{ "id": 6142390, "name": "Raymond C. SWEEDEN, et al. v. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Sweeden v. Farmers Insurance Group", "decision_date": "2000-11-15", "docket_number": "CA 99-988", "first_page": "381", "last_page": "395", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "71 Ark. App. 381" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "30 S.W.3d 783" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "252 Ark. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1629849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/252/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ark. App. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139375 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/67/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 S.W.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 Ark. App. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139015 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/25/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ark. App. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/1/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 1355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Mass. App. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass. App. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 772128 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass-app-ct/44/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-19-605", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 23-89-209", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 N.W.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Wis.2d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Nev. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 4798429 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/95/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 N.Y.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 4413502 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/74/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 S.W.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1451234, 1451279 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0604-01", "/ark/320/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451234 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ark. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8723245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/243/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 F. Supp. 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3049071 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/306/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.W.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "436 Mich. 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "442 N.W.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Mich. App. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 2313862 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/177/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140200 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/66/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "663 A.2d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7869982 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/663/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ark. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137746 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/67/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ark. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1606839 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/245/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ark. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139105 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/13/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "an uninsured motorist case" }, { "parenthetical": "an uninsured motorist case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906049 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "an underinsured motorist case" }, { "parenthetical": "an underinsured motorist case" }, { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136770 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "877 S.W.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1443753, 1443809 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0308-01", "/ark/317/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443753 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ark. App. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139788 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/46/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655444 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-16-702", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 981, "char_count": 26354, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8176030626588312e-07, "percentile": 0.7187542594182131 }, "sha256": "c06be415846c45acedcd603b01c6d7ef73f44fdbe17cb02b1b45945c5746e4a8", "simhash": "1:b5764c654808b67f", "word_count": 4226 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:32:31.293590+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GRIFFEN and R.OAF, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Raymond C. SWEEDEN, et al. v. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge.