{ "id": 6140831, "name": "Wiley H. GRUBBS v. William C. HALL", "name_abbreviation": "Grubbs v. Hall", "decision_date": "1999-09-29", "docket_number": "CA 99-196", "first_page": "329", "last_page": "332", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ark. App. 329" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "999 S.W.2d 693" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "270 Ark. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709262 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 U.S. 61", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11323 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/98/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ark. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1737889 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/237/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ark. App. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141581 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "929" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/61/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0479-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 357, "char_count": 5071, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1078528839368683e-07, "percentile": 0.56999114620196 }, "sha256": "9e4b0929cb64f413e34b9c3ec950e7d75e19192f580eeb31540c5e595e97c8c8", "simhash": "1:806b11ab727cf3a3", "word_count": 836 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:03.568570+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins, C.J., and Bird, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Wiley H. GRUBBS v. William C. HALL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge.\nThis case involves an order from the Faulkner County Circuit Court setting aside a February 2, 1995, judgment against the appellee, William C. Hall. On appeal, the appellant, Wiley H. Grubbs, argues that the trial judge\u2019s decision was clearly erroneous because no extrinsic fraud was perpetrated upon the court and because appellee failed to state a meritorious defense in his motion to set aside the judgment. We reverse and remand.\nAppellant was driving his vehicle on a highway in Faulkner County, Arkansas, when his car was hit in the rear by appellee. Appellant filed suit against appellee, but appellee\u2019s automobile insurance company, Credit General Insurance Company, refused to defend appellee, stating that his policy had expired for nonpayment.\nOn February 2, 1995, both appellant and appellee appeared for trial; however, counsel for appellant was not present. Both parties went to the home of appellant\u2019s counsel and met prior to the hearing set for that afternoon. During that time, several conversations took place between appellant\u2019s counsel and the unrepresented appellee, which concerned appellee\u2019s liability in the case and a possible settlement. Then, appellee signed a wage assignment prepared by appellant\u2019s counsel, which provided for a regular deduction from his paycheck of $50 per month. Appellant\u2019s counsel told appellee that he could receive his money back from a contemplated lawsuit against Credit General Insurance Company.\nThereafter, appellant sued Credit General Insurance Company. The circuit judge ruled in favor of the insurance company, but on appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision. See Grubbs v. Credit General Insurance Company, 327 Ark. 479, 939 S.W.2d 290 (1997). Later Credit General Insurance Company retained counsel for appellee in an attempt to set aside the judgment in this case. The circuit judge found in favor of appellee based upon Ark. R. Civ. P. 60. The judge determined that appel-lee had a meritorious defense and that fraud had been practiced upon the court in procurement of the judgment. On September 30, 1998, the circuit judge entered an order setting aside the judgment dated February 2, 1995.\nArkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) provides:\nThe court in which a judgment, other than a default judgment [which may be set aside in accordance with Rule 55(c)] has been rendered or order made shall have the power, after the expiration of ninety (90) days after the filing of said judgment with the clerk of the court, to vacate or modify such judgment or order.\nHowever, in order to vacate or modify a judgment or order, the lower court must determine that at least one of an enumerated list of circumstances exists. Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(c). In this case, we believe that the only subsection that could possibly apply is subsection (c)(4), which requires fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining the judgment. The fraud to be shown is not intrinsic, but rather fraud in the procurement of the judgment or extrinsic fraud. Ward v. McCord, 61 Ark. App. 271, 966 S.W.2d 925 (1998). This issue of whether the procurement of a judgment amounts to a fraud upon the court is a question of law. Hardin v. Hardin, 237 Ark. 237, 372 S.W.2d 260 (1963). Appellee had the burden of showing this fraud by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Ward, supra. In Ward, this court quoted United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93, wherein the Supreme Court described extrinsic fraud as follows:\nWhere the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client\u2019s interest to the other side.\nId. at 280, 966 S.W.2d at 929 (1998).\nTo reverse the circuit judge\u2019s decision, we must find that he abused his discretion. See Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 606 S.W.2d 112 (Ark. App. 1980). After careful review, we find that the lower court judge did in fact abuse his discretion in setting aside the judgment. Appellee proceeded pro se in this matter and at his own risk. Perhaps he should have employed counsel to represent him. Nevertheless, we find that no fraud, extrinsic or otherwise, was practiced upon the court or appellee.\nWe need not address appellant\u2019s second argument on appeal as appellant has succeeded on his first challenge. We reverse and remand with directions to the trial court to reinstate the 1995 order. See Meisch, supra.\nReversed and remanded.\nRobbins, C.J., and Bird, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Peel & Simmons, P.A., by: Richard L. Peel, for appellant.", "Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: William H. Edwards, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Wiley H. GRUBBS v. William C. HALL\nCA 99-196\n999 S.W.2d 693\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered September 29, 1999\nPeel & Simmons, P.A., by: Richard L. Peel, for appellant.\nBarber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: William H. Edwards, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0329-01", "first_page_order": 359, "last_page_order": 362 }