{
  "id": 6140383,
  "name": "James Don LEATHERWOOD v. STATE",
  "name_abbreviation": "Leatherwood v. State",
  "decision_date": "2000-03-01",
  "docket_number": "CA CR 99-522",
  "first_page": "233",
  "last_page": "238",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "69 Ark. App. 233"
    },
    {
      "type": "parallel",
      "cite": "11 S.W.3d 571"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
    "id": 13370,
    "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 34,
    "name_long": "Arkansas",
    "name": "Ark."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-103",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1997,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "338 Ark. 608",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
        243400
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1999,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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        "/ark/338/0608-01"
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    {
      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-103",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1997,
      "opinion_index": 1
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:43.542887+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Robbins, C.J., Pittman, Jennings, Stroud, and Meads, JJ., agree.",
      "Griffen, Bird, and Neal, JJ., dissent."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "James Don LEATHERWOOD v. STATE"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge.\nAppellant James Don Leather-wood appeals his conviction for Felon in Possession of a Firearm. He alleges on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.\nWe review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and affirm the lower court\u2019s decision if there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. Stewart v. State, 338 Ark. 608, 999 S.W.2d 684 (1999).\nOn April 1, 1997, the appellant\u2019s wife called the police advising them that the appellant \u201cpulled\u201d a 30-06 on her. Mr. Leather-wood was arrested and the rifle recovered. The appellant was charged with violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-103 (Repl. 1997), Possession of Firearm by Certain Persons. The State alleged that the appellant, having previously been convicted of a felony, possessed a firearm.\nThe appellant was tried by the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The State proved, and the appellant concedes, that Mr. Leather-wood was in possession of the rifle. However, the appellant argues that the State failed to show that the appellant was the same James Don Leatherwood that had a felony conviction from Texas.\nThe appellant objected to the introduction of the record of James Don Leatherwood for a felony conviction from Jefferson County, Texas. The following colloquy occurred between the attorney for the appellant and the court:\nMR. Brown: Your Honor, I have some specific objections. If I may approach.\nTHE COURT: All right, what are your objections?\nMr. Brown: Your Honor, to all the pages that I\u2019ve certified, Your Honor.\nThere\u2019s not any certification of all these pages showing where it came from.\nAlso, specifically, Your Honor, there is one case that is not a court document and not certified in any manner and it\u2019s listed as specifically investigator summary. It has no certification on it in any manner, no heading, no file mark, Your Honor, or anything. I have a specific objection to that.\nAlso, Your Honor, the signatures here that it is signed by a judge and there\u2019s no judge presiding on that.\nMR. Mariani: Your Honor, this was stapled together. It was certified. You\u2019d have to look at the certification. This was what was sent to us from Texas authorities. It does state in here that he was a felon and that he was given two years in prison.\nThe COURT: All right, your objection is overruled. Let it be received over the Defendant\u2019s objection.\nThe appellant objected to the authenticity of the documents and not to relevancy or lack of foundation.\nThe documents contained the name James Don Leatherwood, Jr., with a date of birth on the grand jury indictment of November 7, 1960. The investigator\u2019s summary reflects a birth date of November 7, 1956. Several of the documents were signed by the appellant.\nThe court records in this case reflect that the appellant is James Don Leatherwood, Jr., with a date of birth of November 7, 1960. Several of the court documents are signed by the appellant. We cannot say that the conviction is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court had before it the documents from Texas showing a felony conviction for James Don Leatherwood and the grand jury\u2019s true bill that reflected ajames Don Leatherwood, Jr., with a date of birth being November 7, 1960, the same name and date of birth contained on the Arkansas documents. Further, the Court had the appellant\u2019s signature from both documents to review. Surely, had the documents referred to been in regard to another James Don Leatherwood, the appellant would have objected on grounds other than authenticity.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins, C.J., Pittman, Jennings, Stroud, and Meads, JJ., agree.\nGriffen, Bird, and Neal, JJ., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge,\ndissenting. The issue in this case is the sufficiency of the evidence and not whether the appellant objected to the State\u2019s evidence \u201con grounds other than authenticity.