\nThe issues in this appeal concern the extent of liability coverage available under three separate automobile insurance policies, each having per-person bodily injury limits of $100,000. The policies were issued to appellant Kenneth White (and, in the case of one policy, Kenneth White and Kenneth\u2019s Auto Sales) by appellees Mid-Century Insurance Company, Farmers Insurance Company, and Farmers Insurance Exchange, all members of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies. Coverage issues arose in 1996 when an automobile accident occurred between a vehicle driven by appellant Raymond Sweeden and a vehicle driven by Kenneth White\u2019s son, Randall. As a result of the accident, Sweeden and his wife, appellant Ileen Sweeden, sued the White family seeking compensation for Raymond\u2019s injuries and for Ileen\u2019s loss of consortium. Before that suit was resolved, however, the Sweedens filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against appellees claiming that, to obtain redress for their injuries, liability coverage should be available under all three of the Whites\u2019 insurance policies. Appellees moved for summary judgment and argued that, as a matter of law, their coverage obligation was limited to the $100,000 limit of one of the policies. The circuit judge agreed and granted summary judgment in their favor. We affirm.\nThe accident in which Raymond Sweeden was injured occurred on May 9, 1996. His vehicle was struck from the rear by a 1989 Chevrolet CIO pickup driven by seventeen-year-old Randall White. Following the accident, the Sweedens sued Randall and his parents, Kenneth and Brenda White, alleging that the accident was proximately caused by Randall\u2019s negligence. They further alleged that Randall\u2019s negligence should be imputed to Kenneth and Brenda White pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-16-702 (Supp. 1999). That statute provides that the negligence of a minor driver shall be imputed to the person who either signs or is authorized to sign the minor\u2019s driver\u2019s license application.\nAs a result of the Sweedens\u2019 lawsuit against the Whites, questions arose concerning the extent of liability coverage owed by appellees under the following three policies: 1) a policy issued by Mid-Century Insurance Company to Kenneth White on the 1989 Chevrolet CIO pickup with bodily injury liability limits of $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for each occurrence (hereafter, \u201cthe Mid-Century policy\u201d); 2) a policy issued by Farmers Insurance Company to Kenneth White on a 1995 Taurus with bodily injury liability limits of $100,000 for each person and $300,000 for each occurrence (hereafter, \u201cthe Taurus policy\u201d); and 3) a commercial garage policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange to Kenneth White and Kenneth\u2019s Auto Sales with liability limits of $100,000 for each accident (hereafter, \u201cthe garage policy\u201d). Appellees acknowledged that $100,000 in coverage was available under the Mid-Century policy, but denied that any further amounts were due under any of the policies.\nTo resolve the coverage issues, the Sweedens filed the declaratory-judgment complaint that is the subject of this appeal. They sought a declaration that liability coverage was available under all three of the White\u2019s policies and that Ileen Sweeden\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim should not be included in the per-person bodily injury limits of any one of the policies. In effect, they asserted that up to $400,000 in liability coverage was available under the policies: $300,000 as the total per-person liability limits on the policies, plus another $100,000 for Ileen\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim. Kenneth and Brenda White, who were named as defendants in the action along with the appellee insurance companies, cross-claimed against appel-lees and agreed with the Sweedens that more than $100,000 in coverage was owed.\nOn July 25, 1997, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of law, the total limit of liability coverage available to the White family was $100,000. They contended that: 1) Ileen Sweeden\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim was derivative and therefore included in the $100,000 limit of liability for Raymond Sweeden\u2019s bodily injury; 2) there was no coverage under the Taurus policy because it excluded coverage for any of Kenneth White\u2019s vehicles other than the Taurus; and 3) there was no coverage under either the Taurus policy or the garage policy because they contained \u201cother insurance\u201d clauses that limited coverage to $100,000. Copies of all three policies were attached to the motion. The Sweedens responded to the motion for summary judgment by arguing that: 1) Ileen Sweeden\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim was entitled to be treated as a separate bodily injury; and 2) the \u201cother insurance\u201d clauses in the policies were ambiguous and against public policy. The Sweeden\u2019s response was adopted by appellants Kenneth and Brenda White.\nOn November 10, 1997, Circuit Judge Lance Hanshaw denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that factual issues remained in dispute. Several months later, judgment was entered in the Sweedens\u2019 tort case against the White family. The judge found that Randall White was guilty of negligence and that his negligence should be imputed to Kenneth and Brenda White. He awarded $300,000 in damages to Raymond Sweeden and $100,000 to Ileen Sweeden. On February 18, 1999, appellees renewed their motion for summary judgment, asserting the same arguments they had previously made. Following a hearing, Judge Phillip Whiteaker, to whom Judge Hanshaw had transferred the case, granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. The Sweedens and the Whites bring their appeal from that ruling.