{ "id": 6142083, "name": "CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jim ADAMS d/b/a Adams Trucking and DeWitt Bank & Trust", "name_abbreviation": "Canal Insurance v. Adams", "decision_date": "2001-02-14", "docket_number": "CA 00-301", "first_page": "440", "last_page": "442", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "72 Ark. App. 440" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "37 S.W.3d 677" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 Ark. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51187 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ark. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1621151 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" }, { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/258/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Ark. 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8725273 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "934" }, { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/228/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257779 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655466 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0679-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 343, "char_count": 4847, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.30798726103336527 }, "sha256": "37e3fbc4d36c1862aea8ecb275ed194f2771e14b5fa567ceb9d28194c881df0e", "simhash": "1:10b5cea101a4b022", "word_count": 803 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:58:14.113773+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart and Jennings, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jim ADAMS d/b/a Adams Trucking and DeWitt Bank & Trust" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tree Crabtree, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from the Arkansas County Circuit Court\u2019s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Jim Adams, and to deny summary judgment to the appellant, Canal Insurance Company. The facts in this case were stipulated to by the parties. In March 1996, appellee was traveling in New Mexico pulling a 1988 Corn-husker trailer. The trader was loaded with twenty-five tons of pot ash. After traveling about fifteen miles, appellee approached a set of radroad tracks. AppeUee traversed the radroad tracks, and as a result sustained damages to the trader. AppeUee filed a proof of loss for the damage to his trader under the coUision provision of his insurance pohcy. AppeUant had issued an insurance policy to appeUee providing coverage to the 1988 Cornhusker trader. The policy covers physical damage caused by coUision. CoUision is defined in the poficy to mean \u201ccoUision of a covered automobde with another object.\u201d The trial court granted appeUee\u2019s motion for summary judgment and denied appeUant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, finding that coverage was mandated in this case.\nAt issue is the policy provision defining coUision as \u201ccollisions between a covered automobde and another object.\u201d More specifi-caUy the issue in this case is whether or not a coUision with another object occurs when a covered automobile is traversing a set of railroad tracks. AppeUant argues that no coverage exists as no coUision occurred between the trader and another object. We disagree, and thus affirm.\nWhere the parties have agreed that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact we determine whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 318 Ark. 679, 887 S.W.2d 296 (1994). We wiU not reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling unless the court\u2019s findings are clearly erroneous. Grayson v. Bank of Little Rock, 334 Ark. 180, 971 S.W.2d 788 (1998). A trial court\u2019s finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Ouachita Trek & Dev. Co. v. Rowe, 341 Ark. 456, 17 S.W.3d 491 (2000).\nIn Washington Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ryburn, 228 Ark. 930, 311 S.W.2d 302 (1958), the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld coverage where the insured\u2019s truck, because of a sUck place in the road, careened off the highway and into a ditch filled with water. The supreme court found that there was a collision with another object within the policy provision authorizing recovery for \u201c[a]ny direct and accidental loss caused by collision of the automobile with another object or by upset of the automobile.\u201d Id. at 933, 311 S.W.2d at 305. At issue was whether the truck collided with an object. The court found that the truck had collided with another object, the water in the ditch. Id. at 934, 311 S.W.2d at 305.\nThe Arkansas Supreme Court, quoting from Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Volume 7, \u00a7 312.4, p.487, has defined \u201cobject\u201d as \u201cany tangible thing, visible or capable of discernment by the senses, which offers an impediment or resistance to another object.\u201d New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Frisby, 258 Ark. 39, 43, 522 S.W.2d 418, 420 (1975). In Frisby, the supreme court found that coverage existed when a bulldozer struck a protruding valve which protruded above the ground 10-14 inches. Id. It was found that coverage existed under the provision covering collision with an object. Id.\nOn the facts of the case at bar, we hold that under the definition of object provided for us in Frisby, appellee\u2019s trailer collided with another object, i.e. the railroad tracks. The tracks were a tangible object that offered an impediment to the trailer. Therefore, the railroad tracks were an object with which appellee\u2019s trailer collided. \u201cCourts must give effect to the plain wording of an insurance policy according to the ordinary meaning of its terms where the language is unambiguous.\u201d Phelps v. U.S. Life Credit Life Ins. Co., 336 Ark. 257, 261, 984 S.W.2d 425, 428 (1999). This case centers around the interpretation given to the policy provision defining collision to mean \u201ccollision of a covered automobile with another object.\u201d In giving effect to the plain wording of the insurance pohcy we hold that the damage to the trailer was occasioned by a collision with an object, and the loss is thus covered under the collision provision of the policy.\nAffirmed.\nHart and Jennings, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tree Crabtree, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Matthews, Sanders, & Sayes, by: Doralee Idleman Chandler and Roy Gene Sanders, for appellant.", "Gibson & Hashem, P.L.C., by: Hani W. Hashem, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Jim ADAMS d/b/a Adams Trucking and DeWitt Bank & Trust\nCA 00-301\n37 S.W.3d 677\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division III\nOpinion delivered February 14, 2001\nMatthews, Sanders, & Sayes, by: Doralee Idleman Chandler and Roy Gene Sanders, for appellant.\nGibson & Hashem, P.L.C., by: Hani W. Hashem, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0440-01", "first_page_order": 468, "last_page_order": 470 }