{
  "id": 6140581,
  "name": "RITCHIE GROCERY v. Sherry K. GLASS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Ritchie Grocery v. Glass",
  "decision_date": "2000-05-10",
  "docket_number": "CA 99-1206",
  "first_page": "222",
  "last_page": "228",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.",
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      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
      "year": 1996,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "(a)(2)"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Hart and Jennings, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "RITCHIE GROCERY v. Sherry K. GLASS"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ANDREE LAYTON Roaf, Judge.\nRitchie Grocery (Ritchie) appeals from an order of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission that awarded one of its employees, Sherry Glass, who was the victim of an armed robbery, medical benefits for treatment of post-traumatic-stress disorder (PTSD). On appeal, it argues that the Commission erred in its decision because it misinterpreted the Diagnostic Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (DSM-IV). We affirm.\nOn the night of January 14, 1998, Sherry Glass was attempting to lock the door to one of Ritchie\u2019s convenience stores, Rainbow Food Mart #3, where she worked as a night clerk, when a gun-wielding assailant surprised her from behind, forced his hand over her mouth, and ordered her not to scream. The assailant prodded her into a dark corner outside the store and pressed her into the corner with his body. A second man approached and demanded Glass\u2019s purse and keys. When the sound of an approaching vehicle caused her to look up, Glass\u2019s assailant placed his gun against her temple and ordered her to look down again. The second assailant unlocked Glass\u2019s car door and took Glass into the store. He ordered her to turn off the alarm and open the safe. When he found out that she could retrieve only $300 and could not access the floor safe, he threatened her. She put her hands over her face, turned away from the robber, and silently prayed for her life. Glass heard the robber leave the store and turned around in time to see the tail lights of her car as it left the parking lot.\nGlass started having nightmares about the robbery, and on February 9, 1998, she went through an intake appointment at a psychological counseling center, Neuropsychiatry Associates of South Arkansas. She was subsequently diagnosed with, and treated for, PTSD. Ritchie controverted her claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits, denying that she had suffered a compensable injury.\nAt a July 31, 1998, hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ), Glass\u2019s treating psychologist, Dr. Taryn Sue Van Guilder, testified that she began treating Glass for PTSD on a weekly basis, beginning on February 16, 1998. According to Dr. Van Guilder, Glass has experienced several of the symptoms associated with PTSD. She also stated that there was no other triggering event in Glass\u2019s history, and although Glass was treated for alcohol abuse some seven years before, she opined that alcohol abuse could not cause symptoms of PTSD, although it could \u201cexacerbate\u201d the symptoms. She also stated that Glass was still symptomatic and in treatment as of the day of the hearing, and she could not predict when Glass\u2019s symptoms would abate.\nOn cross-examination, Ritchie\u2019s attorney questioned Dr. Van Guilder at length about whether the symptoms that Glass exhibited conformed to the criteria required by DSM-IV. Dr. Van Guilder stated that Glass exhibited markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities, although that symptom \u201cremitted pretty quickly . . . [after] a month, maybe,\u201d but noted that'Glass started feeling \u201ca little bit better about that as things progressed.\u201d Dr. Van Guilder further noted that Glass exhibited a restricted range of affect, but conceded that this finding was relative to the general population and that she was not familiar with Glass\u2019s range of affect prior to the robbery. Finally, Dr. Van Guilder stated that Glass exhibited persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma, and she disagreed that the fact that Glass had visited the convenience store would detract from the validity of this diagnostic finding because returning to the store was a specific part of Glass\u2019s therapy. Dr. Van Guilder concluded her testimony by stating that the nature of Glass\u2019s condition had changed over time, at least in part because of the more than five months of treatment that Glass had undergone.\nGlass\u2019s husband, John Wayne Glass, testified that she began experiencing nightmares immediately after the robbery, which he considered \u201cnormal.\u201d He eventually urged her to seek help, however, when it seemed to be getting worse. John Glass further testified that after the robbery, \u201cthere definitely was a change. Sherry didn\u2019t want nobody touching her, you know. I mean, she was just acting strange.\u201d\nIn addition to testifying about the robbery, Glass stated that she had dreams about the incident, overreacted to benign situations such as when a person bumped into her, and was only looking for day-time employment. On cross-examination, she admitted to going back to the store \u201cjust a few times\u201d including once to get her last paycheck, \u201ca few times to purchase cigarettes or whatever,\u201d and an unspecified number of times to purchase beer. She noted however, that she was required to go to the store as part of her therapy.\nJohn Benson, vice-president of Ritchie Grocery Company, testified that he obtained surveillance video that showed Glass in the store during the early evening hours on March 26, 1998, April 7, 1998, and April 14, 1998. Glass subsequently viewed the video tapes and noted that on April 7, 1998, she was accompanied by her daughter who also appeared on the tape. Glass\u2019s supervisor, Carol Dyson, testified that Glass had been in the store \u201ctwo or three times\u201d since the robbery. Dyson also stated that she worked \u201cdays\u201d and that she only waited on Glass one of the times that she came to the store. Dyson also stated that store clerk Bobby Green waited on Glass the other times, and that she was present when Green was working \u201cmost of the time.