\nIn reviewing summary-judgment cases, we determine whether the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented by the moving party left a material question of fact unanswered. Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242 (2000). The moving party always bears the burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment. Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998). All proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the resisting party, and any doubts must be resolved against the moving party. Id. In a case such as this one where there are no disputed facts, our review must focus on the trial court\u2019s application of the law to those undisputed facts. See id.\nThe issues in this case involve the construction of language in various insurance policies. A contract is unambiguous and its construction and legal effect are questions of law when its terms are not susceptible to more than one equally reasonable construction. See Singh v. Riley\u2019s, Inc., 46 Ark. App. 223, 878 S.W.2d 422 (1994). However, an ambiguity may arise when the language in an insurance policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Keller v. Safeco Ins. Co., 317 Ark. 308, 877 S.W.2d 90 (1994). Policy language is to be construed in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. See Norris v. State Farm, supra. The terms of an unambiguous insurance policy are not to be rewritten under the rule of strict construction against an insurer to bind an insurer to a risk that is plainly excluded and for which it was not paid. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 69 Ark. App. 35, 9 S.W.3d 545 (2000).\nThe first policy language we discuss on appeal is an exclusionary clause contained in the Taurus policy. The policy excludes from liability coverage \u201cbodily injury... arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of any vehicle other than your insured car which is owned by or furnished or available for regular use by you or a family member.\u201d Based on the record before us, the term \u201cyour insured car\u201d is defined in the policy for purposes of this issue as the 1995 Taurus. That being the case, we interpret the clause to exclude coverage for bodily injury arising out of the use of any vehicle owned by Kenneth White, other than the Taurus. This type of clause is known as an \u201cowned-but-not-insured\u201d exclusion. See Clampit v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Ark. 107, 828 S.W.2d 593 (1992) (an underinsured motorist case); Crawford v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988) (an uninsured motorist case). Such clauses preclude recovery for accidents involving a vehicle that is owned by the named insured but that is not insured under the particular policy in question. See Clampit v. State Farm, supra. The rationale behind such a clause was noted in Clampit as follows:\nIf an insurer is required to insure against a risk of an undesignated but owned vehicle, or a different and more dangerous vehicle of which it has no knowledge, it is thereby required to insure against risks of which it is unaware, unable to underwrite and unable to charge a premium therefor.\nId. at 109, 828 S.W.2d at 594.\nHere, Kenneth White owned the CIO pickup involved in the accident, but the pickup was not insured under the Taurus policy. Therefore, under the terms of the \u201cowned-but-not-insured\u201d clause, the Taurus policy provides no liability coverage for bodily injury arising out of the use of the CIO pickup.\nHaving determined that no coverage is owed under the Taurus policy, we address the next set of issues with reference to appellees\u2019 coverage obligation under the garage policy. Unlike the Taurus policy, the garage policy has no \u201cowned-but-not-insured\u201d exclusion. In fact, one of the unique features of a garage policy is that, unlike standard automobile liability policies, it does not insure a particular automobile. See Insured Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Arkansas Truck Parts, Inc., 13 Ark. App. 165, 681 S.W.2d 403 (1984). Further, appellees do not argue that Randall White\u2019s use of the CIO pickup does not constitute a \u201cgarage operation\u201d as defined by the policy. Instead, appellees contend that the garage policy contains \u201canti-stacking\u201d or \u201cother insurance\u201d language that limits coverage when more than one insurance policy is applicable. The relevant provision reads, in pertinent part, as follows:\nTWO OR MORE COVERAGE FORMS OR POLICIES ISSUED BY US\nIf this Coverage Form and any other Coverage Form or policy issued to you by us or any company affiliated with us apply to the same \u2018accident\u2019, the aggregate maximum Limit of Insurance under all the Coverage Form [sic] or policies shall not exceed the highest applicable Limit of Insurance under any one Coverage Form or policy.\nAppellees argue that, because Mid-Century \u2014 the company that issued the CIO \u2014 policy and Farmers Insurance Exchange \u2014 the company that issued the garage policy \u2014 are affiliated, this clause limits their combined coverage obligation to the highest applicable limit: under either policy. Thus, they claim, appellants are prohibited from stacking the two policies to obtain coverage of more than $100,000.