{
  "id": 6142422,
  "name": "Loran E. COPPOC v. Mark MOELLER and David Moeller",
  "name_abbreviation": "Coppoc v. Moeller",
  "decision_date": "2000-03-29",
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  "first_page": "392",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:09:43.542887+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Pittman and Stroud, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Loran E. COPPOC v. Mark MOELLER and David Moeller"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge.\nAppellant, Loran E. Cop-poc, appeals the chancery court\u2019s granting of summary judgment in favor of appellees, Mark Moeller and David Moeller, on appellees\u2019 suit seeking foreclosure of property on which appellant executed a mortgage in favor of appellees. Appellant contends that there remained a genuine issue of material fact: he executed the note and mortgage under duress. Because that affirmative defense was not raised in appellant\u2019s answer, we affirm.\nAccording to appellees\u2019 complaint for foreclosure, appellant executed a promissory note in the amount of $40,000 payable to appellees and a mortgage conveying certain real property in Garland County to appellees. Appellees also stated that appellant defaulted in the payment of his obligations under the note, and appellees declared the entire principal balance due and payable. Further, appellees sought foreclosure on the real property. Appellant filed an answer admitting that he executed the mortgage but denying that he executed the promissory note. In appellant\u2019s answers to appel-lees\u2019 request for admissions, appellant denied executing both the promissory note and the mortgage.\nAppellees sought summary judgment, alleging that no genuine issue of material fact remained. In response, appellant denied the allegations in appellees\u2019 motion for summary judgment, including their claim that no genuine issue of material fact remained. Though no affidavits were attached to the response, appellant subsequently filed an affidavit in which he admitted that he executed an agreement, the promissory note, and the mortgage. Appellant further stated that when he executed these documents, appellees were staying at his home following his wife\u2019s, the appellees\u2019 mother\u2019s, death. He stated that appellee David Moeller was \u201cvery threatening\u201d and threatened to kill appellant if David did not \u201cget the money back.\u201d He further stated that he did not want to sign the papers but did so because he was afraid of David Moeller since he was staying at his home.\nThe court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, noting that in his affidavit, appellant neither denied executing the note and mortgage nor denied that he was in default. On appeal, appellant contends that the court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact remained, that is, his claim that he was under duress when he executed the documents.\nSummary judgment should be granted only when a review of the pleadings, depositions, and other filings reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Lee v. Hot Springs Village Golf Sch., 58 Ark. App. 293, 951 S.W.2d 315 (1997). All proof submitted must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and any doubts or inferences must be resolved against the moving party. See id.\nA claim of duress is an affirmative defense. See Goode v. First Nat\u2019l Bank of Conway, 269 Ark. 755, 600 S.W.2d 755 (Ark. App. 1980). Even if an affirmative defense is raised in a motion for summary judgment, if it was not raised in the answer, then the party is precluded from arguing it at any other stage in the case, and we will not review the issue. Bharodia v. Pledger, 340 Ark. 547, 11 S.W.3d 540 (2000). \u201cAlthough the burden of demonstrating the non-existence of a genuine issue of fact is on the moving party, a plaintiff moving for summary judgment after answer has been filed is not required to negate defenses not raised by the answer,\u201d and an issue not raised in an answer cannot be raised by amending a response to a motion for summary judgment. See BWH, Inc. v. Metropolitan Nat\u2019l Bank, 267 Ark. 182, 189, 590 S.W.2d 247, 252 (1979). Appellees were not required to negate an affirmative defense not raised in appellant\u2019s answer, and no genuine issue of material fact remained which we are required to address. Thus, the court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees.\nAffirmed.\nPittman and Stroud, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Kenneth Breckenridge, L.L.C., by: Kenneth Breckemidge, for appellant.",
      "Hargraves & McCrary, by: Michael S. McCrary, for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Loran E. COPPOC v. Mark MOELLER and David Moeller\nCA 99-867\n13 S.W.3d 596\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered March 29, 2000\nKenneth Breckenridge, L.L.C., by: Kenneth Breckemidge, for appellant.\nHargraves & McCrary, by: Michael S. McCrary, for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0392-01",
  "first_page_order": 420,
  "last_page_order": 422
}