{ "id": 6141470, "name": "Christopher CLARK (Deceased) v. SBARRO, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Clark v. Sbarro, Inc.", "decision_date": "1999-10-06", "docket_number": "CA 99-383", "first_page": "372", "last_page": "377", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "67 Ark. App. 372" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1 S.W.3d 38" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 Ark. App. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/61/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627363 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862799 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "emphasis supplied" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "944 S.W.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50383 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ark. App. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142965 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "aff'd 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 381 (1998)" }, { "parenthetical": "aff'd 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 381 (1998)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/55/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ark. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136012 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/61/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 514, "char_count": 8912, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08, "percentile": 0.4133225527820348 }, "sha256": "59b4ea3eb0f6ccb7f27f999be63c26a9b75d1a82f150712753b02e2285c3ac3c", "simhash": "1:9645c0031da6b7bb", "word_count": 1405 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:56:03.568570+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Meads and Rogers, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Christopher CLARK (Deceased) v. SBARRO, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge.\nChristopher Clark died in an automobile accident while returning from a business trip in Missouri, and Clark\u2019s surviving family members (the Clark heirs) filed a claim for workers\u2019 compensation death benefits. The Commission denied benefits based upon a finding that the claim was barred because the accident was substantially occasioned by Clark\u2019s use of alcohol. The Clark heirs raise two issues on appeal: 1) the Commission erred in concluding that Clark was not performing employment services at the time of the accident; and 2) substantial evidence does not support the Commission\u2019s finding that the accident was substantially occasioned by Clark\u2019s use of alcohol. We agree that there is not substantial evidence to support the finding that the accident was substantially occasioned by Clark\u2019s use of alcohol and reverse and remand.\nOn November 20, 1996, Clark was returning home from a required business meeting in St. Louis, Missouri. He drove his own vehicle. Around 8:30 p.m., another vehicle crossed the center fine and struck his vehicle head-on near Corning, Arkansas. Clark died as a result of his injuries; the other driver sustained serious injuries, but survived. Blood-alcohol tests revealed that Clark\u2019s blood-alcohol content (BAC) was .21%, and the other driver\u2019s BAC was .28%.\nWhen reviewing a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision and affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. High Capacity Prods. v. Moore, 61 Ark. App. 1, 962 S.W.2d 831 (1998). We reverse a decision of the Commission only if convinced that fair-minded persons using the same facts could not reach the conclusion reached by the Commission. Id. As a general rule, this court recognizes that administrative agencies are better equipped by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible procedures than are courts to determine and analyze legal issues affecting their agencies. While not conclusive, the interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency is highly persuasive. Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1997) (aff'd 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 381 (1998)).\nIn pertinent part, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 1997) provides:\n(B) \u201cCompensable injury\u201d does not include:\n(iv)(a) Injury where the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician\u2019s orders.\n(b) The presence of alcohol, illegal drags, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician\u2019s orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician\u2019s orders.\n(d) An employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs utilized in contravention of the physician\u2019s orders did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.\nFor the first point on appeal, the Clark heirs argue that the Commission erred in finding that Clark was not performing employment services at the time of the accident. However, although Sbarro raised this contention in the proceedings below, neither the opinion issued by the ALJ nor by the Commission addresses this issue. Rather, benefits were denied solely upon a finding that Clark\u2019s accident was substantially occasioned by his use of alcohol. Because the Commission made no finding on this issue, we do not address this argument on appeal.\nThe Clark heirs next contend that the Commission erred in finding that the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol. They argue that the rebuttable presumption that the accident was substantially occasioned by Clark\u2019s use of alcohol was overcome by the evidence.