\nThe term \u201cstacking\u201d is used to describe a situation where all available policies are added together to create a larger pool from which the injured party may draw in order to compensate him for his loss where a single policy is not sufficient to make him whole. Neil Chamberlin and J. Stephen Holt, Why Arkansas Should Overturn Its Anti-Stacking Precedent: A Look At Aggregating Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage, 21 UALR. L.J. 413 (1999). Insurance companies have often sought, by their policy language, to prevent insureds from stacking coverage. See id. Anti-stacking clauses have been upheld by our courts so long as they are not ambiguous. See generally Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 340 Ark. 335, 10 S.W.3d 846 (2000); Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 69 Ark. App. 35, 9 S.W.3d 545 (2000); Kanning v. Allstate Ins. Cos., 67 Ark. App. 135, 992 S.W.2d 831 (1999). The issue of stacking has arisen most often in the context of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. In fact, all of the above-cited decisions involve either uninsured or underinsured coverage. This case represents the first time that our courts have addressed the stacking issue with regard to automobile liability insurance. We note however, that stacking of liability coverage has been addressed in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lonergan v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 663 A.2d 480 (Del. Super. 1995), a case with facts very similar to the case at bar. See also collected cases at 12 Couch on Insurance 3d \u00a7 169:109 (1999) and 7A Am. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance \u00a7 427 (2d ed. 1997).\nThe Sweeden appellants and the White appellants raise numerous issues regarding the anti-stacking language in the garage policy. For the sake of clarity and convenience, we will discuss each argument separately.\nThe Term \u201cAffiliated\u201d As Used in the Garage Policy\u2019s \u201cOther Insurance\u201d Clause Is Ambiguous\nThe garage policy\u2019s \u201cother insurance\u201d clause places a limit on the insurance company\u2019s coverage obligation in situations where another applicable policy has been \u201cissued to you by us or any company affiliated with us.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Both the Sweeden appellants and the White appellants argue that the term \u201caffiliated\u201d is ambiguous, i.e., that the insured may not have known that Mid-Century and Farmers Insurance Exchange were affiliated. As we pointed out earlier, an ambiguity may arise in an insurance contract when a term is susceptible to more than one equally reasonable construction. Keller v. Safeco Ins. Co., supra. Appellants are unable to demonstrate on appeal a reasonable construction of this particular contract that might have led an insured to believe that Mid-Century and Farmers Insurance Exchange were not affiliated. The declarations page of the garage policy lists both Mid-Century and Farmers Insurance Exchange as being members of the Farmers Insurance Group of Companies. Additionally, the Farmers Insurance Group logo appears at various places throughout both policies. Contracts of insurance should receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the apparent object and intent of the parties in light of their general object and purpose. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, supra. Further, different clauses in a contract must be read together and construed so that all of its parts harmonize, if that is at all possible. Boatmen\u2019s Ark., Inc. v. Farmer, 66 Ark. App. 240, 989 S.W.2d 557 (1999).\nWe also note that, in making this argument, the Sweeden appellants refer to the case of Yahr v. Garcia, 177 Mich. App. 705, 442 N.W.2d 749 (1989), which held that an \u201cother insurance\u201d clause involving policies issued by the same company was ambiguous. Elowever, that case was reversed on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court for the reasons set forth in the dissent in the appeals court case, among them, that the clause was unambiguous. See Yahr v. Garcia, 436 Mich. 872, 461 N.W.2d 363 (1990).\nIn light of all these factors, we decline to reverse the trial judge\u2019s grant of summary judgment on the basis of an ambiguity in the word \u201caffiliated.\u201d\n\u201cOther Insurance\" Language in Policies Issued by Affiliated Companies Is Per Se Inapplicable\nThe Sweeden and White appellants also argue that, because Mid-Century and Farmers Insurance Exchange are affiliated, the \u201cother insurance\u201d clause in the garage policy is inapplicable. As support for their argument, they cite Woolston v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 306 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Ark. 1969). In Woolston, a pedestrian, Jennifer Woolston, was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist. Jennifer\u2019s parents owned two policies issued by State Farm, and each of the policies provided $10,000 per person limits on UM coverage. The Woolstons sought coverage under both policies for a total of $20,000. State Farm argued that, due to an \u201cother insurance\u201d clause in their policies, their liability was limited to $10,000. The clause read, in pertinent part that \u201cif the insured has other similar insurance available to him against a loss covered by this coverage, then the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance....