2019s finding on this point.\nThe next issue concerns the effect of the lease on appellants\u2019 easement across the leased property. At the time appellants took title to their property in April 1997, the lease between Billy Jim Smith and J-Dog, Inc., had not been recorded. Generally, no instrument in writing which may affect title to real property shall be valid against a subsequent purchaser of the property unless the instrument is filed for record in the county where the real estate is situated. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 14-15-404(b) (Repl. 1998). However, the instrument is valid if the subsequent purchaser had actual notice of it. Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 303 Ark. 547, 798 S.W.2d 419 (1990); Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 280 Ark. 420, 658 S.W.2d 397 (1983). Whether one buying land had notice of another\u2019s interest in the land is a question of fact. McGill v. Grigsby, 205 Ark. 349, 168 S.W.2d 809 (1943). We will not reverse a chancellor\u2019s finding of fact regarding whether a party is an innocent purchaser without notice unless that finding is clearly erroneous. Malone v. Hines, 36 Ark. App. 254, 822 S.W.2d 394 (1992).\nThe chancellor\u2019s finding on this issue is not clearly erroneous. A subsequent purchaser will be deemed to have actual notice of a prior interest in the property if he is aware of such facts and circumstances as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on such inquiry that, if diligently pursued, would lead to knowledge of these prior interests. Killam v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., supra. In the case at bar, appellants were aware, prior to acquiring title, that J-Dog was farming the property in 1997 and that he had been farming it for many years prior to that. James Gary Smith, appellant Dwayne Smith\u2019s brother and the managing partner of Circle S, testified that he became aware of the 1996 lease several days after it was executed. Further, on April 14, 1997, the same day their deeds were recorded, the partners of Circle S, including Dwayne Smith, wrote to J-Dog to advise that the partnership had been assigned the lease. Finally, the partnership received monetary benefits from the lease in 1997. These facts show not only actual notice of the lease but ratification of it. See generally Harrison v. United Farm Agency, 222 Ark. 530, 262 S.W.2d 293 (1953).\nAffirmed.\nHart and Griffen, JJ., agree.\nThere was no argument below, nor is there an argument on appeal, that the leased property did not contain the homestead of Mr. and Mrs. Smith.", "type": "majority", "author": "Judith Rogers, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey, Trimble, Lowe, Sellars & Thomas, by; Rick Sellars, for appellants.", "Kelly & Huckabee, by: Jerry Kelly, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Dwayne SMITH and Rebecca Smith v. Otis PARKER, Pauline Parker, and J-Dog, Inc.\nCA 98-1316\n998 S.W.2d 1\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered September 1, 1999\nBailey, Trimble, Lowe, Sellars & Thomas, by; Rick Sellars, for appellants.\nKelly & Huckabee, by: Jerry Kelly, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0221-01", "first_page_order": 251, "last_page_order": 256 }