\u201d Furthermore, the scope or nature of the appellant\u2019s objection does not in any way relieve the State of its burden of proof. Unlike the majority, I am unwilling to hold that the State met its burden merely by producing evidence that a person in Texas with a similar name, who may or may not share the same birthday as the appellant, committed a felony. I would hold that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to withstand the appellant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict, and would therefore reverse the appellant\u2019s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence as follows:\nAppellant\u2019s Counsel: Move for a directed verdict, Your Honor, on the felony in possession. There\u2019s been absolutely no proof in the State\u2019s case that this James Leatherwood is that same James Leatherwood. They had an opportunity to put on his date of birth, Social Security number in their case in chief. They did not. All they identified him as James Leatherwood. They haven\u2019t put on any evidence. There was no evidence finking this James Leather-wood to that James Leatherwood. The State has not proved it beyond a reasonable doubt, Your Honor, and they have not done that at this point. And also as I said, my objection to that certification. All the pages are certified. There is some hearsay documentation in there, Your Honor, so I move for a directed verdict on those charges.\nCourt: Denied.\nAt the close of all of the evidence, the appellant renewed his motion for a directed verdict. It is true the appellant did not object to the evidence of a prior felony on the ground that the prior conviction was not his. Rather, he objected on the basis that the documents were not certified. While it may have been more prudent for the appellant to object on the grounds that the prior conviction was not his, he was not required to do so. Instead, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by a motion for a directed verdict, as he is allowed to do, arguing that the State presented no proof that the appellant is the same person who committed the felony in Texas, and noting the State\u2019s failure to present evidence of his birth date or Social Security number in its case-in-chief.\nIt is beyond question that the State must prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. When the State accuses a defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a felon, that is, has been convicted of a prior felony. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-73-103 (Repl. 1997). Stated another way, it was the State\u2019s burden in this case to prove that the person who committed the prior felony upon which this charge is based, is the appellant.\nThe evidence presented in this case consisted of: 1) testimony by the appellant\u2019s wife describing the assault and identifying the rifle that was used in the assault; 2) testimony by the officer concerning the confiscation of the rifle and the appellant\u2019s arrest; 3) admission of the rifle in question into evidence; and 4) exhibit A, which contained court documents showing that a person with a similar name committed a felony in Texas.\nExhibit A shows the Texas defendant was convicted of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated in December 1983. The Texas defendant\u2019s name and birthday are listed in the documents presented by the State as James Don Leatherwood, D.O.B. November 7, 1956, on an Investigator Summary, and as James Don Leath-erwood, Jr., D.O.B. November 7, 1960, on the bill of indictment. The documents presented by the State also referred to the Texas defendant alternatively as James Don Leatherwood, Jr., James Don Leatherwood, and James Leatherwood. The defendant who committed the Texas offense consistently signed his name, \u201cJames D. Leatherwood.\u201d\nThe issue in this case is whether, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence by which the trial court could determine the State met its burden of proving that the James D. Leatherwood who was convicted of a felony in Texas was the same James D. Leatherwood who was on trial for felony possession of a firearm in this case. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State\u2019s evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant is the same person who committed the Texas felony. It is sufficient for the majority that the Texas documents contain references to a person with the same name and date of birth as the appellant. However, even though it is undisputed that the appellant\u2019s birth date is November 7, 1956, the State never established the birth date of the Texas defendant, and most certainly did not establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. How can the State assert the birth date of the appellant is the same as the Texas defendant\u2019s when the State failed to prove which birth date is the proper birth date of the Texas defendant? Moreover, even if the State proved that the birth date of the Texas defendant was the same as the appellant\u2019s, it is chilling to contemplate that a similar name, even a very similar name, and an identical birthday, are sufficient proof of a person\u2019s identification, without additional documentary, fingerprint, pictorial, or testimonial evidence, to establish a person\u2019s identity for the purpose of convicting that person of a criminal offense. The fact that the appellant is named \u201cJr.\u201d indicates that there is at least one more person with exactly the same name.\nThe decision reached by the majority today sends the wrong message to prosecutors. The prosecution should never be relieved of its duty to prove every element of its case, whether that task is onerous or not. However, the laxity on the part of the prosecution is particularly egregious here, where the State could have easily obtained a mug shot or fingerprint record, compared Social Security numbers, or elicited testimony from the appellant\u2019s wife, to prove the Texas defendant and the appellant in this case are the same person.\nFor the above reasons, I respectfully dissent, and am authorized to state that Judges BIRD and NEAL join in this opinion.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William M. Brown, for appellant.",
      "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: James R. Gowen, Jr., Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "James Don LEATHERWOOD v. STATE\nCA CR 99-522\n11 S.W.3d 571\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions II, III, and IV\nOpinion delivered March 1, 2000\nWilliam M. Brown, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: James R. Gowen, Jr., Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0233-01",
  "first_page_order": 261,
  "last_page_order": 266
}