\u201d The federal court held that the clause was ambiguous because it did not specifically refer to the fact that \u201cother similar insurance\u201d could be another policy issued by the same company.\nThe Woolston case is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, the \u201cother insurance\u201d clause expressly contemplates the possibility that other applicable insurance has been issued by an affiliated company. Such language makes this case more like MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallace, supra, than Woolston. In MFA v. Wallace, the insurer issued two separate policies to Wallace on two separate vehicles. MFA resisted Wallace\u2019s attempt to stack UM coverage under the two policies based on the following clause:\nOther Automobile Insurance In The Company With respect to any occurrence, accident, death, or loss to which this and any other automobile insurance policy issued to the named insured or spouse by the Company also applies, the total limit of the Company\u2019s liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability or benefit amount under any one policy.\nThis particular language was declared unambiguous by the supreme court in the earlier case of Varvil v. MFA Mutual Insurance Cos., 243 Ark. 692, 421 S.W.2d 346 (1967), which involved an attempt to stack death benefits under an auto policy. In Wallace, the supreme court held that this language was not repugnant to the UM statute requiring that certain minimum coverage be afforded an insured.\nThe Woolston court, in holding that State Farm\u2019s \u201cother insurance\u201d clause was ambiguous, distinguished Wallace and Varvil on the basis that, in those cases, the \u201cother insurance\u201d clause specifically referred to other insurance issued by the same company. The policy language at issue here is very similar to that approved in Varvil and Wallace, with the exception that it refers to affiliated companies rather than the same company. Having already determined that the term \u201caffiliated\u201d is not ambiguous in this context, we have no difficulty holding that summary judgment was properly granted on this issue.\nBefore leaving this issue, we distinguish the cases of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Barnhill, 284 Ark. 219, 681 S.W.2d 341 (1984), and Ross v. United Services Automobile Association, 320 Ark. 604, 899 S.W.2d 53 (1995), both of which allowed an insured to stack coverages. Both cases involved several vehicles insured under a single policy. In Barnhill, the supreme court held that Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cother insurance\u201d clause, which was different than the one at issue here, did not contemplate that the other insurance involved could mean coverages available under the same policy. In Ross, the holding was limited to the particular language in the policy (which is not contained in the opinion) which, according to the court, \u201cprohibit[ed] the stacking of policies, and not the stacking of cars within the policy.\u201d Here, appellants are attempting to stack coverages under different policies.\nAn Ambiguity Exists When The Clause At Issue Is Read In Connection With A Standard \u201cOther Insurance\u201d Clause In The Policy\nIn addition to the above-quoted \u201cother insurance\u201d clause, the garage policy contained the following clause:\nWhen this Coverage Form and any other Coverage Form or policy covers on the same basis, either excess or primary, we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that the Limit of Insurance of our Coverage Form bears to the total of the limits of all the Coverage Forms and policies covering on the same basis.\nThe Sweeden appellants argue that this clause, which attempts to prorate the insurer\u2019s liability, conflicts with the above-quoted \u201ctwo or more\u201d clause that sets an overall coverage limit. They rely on the case of Carlino v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 350, 546 N.E.2d 909 (1989). In Carlino, it was held that a \u201ctwo or more\u201d clause like the one here impermissibly reduced the total applicable limits available to an insured. However, the holding was based on a New York insurance regulation that required insurers to ratably contribute when other insurance was involved. Appellants point to no such Arkansas regulation. Thus, we conclude that no inconsistency exists here. The standard \u201cother insurance\u201d clause obviously applies in situations when other applicable policies are issued by a company other than one affiliated with Farmers Insurance Exchange.\nVicarious Liability\nThe Sweeden appellants argue that the garage policy provides coverage for Kenneth and Brenda White\u2019s vicarious liability separate and apart from the coverage provided to Randall White under the CIO policy for his negligence. In effect, they contend that the available policy limits should be increased because more than one insured may be held liable under separate theories of recovery. We disagree with appellants\u2019 argument. First, the garage policy provides $100,000 coverage for each \u201caccident.\u201d There is no contention that more than one accident occurred in this case. Secondly, the Mid-Century policy provides coverage of $100,000 bodily injury for each person. The policy expressly states that its limit for \u201ceach person\u201d is the maximum for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one occurrence. It further provides that the company will pay no more than the maximum limits regardless of the number of insured persons involved in the occurrence. Thus, the $100,000 limit for \u201ceach person\u201d referred to in the policy means $100,000 for each injured person, not for each insured person.