\nOur supreme court has discussed the statutory presumption concerning whether an accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol. In ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998), the supreme court held that a man who sustained injuries from a fall successfully rebutted the presumption that his fall was due to the presence of alcohol. In ERC, the claimant\u2019s BAC test indicated a presence of 0.01% blood alcohol, or one-tenth the legal limit, and medical evidence indicated that he suffered a seizure related to alcohol withdrawal. The supreme court concluded that the mere presence of 0.01% BAC was sufficient to trigger the statutory presumption; however, the court affirmed the Commission\u2019s finding that the claimant sufficiently rebutted the presumption. Of significance to this appeal, in construing the meaning of the phrase \u201csubstantially occasioned,\u201d the court stated:\nFirst, we turn to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words themselves. The word \u201coccasion\u201d when used as a verb is defined in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary as \u201cto produce; to cause incidentally or indirectly; to bring about or be the means of bringing about.\u201d Black\u2019s, supra, at 1078. Thus, the word \u201coccasion\u201d is broad in scope and, standing alone, encompasses causation that may be indirect in origin. However, the word \u201coccasioned\u201d is modified by the adverb \u201csubstantially,\u201d which is defined as \u201cactually and essentially.\u201d Black\u2019s, supra at 1428-29. When the words substantially occasioned\u2019\u2019 are used together, the causal connection becomes more immediate and direct. Finally, the statute provides that the injury must be caused \u201cby the use of alcohol,\u201d not by abstinence from the use of alcohol. We, therefore, conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase \u201csubstantially occasioned by the use of alcohol\u201d requires that there be a direct causal link between the use of alcohol and the injury in order for the injury to be noncompensable. To conclude otherwise would involve the addition of words that do not appear in the text of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 -9-102(5) (B) (iv).\nERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. at 70 (emphasis supplied).\nIn the instant case, both drivers had a BAC of more than twice the legal limit at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on a straight stretch of highway, and it was raining and the roadway was wet. However, the investigation clearly indicated that the other driver came completely over into Clark\u2019s lane and struck Clark\u2019s vehicle head-on. The investigating officer also concluded from a time-stamped receipt found in Clark\u2019s vehicle that Clark had been speeding during his journey, because he had driven a distance that would ordinarily take three hours and fifteen minutes at the speed limit in a period of about two hours and forty-six minutes. The Commission found that crossing of the center fine by the other driver did not rebut the statutory presumption that Clark\u2019s use of alcohol substantially occasioned the accident. The Commission considered the results of Clark\u2019s BAC test, the evidence that Clark had been speeding, and concluded that Clark\u2019s motor skills and judgment would have been signifi-candy impaired.\nThe question of whether a rebuttable presumption is overcome by the evidence is a question of fact for the Commission to determine. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, supra (citing Clark v. State, 253 Ark. 454, 486 S.W.2d 677 (1972)); Continental Express v. Harris, 61 Ark. App. 198, 965 S.W.2d 811 (1998). Our standard of review requires that we affirm if substantial evidence supports the findings of the Commission. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission, we cannot say that substantial evidence supports the Commission\u2019s finding in this instance. There was no evidence that Clark was speeding at the time of the accident, and no evidence from which the Commission could have concluded, without resorting to speculation, that he could have avoided the accident. However, the evidence did show that the \u201cimmediate and direct\u201d cause of the accident was instead the other driver\u2019s crossing onto Clark\u2019s side of the road. Given the supreme court\u2019s definition of the words \u201csubstantially occasioned,\u201d we cannot say that fair-minded persons using the facts presented in this case could reach the conclusion reached by the Commission. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nMeads and Rogers, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Andree Layton Roaf, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rice, Adams, Beckham & Pulliam, by: Ben E. Rice, for appellant.", "Roberts Law Firm, P.A., by: Mike Roberts, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Christopher CLARK (Deceased) v. SBARRO, INC.\nCA 99-383\n1 S.W.3d 38\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered October 6, 1999\n[Petition for rehearing denied December 22, 1999.]\nRice, Adams, Beckham & Pulliam, by: Ben E. Rice, for appellant.\nRoberts Law Firm, P.A., by: Mike Roberts, for appellees.\nPittman, J., would grant. See dissent in Vol. 68, Arkansas Appellate Reports." }, "file_name": "0372-01", "first_page_order": 402, "last_page_order": 407 }