{ "id": 6138795, "name": "WACKENHUT CORPORATION and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Geneva Marchelle JONES", "name_abbreviation": "Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones", "decision_date": "2001-03-21", "docket_number": "CA 00-865", "first_page": "158", "last_page": "162", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "73 Ark. App. 158" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "40 S.W.3d 333" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(16)", "parenthetical": "B" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ark. App. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140307 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/61/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257722 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257796 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ark. App. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136854 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/62/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ark. App. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/67/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139177 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142164 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0369-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 8245, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4360331197001327e-07, "percentile": 0.8025796098537019 }, "sha256": "b3b959681bc2851b2f5d8e494797bf724bfc713959239b36e0bdb289d049b968", "simhash": "1:78c76127c931321e", "word_count": 1357 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:33:57.447032+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jennings and Neal, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "WACKENHUT CORPORATION and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Geneva Marchelle JONES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John F. STROUD, Jr., Chief Judge.\nAppellants, Wackenhut Corporation and St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company, appeal the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s determination that appellee Geneva Marchelle Jones\u2019s left knee replacement was a reasonable and necessary consequence of her compensable injury under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-508(a) (Repl. 1996). We affirm.\nAppellee, a security guard employed through appellants at Arkansas Nuclear One, sustained a compensable injury on November 21, 1996, when she slipped on the wet running board of a truck and fell, injuring her left knee. She was treated conservatively by Dr. Terry Green, an orthopedic surgeon, and released to return to work on December 2, 1996.\nAppellee continued to experience pain after her return to work, and she was referred to Dr. James Mulhollan, an orthopedic surgeon specializing in arthroscopic knee surgery, in April 1997. Dr. Mulhollan performed surgery on appellee\u2019s left knee on April 14, 1997, and performed a second surgery on the left knee on July 1, 1998.\nAppellee returned to work on July 15, 1998, and worked on limited duty status until October 21, 1998, when she tripped on a mat at work and strained her knee again. Appellee did not return to work after this injury, and Dr. Barry Sorrells performed total knee replacements on both knees on March 2, 1999.\nAppellee made a claim against appellants for the left knee replacement surgery, which appellants refused to pay. The administrative law judge denied appellee\u2019s claim; however, the Commission reversed that decision and awarded appellee benefits. Appellants now appeal, arguing that the surgery was not a reasonable and necessary consequence of appellee\u2019s compensable injury.\nThe standard of review in workers\u2019 compensation cases is well-settled. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s findings and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Geo Specialty Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Air Compressor Equip. v. Sword, 69 Ark. App. 162, 11 S.W.3d 1 (2000). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission\u2019s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Geo Specialty, supra. What constitutes reasonable and necessary medical treatment is a question of fact for the Commission. Green Bay Packaging v. Bartlett, 67 Ark. App. 332, 999 S.W.2d 695 (1999). When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, the employer is responsible for any natural consequence that flows from that injury; the basic test is whether there is a causal connection between the two episodes. Jeter v. B.R. McGinty Mech., 62 Ark. App. 53, 968 S.W.2d 645 (1998).\nIn its decision, the Commission relied upon the deposition testimony of Dr. Mulhollan in awarding benefits to appellee. In his deposition, Dr. Mulhollan testified that appellee was bowlegged, which caused the load on the inner part of her knee to be dramatically higher than it is in the outer compartment of the knee. This condition is known as varus degeneration, which is an angular degenerative process, and it is the cause of most knee failures in females in their fifties, sixties, and seventies; however, appellee was in her early forties at the time of her knee replacements. He testified that when he first saw appellee in April 1997, her left knee, on a scale of one to four, with four being the worst, was probably a grade one, and her right knee was already a grade two or three. However, by January 1999, both knees had degenerated to a four-plus level, which necessitated the double-knee replacement.