{ "id": 6137737, "name": "Jessie C. RAY v. WAYNE SMITH TRUCKING", "name_abbreviation": "Ray v. Wayne Smith Trucking", "decision_date": "1999-11-17", "docket_number": "CA 99-401", "first_page": "115", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "68 Ark. App. 115" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "4 S.W.3d 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "989 S.W.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6137227 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/66/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark. App. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ark. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138540 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/57/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ark. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/62/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)(B)(iii)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ark. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/50/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. App. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6135992 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/44/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ark. App. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/39/0024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 422, "char_count": 6939, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.912794380632971e-08, "percentile": 0.36956073500810277 }, "sha256": "085ca8214687ff6fe3773230fd0145ab3e2c2be5db781e15834b0c12b66aef47", "simhash": "1:f2b7800148f12bca", "word_count": 1141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:17:49.300876+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Bird and Griffen, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Jessie C. RAY v. WAYNE SMITH TRUCKING" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge.\nIn this workers\u2019 compensation case, the Commission denied the appellant, Jessie C. Ray, benefits because he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was performing an employment service when he sustained an injury to his right shoulder on August 16, 1997. The Commission affirmed and adopted the Administrative Law Judge\u2019s decision, and appellant appeals the Commission\u2019s determination claiming that it is not supported by substantial evidence. We reverse.\nThe appellee, Wayne Smith Trucking, employed appellant as an \u201cover-the-road\u201d truck driver. In this capacity, appellant drove a truck owned by appellee across the country, typically from Morril-ton, Arkansas, to Chicago, Illinois. Appellant sustained an injury to his right shoulder on August 16, 1997, when he fell while installing a CB antenna on appellee\u2019s truck.\nOriginally, appellant had been assigned a truck with a \u201cspring ride\u201d suspension system, but he had requested a truck with an \u201cair ride\u201d suspension system, if one became available. Appellant made this request because an \u201cair ride\u201d suspension system provides a more comfortable ride. On August 15, 1997, Allen Hayes, a dispatcher for appellee, called appellant at home and advised him that a truck with an \u201cair ride\u201d suspension was available if he still wanted it. Appellant responded that he did. On Saturday, August 16, 1997, on his regular day off, appellant went to appellee\u2019s shop to move a number of items from his old' truck to the new truck so he would not have to do so early the next morning. Appellant moved several items, including his personal CB radio and antenna, oil, antifreeze, bedding for the sleeper cab, and spring-loaded bars, among other items. It was undisputed that appellee did not require appellant to have a CB or CB antenna in the truck. However, appellant testified that appellee did require spring-loaded bars be installed in the trucks.\nThis court reviews decisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission to see if they are supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992). Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993). The issue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from that reached by the Commission, or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding. Id. If reasonable minds could reach the result shown by the Commission\u2019s decision, we must affirm the decision. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995).\nA compensable injury is defined as an injury causing internal or external physical harm arising out of and in the course of employment. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(5)(A)(Repl. 1997). Act 796 of 1993 amended the workers\u2019 compensation laws to exclude from the definition of \u201ccompensable injury\u201d an injury sustained \u201cat a time when employment services were not being performed.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii). Our appellate courts have found that an employee is performing employment services when he is engaged in the primary activity which he is hired to perform or any incidental activity which is inherently necessary for the performance of the primary employment activity. Tina Harding v. City of Texarkana, 62 Ark. App. 137, 970 S.W.2d 303 (1998).\nAppellant testified that he was paid according to his mileage. Appellant indicated that on the day that he transferred items from one truck to another that he was not paid for any of the work he did that day and that he was not scheduled to come in that day. Appellant testified that he was not asked to change trucks; that when told about the availability of the \u201cair ride\u201d truck, he could have declined; and that appellee had done nothing to make him take the \u201cair ride\u201d truck.\nOn a number of occasions, the appellate courts have affirmed the Commission\u2019s factual findings that a claimant injured while performing a personal task, even while on the employer\u2019s premises, was not performing \u201cemployment services\u201d for the purposes of compensability under Act 796 of 1993. Hightower v. Newark Public School System, 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997). In this instance, we recognize that appellant was on appellee\u2019s premises when appellant injured his shoulder.\nWe conclude that appellant was performing an incidental activity which was inherently necessary for the performance of his primary employment activity. On the day appellant sustained his injury, he was preparing his truck for a cross-country drive by equipping it with items necessary for the effective administrator of his job. Appellant\u2019s testimony revealed that appellee required spring-loaded bars to be installed in all trucks. As the new truck lacked such bars, appellant installed them before he drove the vehicle. In addition, appellant transferred items to the new truck that were extremely useful for a long-distance drive, such as, a CB radio and antenna, extra oil, and antifreeze. Furthermore, appellee did not pay for overnight lodging on appellant\u2019s regular trips to Chicago. Therefore, appellant acted prudently in packing bedding to be used in the truck\u2019s sleeper cab.\nAllen Hayes testified that if appellant had not taken the \u201cair ride\u201d truck that another driver would have taken it. Thus, this accident could have happened to any driver willing to accept the \u201cair ride\u201d truck. Testimony also revealed that appellee was in the process of phasing out its \u201cspring ride\u201d trucks as it purchased only new trucks that contained an \u201cair ride\u201d suspension system. Eventually, appellant would have had to relinquish his \u201cspring ride\u201d truck for a newer \u201cair ride\u201d truck.\nIn its brief, appellee notes that in Allan Kinnebrew v. Little John\u2019s Truck, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 99, 989 S.W.2d 541 (1999), we held that a truck driver is not performing employment services during the time that he is involved in activities of a personal nature. In Kinnebrew, the truck driver was injured when he slipped and fell while taking a shower at a truck stop during the time that he was on the road for his employer. Clearly, a shower is not inherently necessary for the performance of the job the trucker was hired to do. On the other hand, in the case at bar, appellant injured himself as he prepared his truck for the long-distance trip with items necessary for the efficient performance of his job.\nWe do not believe that reasonable minds could have denied appellant benefits in this case. Therefore, we reverse and remand for an award of benefits.\nReversed and remanded.\nBird and Griffen, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jerry G. James, for appellant.", "Trammell Law Firm, by; Gill A. Rogers, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jessie C. RAY v. WAYNE SMITH TRUCKING\nCA 99-401\n4 S.W.3d 506\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered November 17, 1999\n[Petiton for rehearing denied December 22, 1999.]\nJerry G. James, for appellant.\nTrammell Law Firm, by; Gill A. Rogers, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0115-01", "first_page_order": 143, "last_page_order": 147 }