{ "id": 6138866, "name": "Dorothea KOPRIVA and Stanley Kopriva v. BURNETT-CROOM-LINCOLN-PADEN, LLC", "name_abbreviation": "Kopriva v. Burnett-Croom-Lincoln-Paden, LLC", "decision_date": "2000-04-26", "docket_number": "CA 99-1207", "first_page": "131", "last_page": "135", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "70 Ark. App. 131" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "15 S.W.3d 361" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "289 Ark. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 P.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Cal. App. 2d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4565386 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/50/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ark. 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1630095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/252/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark. App. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136449 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/66/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ark. App. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/63/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298636 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ark. App. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140534 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/63/0241-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 450, "char_count": 7001, "ocr_confidence": 0.739, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.340064645421186e-07, "percentile": 0.6309584072276029 }, "sha256": "c0d08c0464d57587d4e6129990463a74a2e1ca421e51b9a87359a021c60eba29", "simhash": "1:53cb95754315d4b0", "word_count": 1178 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:11.491630+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Robbins, C.J., and Stroud, J\u201e agree." ], "parties": [ "Dorothea KOPRIVA and Stanley Kopriva v. BURNETT-CROOM-LINCOLN-PADEN, LLC" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OLLY NEAL, Judge.\nThis is a slip-and-fall case. The jury entered a verdict in the amount of $30, 296.78 in appellant Dorothea Kopriva\u2019s favor, but declined to make an award for Stanley Kopriva\u2019s loss of consortium claim. Appellee subsequently moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). This appeal is taken from the trial court\u2019s order granting appellee\u2019s motion for JNOV Appellants\u2019 sole point for reversal is that the trial court erred in granting appellee\u2019s motion for JNOV We find no error and affirm.\nA trial court may grant a JNOV only if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury and the moving party is entided to judgment as a matter of law. Unicare Homes, Inc. v. Gribble, 63 Ark. App. 241, 977 S.W.2d 490 (1998). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture. Union Pac. R.R. v. Sharp, 330 Ark. 174, 952 S.W.2d 658 (1997). On appeal, we will only consider the evidence favorable to the appellee, together with all its reasonable inferences. Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 63 Ark. App. 221, 977 S.W.2d 12 (1998).\nAppellants argue that substantial evidence supports the jury\u2019s verdict and that the trial court\u2019s grant of JNOV should be reversed.\nOn May 12, 1997, Dorothea Kopriva arrived at appellee Burnett-Croom-Lincoln-Paden Clinic for a scheduled doctor\u2019s appointment. Mrs. Kopriva entered the clinic\u2019s restroom to collect a urine sample for her physician and fell on the restroom\u2019s floor, fracturing her hip. She filed suit, alleging that she was injured as a result of the clinic\u2019s negligence in failing to use ordinary care to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition. At trial and on appeal, Mrs. Kopriva\u2019s theory of the causation of her accident was that the floors were shiny and slick, and that the condition of the clinic\u2019s floor caused her fall.\nA property owner has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of an invitee. Kelly v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 329, 937 S.W.2d 660 (1997). In order to prevail in a typical slip-and-fall case involving an invitee, the plaintiff must show either (1) that the presence of a substance upon the premises was the result of the defendant\u2019s negligence, or (2) that the substance had been on the premises for such a length of time that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of its presence and failed to use ordinary care to remove it. Fred\u2019s Stores v. Brooks, 66 Ark. App. 38, 987 S.W.2d 287 (1999).\nThis case is unlike the typical slip-and-fall case, in that appellants do not claim that Mrs. Kopriva\u2019s fall was caused by the presence of a substance on the floor. Rather, appellants suggest that the floor\u2019s condition resulting from the application of wax rendered the floor slick and shiny, causing Mrs. Kopriva\u2019s fall. In National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey, 252 Ark. 106, 477 S.W.2d 488 (1972), the supreme court adopted the following view expressed in Nicola v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 612, 123 P.2d 529:\nIf wax is applied to a floor it must be in such a manner as to afford reasonably safe conditions for the proprietor\u2019s invitees, and if such compounds cannot be used on a particular type of floor material without the violation of the duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of invitees, they should not be used at all. Of course slipperiness is an elastic term. From the fact that a floor is slippery does not necessarily result that it is dangerous to walk upon. It is the degree of shpperiness that determines whether the condition is reasonably safe. This is a question of fact.\nMrs. Kopriva testified that one of the clinic\u2019s nurses named \u201cDawn\u201d informed her after the accident that clinic employees had removed excess wax from the floors with alcohol and cotton swabs on prior occasions.\nDawn Pratt testified that she had removed substances from the clinic\u2019s laboratory floor, but could not recall cleaning up excess wax from any of the clinic\u2019s floors. She also testified that she never heard of anyone cleaning excess wax from the bathroom where Mrs. Kopriva fell.\nDonna Burnett, the clinic\u2019s administrator, testified that she had been informed of prior occasions where clinic employees had removed excess wax from the floors. She also testified that the last time the floors were waxed before appellant\u2019s fall was May 28, 1996, and that the next time the floors were waxed was one week after appellant fell. She could not recall a patient ever having slipped on any of the clinic\u2019s floors.\nLillie Harper, a clinic employee, testified that she had on occasion removed excess wax from the clinic floor. She did not recall the floor being very slick and shiny at the time of appellant\u2019s fall. She also testified that she had never heard of anyone removing excess wax from the bathroom where appellant fell.\nIn granting appellee\u2019s motion for JNOV the trial court reasoned:\nIn the trial of this matter, the plaintiff didn\u2019t contend that there was any foreign substance on the floor, but that the floor was \u201cshiny and slick.\u201d She seemed aware of this before the fall. The court should have granted the Motion for Directed Verdict, but submitted the matter to the jury with the feeling that the jury would reach a defendant\u2019s verdict as there was really no proof of defect or showing of notice that the floor was slippery. From the amount of the verdict one could surmise that the jury disregarded the instructions of law, felt sympathy for Mrs. Kopriva and awarded her the amount of the medical bills.\nAppellants argue that there was substantial evidence, both direct and circumstantial, to support the jury\u2019s verdict. They point out the fact that there was testimony to the effect that the clinic\u2019s floors were shiny and slick. However, testimony to this effect was insufficient to show that the bathroom floor\u2019s condition caused Mrs. Kopriva\u2019s fall. See, e.g., Black v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 316 Ark. 418, 872 S.W.2d 56 (1994). In fact, the evidence showed that the floors were buffed weekly, which, in our view, is the exercise of ordinary care in maintenance of the premises. Possible causes of a fall, as opposed to probable causes, do not constitute substantial evidence of negligence. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Willmon, 289 Ark. 14, 708 S.W.2d 623 (1986).\nUpon completing our review of the abstracted record and appellant\u2019s argument thereon, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting appellee\u2019s JNOV motion.\nAffirmed.\nRobbins, C.J., and Stroud, J\u201e agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "OLLY NEAL, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jewell, Moser, Fletcher & Holleman, for appellant.", "Barber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Glenn W. Jones and Morris W. Williams, III, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Dorothea KOPRIVA and Stanley Kopriva v. BURNETT-CROOM-LINCOLN-PADEN, LLC\nCA 99-1207\n15 S.W.3d 361\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered April 26, 2000\nJewell, Moser, Fletcher & Holleman, for appellant.\nBarber, McCaskill, Jones & Hale, P.A., by: Glenn W. Jones and Morris W. Williams, III, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0131-01", "first_page_order": 161, "last_page_order": 165 }