\u201d Bobby Green, who stated that she only worked mornings, testified Glass may have been in the store as many as five times, but only twice by herself. Janice Gold, a clerk who worked the 2:00-to-ll:00 shift at Rainbow, testified that she was present when Glass came into the store on March 26, 1998, and described the visit. On cross-examination, Gold stated that she was familiar with the times that Glass came into the store because Benson told her to keep a record of each visit. Gold was unable, however, to explain why only three of the visits were depicted.on video tape. She also admitted that it was apparent from the video that the April 7, 1998, visit was conducted during daylight hours.\nRitchie argues on appeal that the Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the diagnostic criteria in DSM-IV to conclude that Glass was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. It contends that although some of the symptoms required to diagnose PTSD were arguably present, Dr. Van Guilder\u2019s testimony regarding the symptom of \u201cmarkedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities\u201d lasting \u201ca month\u201d, maybe,\u201d was insufficient to establish the presence of the indicator for the requisite one-month period. Further, regarding the symptom of restricted range of affect, it contends that Dr. Van Guilder had no basis to know how Glass\u2019s affect had changed. Finally, regarding the indicator of avoiding activities, people, and places that arouse recollections of the traumatic event, Ritchie contends that the videotape showing Glass\u2019s presence in the store and other eye-witness testimony contradicts Glass\u2019s own account that she was avoiding the store. This argument is without merit.\nArkansas\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation law states in pertinent part that: \u201cNo mental injury or illness under this section shall be compensable unless it is also diagnosed by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist and unless the diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-113(a)(2) (Repl. 1996). When we review appeals from decisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and affirm if supported by substantial evidence. Oliver v. Guardsmark, Inc., 68 Ark. App. 24, 3 S.W.3d 336 (1999). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue on appeal is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission\u2019s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Id.\nRegarding Ritchie\u2019s argument that the duration of Glass\u2019s \u201cmarkedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities\u201d was not sufficiently long to satisfy Diagnostic Criteria E, the standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases prevents reversal on this issue. As noted above, we are required to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision. While it is true that Dr. Van Guilder\u2019s assessment of the duration of the symptom in question was somewhat equivocal, to reach Ritchie\u2019s conclusion, this court would have to disregard Dr. Van Guilder\u2019s testimony that Glass was diagnosed in accordance with DSM-IV, which implies that the symptom was present for more than a month, and then conclude that the Commission erred as a matter of law in interpreting the phrase \u201ca month, maybe\u201d as meaning less than a month. The Commission is empowered to conduct such a de novo review; this court is not.\nSimilarly without merit is Ritchie\u2019s contention that because Dr. Van Guilder had no basis to know how Glass\u2019s affect had changed, restricted range of affect could not be counted as valid diagnostic criteria. In making this argument, Ritchie ignores the fact that Dr. Van Guilder is a trained professional who was qualified to recognize a flat affect and give an opinion as to its presence. Moreover, DSM-IV states as an example of restricted range of affect, \u201ce.g., unable to have loving feelings.\u201d As noted above, the Commission had before it the testimony of Glass\u2019s husband of eighteen years who stated that he sought treatment for Glass after the robbery because she would not allow anyone to touch her, which certainly would support. a conclusion that Glass was not demonstrating loving feelings.\nFinally, Ritchie\u2019s assertion that the indicator of avoiding activities, people, and places that arouse recollections of the traumatic event was not present simply because Glass was observed going to the store, is disingenuous at best. Not only was Ritchie\u2019s testimony regarding the number of times that Glass actually visited the store not clearly inconsistent with what Glass had reported, Dr. Van Guilder testified that part of Glass\u2019s therapy was to make such visits. Moreover, Dr. Van Guilder testified that Glass\u2019s condition was improving; as noted above, under DSM-IV, the symptom need only to be present for one month to be a valid diagnostic criteria.\nAffirmed.\nHart and Jennings, JJ., agree.\nUnder DSM-IV, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is organized in six sections, all must be present for a diagnosis of PTSD. Ritchie only challenges the diagnostic criteria in one of the sections, Section C. Section C states:\nPersistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:\n(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma\n(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma\n(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma\n(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activites\n(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others\n(6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)\n(7) sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span)\nDr. Van Guilder only found symptoms 2, 4, and 5 supported the diagnosis.\nIn DSM-IV, one of the diagnostic criteria for PTSD requires that the symptoms listed in Sections B, C, and D be present for \u201cmore than 1 month.\u201d",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "ANDREE LAYTON Roaf, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bridges, Young, Matthews & Drake, by: Michael J. Dennis, for appellant.",
      "Georgia L. Taylor, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "RITCHIE GROCERY v. Sherry K. GLASS\nCA 99-1206\n16 S.W.3d 289\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered May 10, 2000\nBridges, Young, Matthews & Drake, by: Michael J. Dennis, for appellant.\nGeorgia L. Taylor, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0222-01",
  "first_page_order": 252,
  "last_page_order": 258
}