\nDr. Mulhollan unequivocally stated that appellee\u2019s compensa-ble injury was the start of the rapid deterioration of appellee\u2019s knee, that it was \u201cprobably predestined that this was going to occur, and the job injury just happened to be what triggered this one knee.\u201d When asked whether the deterioration would have taken place as quickly without the job injury, Dr. Mulhollan replied, \u201cThat would be a purely speculative guess, because under my very eyes the opposite knee had the same process occur. So it may well have been predestined that it was going to occur, it just so happened that the job injury started the process on the left side.\u201d When asked by appellants\u2019 attorney whether it was his belief that the job injury probably exacerbated or accelerated the need for treatment of appellee\u2019s condition, Dr. Mulhollan replied, \u201cThat\u2019s correct.\u201d On redirect examination, the following dialogue occurred between Dr. Mulhollan and appellee\u2019s counsel:\nAppellee\u2019s Counsel:\nIn terms of when [appellee] would have probably faced this [knee replacement] in the future had not this injury occurred, what, in your opinion \u2014 when would this have probably manifested itself to a degree that she would have had that knee replacement?\nDr. Mulhollan:\nYou know, I can\u2019t imagine. I think \u2014. All I can really say is that it just probably occurred sooner.\nAppellee\u2019s Counsel:\nAny figure, in your best professional judgment, of how much sooner because of the job-related injury?\nDr. Mulhollan:\nProbably the best guesstimate of how to come up with that number would have to be based on the \u2014. By January of 1999, both knees had reached a 4+ degenerative level.\nAppellee\u2019s Counsel:\nThat\u2019s the most severe?\nDr. Mulhollan:\nThat\u2019s as bad as it can be. And this, of course, is when I referred her to Dr. Sorrells to have total replacement or osteotomy. But in any event, one knee had an injury and one knee didn\u2019t have an injury prior to that, and they both ended up at the same level at the same time. So, you know, I guess I really \u2014. The only timetable I can give you is that I think it happened quicker than it probably would have without the job injury, but probably not a wide time span different.\nAppellants contend that our supreme court\u2019s decisions in Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000), and Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp., 341 Ark. 527, 20 S.W.3d 280 (2000), mandate reversal of the Commission\u2019s decision. In Frances, supra, the supreme court held that \u201cexpert opinions based upon \u2018could,\u2019 \u2018may,\u2019 or \u2018possibly\u2019 lack the definiteness required to meet the claimant\u2019s burden to prove causation pursuant to section 11 \u2014 9\u2014 102(16)(B).\u201d 341 Ark. at 533, 20 S.W.3d at 284. This same rationale was employed by the supreme court one month later in Crudup, supra. We disagree with appellant\u2019s argument that the language in Frances and Crudup require reversal in the case presently before us.\nAn expert opinion is to be judged upon the entirety of the opinion, and it is not validated or invalidated on the presence or lack of \u201cmagic words.\u201d Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Griffin, 61 Ark. App. 222, 966 S.W.2d 914 (1998). In the present case, Dr. Mulhollan stated that the job injury began the deterioration process in appellee\u2019s left knee, and that the need for the total left knee replacement probably occurred sooner as a result of the compensable job injury. \u201cProbably\u201d is defined in The American Heritage Dictionary, New College Edition, as \u201cmost likely,\u201d and it was not expressly prohibited by the supreme court\u2019s decisions in Frances and Crudup, supra. We hold that use of the word \u201cprobably\u201d is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(16) (B) (Supp. 1999) that medical opinions addressing compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.\nAffirmed.\nJennings and Neal, JJ., agree.\nDr. Mulhollan performed surgery on appellee\u2019s right knee in October 1997; however, this surgery was not work related and is not the subject of this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "John F. STROUD, Jr., Chief Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Chisenhall, Nestrud, & Julian, P.A., by: Jim L. Julian and Marck W. Hodge, for appellants.", "McCormick Law Firm, PA., by: David H. McCormick, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WACKENHUT CORPORATION and St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Geneva Marchelle JONES\nCA 00-865\n40 S.W.3d 333\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division III\nOpinion delivered March 21, 2001\nChisenhall, Nestrud, & Julian, P.A., by: Jim L. Julian and Marck W. Hodge, for appellants.\nMcCormick Law Firm, PA., by: David H. McCormick, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0158-01", "first_page_order": 184, "last_page_order": 188 }