\nAppellants cite cases from other jurisdictions in support of their argument. See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass\u2019n v. Crandall, 95 Nev. 334, 594 P.2d 704 (1979); Klatt v. Zera, 11 Wis.2d 415, 105 N.W.2d 776 (1960). However, these cases hold only that an insurer may owe coverage to an insured parent who incurs vicarious liability for his child\u2019s negligence in driving an automobile. None of the cited cases stands for the proposition that a policy\u2019s per-person limits may be increased when more than one insured is liable for damages.\nUninsured/TJnderinsured Cases Not Applicable\nThe Sweeden appellants also argue that Arkansas cases that have approved anti-stacking language are inapplicable here because they involve uninsured and underinsured coverage rather than liability coverage. No cogent reason is offered for why this distinction is important. Appellants refer to the fact that our supreme court has said that, to analyze any stacking issue, the court should \u201cRead the Statute and Read the Policy.\u201d See Youngman v. State Farm, supra. However, they claim that \u201c[wjithout uninsurance [sic] or underinsurance at issue, there is no statute to read.\u201d This is incorrect. The \u201cstatute\u201d referred to in the supreme court\u2019s maxim is the statute that mandates that liability insurers offer minimum UM or UIM coverage. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 23-89-209 and 23-89-403 (Repl. 1999). As with these types of coverages, Arkansas law also mandates minimum liability coverage. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-19-605 (Repl. 1999). Thus, we see no relevant distinction for purposes of this case.\nGarage Policy Issued to Two Separate Entities\nThe \u201cother insurance\u201d clause at issue in this case aggregates policy limits when another policy has been \u201cissued to you by us or any company affiliated with us....\u201d (Emphasis added.) The Sweeden appellants argue that, because the garage policy was issued to two separate entities \u2014 Kenneth White and White\u2019s Auto Sales \u2014 the term \u201cissued to you\u201d is ambiguous. They cite Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 44 Mass. App. 218, 689 N.E.2d 1355 (1998), in which it was held that an \u201cother insurance\u201d clause identical to the one here applied only when the policy was issued to a single owner, not when it was issued to two separate entities. The record as abstracted does not show that appellants made this argument below. We do not address arguments made for the first time on appeal. Hendricks v. Burton, 1 Ark. App. 159, 613 S.W.2d 609 (1981). Additionally, appellants make the argument for the first time in their reply brief, which is not permitted. See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Deason, 25 Ark. App. 152, 752 S.W.2d 111 (1988).\nArkansas Decisions Upholding Anti-Stacking Clauses Should Be Overruled\nThe White appellants argue that MFA v. Wallace and its progeny, which have upheld anti-stacking language in insurance policies, should be overruled. This court is not permitted to overrule cases handed down by our supreme court. Eisner v. Fields, 67 Ark. App. 238, 998 S.W.2d 421 (1999). Our attempt to certify the case to the supreme court was denied, no doubt because the court only recently rejected this same argument in Youngman v. State Farm Automobile Insurance, supra.\nIn light of the forgoing, we hold that the anti-stacking language contained in the garage policy was not ambiguous and was applicable to this case. Therefore, appellees\u2019 coverage obligation was limited to the highest applicable limits, which would be the $100,000 per-person limits available under the Mid-Century policy.\nThe only issue that remains is whether Ileen Sweeden\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim constitutes a separate \u201cper-person\u201d bodily injury, such that the Mid-Century policy\u2019s $300,000 per occurrence limit rather than its $100,000 per-person limit should apply. We hold it does not. The Mid-Century policy provides that any claim for loss of consortium shall be included in the per-person limit. A similar and even less specific (it did not mention loss of consortium) restriction was upheld in Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 Ark. 57, 477 S.W.2d 186 (1972).\nAffirmed.\nGRIFFEN and R.OAF, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lona McCastlain and David A. Hodges, for appellants Raymond C. Sweeden and Ileen P. Sweeden.", "Rice, Adams, Beckham & Pulliam, by: Ben E. Rice, for appellants Randall A. White, Kenneth White, and Brenda White.", "Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, PA., by: Julia L. Busfield and Bruce Munson, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Raymond C. SWEEDEN, et al. v. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, et al.\nCA 99-988\n30 S.W.3d 783\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered November 15, 2000\nLona McCastlain and David A. Hodges, for appellants Raymond C. Sweeden and Ileen P. Sweeden.\nRice, Adams, Beckham & Pulliam, by: Ben E. Rice, for appellants Randall A. White, Kenneth White, and Brenda White.\nHuckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, PA., by: Julia L. Busfield and Bruce Munson, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0381-01", "first_page_order": 413, "last_page_order": 427 }