{ "id": 6139229, "name": "WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Claims Management, Inc. v. Kemberly BROWN", "name_abbreviation": "Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Brown", "decision_date": "2001-03-28", "docket_number": "CA 00-944", "first_page": "174", "last_page": "177", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "73 Ark. App. 174" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "40 S.W.3d 835" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "335 Ark. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862787 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ark. App. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/50/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703806 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137228 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0063-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 326, "char_count": 5500, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2522467591525017e-07, "percentile": 0.6104502617720183 }, "sha256": "8a59810c43bf7844dcd10b1ba7e7bb6040e36eb021103194224e384762a92f8c", "simhash": "1:299ae500a0c8363d", "word_count": 853 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:33:57.447032+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Griffen and Baker, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Claims Management, Inc. v. Kemberly BROWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge.\nThis is an appeal of an Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission\u2019s decision awarding attorney\u2019s fees to appellee, Kemberly Brown, on the amount of temporary partial disability benefits paid to her by appellants, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Claims Management, Inc. Appellee sustained a compensable injury to her wrist while lifting a box. Appellants initially accepted the claim and paid certain medical expenses. On October 20, 1998, at a prehearing conference, appellants admittedly controverted appellee\u2019s temporary partial disability benefits. A hearing was scheduled for January 6, 1999, on that issue. By letter dated December 7, 1998, appellants\u2019 attorney advised appellee\u2019s attorney that appellants would agree to accept the temporary partial disability, and appellants paid it accordingly. Appellants refused to pay any attorney\u2019s fees with respect to the temporary-partial disability benefits paid.\nIn an opinion filed on November 22, 1999, an Administrative Law Judge (\u201cALJ\u201d) found that appellee did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to an attorney\u2019s fee on the amount of the temporary partial benefits paid by appellants. Appellee appealed to the full Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission. The Commission reversed the ALJ, and held that appellee was entitled to such attorney\u2019s fees. Appellants appeal the Commission\u2019s decision. We hold that the Commission\u2019s decision was supported by substantial evidence, and, thus, we affirm.\nThe Commission\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees was given pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii) (Repl. 1996), which provides that fees for legal services shall be allowed only on the amount of compensation controverted and awarded. Appellants argue on appeal that no \u201caward\u201d was granted in this case, and thus an award of attorney\u2019s fees was not supported by substantial evidence.\nThis court reviews decisions of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission to see if the they are supported by substantial evidence. Crossett Sch. Dist. v. Fulton, 65 Ark. App. 63, 984 S.W.2d 833 (1999). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether this court might have reached a different result from the Commission. Malone v. Texarkana Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 343, 969 S.W.2d 644 (1998). If reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission, we must affirm the decision. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995).\nAppellants admit that they initially controverted appellee\u2019s temporary partial disability benefits. Appellants argue, however, that they eventually paid the benefits voluntarily, and thus appellee was never awarded the benefits and section ll-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii) was not fulfilled. The Commission interpreted the requirements of section ll-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii) to be that where an employer controverts an injured employee\u2019s entidement to certain benefits, but later accepts liability prior to a hearing on the merits, the employee\u2019s attorney may still request a hearing for an attorney\u2019s fee on those controverted benefits. The Commission found that when there is no dispute that the employer controverted benefits but then paid the benefits on which an attorney\u2019s fee is sought that the employee has established entidement to an award of those benefits for purposes of the employee\u2019s attorney seeking an attorney\u2019s fee under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii). The Commission found no requirement in section ll-9-715(a)(2)(B)(ii) requiring that an award of controverted benefits must precede the employer\u2019s payment of benefits for the claimant\u2019s attorney to be entitled to a fee. We agree and hold that the Commission\u2019s findings are supported by substantial evidence.\nIt has long been recognized that \u201cmaking an employer hable for attorney\u2019s fees serves legitimate social purposes such as discouraging oppressive delay in recognition of liability, deterring arbitrary or capricious denial of claims, and insuring the ability of necessitous claimants to obtain adequate and competent legal representation.\u201d Cleek v. Great S. Metals, 335 Ark. 342, 345, 981 S.W.2d 529, 530 (1998). \u201cIf the fundamental purposes of attorney\u2019s fee statutes such as \u00a7 11-9-715 are to be achieved, it must be considered that their real object is to place the burden of litigation expenses upon the party which made it necessary.\u201d Id. If appellee had not employed counsel to assist her in this matter, it is reasonable to conclude that her claim for temporary partial disability benefits would not have been properly presented and protected. See id. Appellants controverted appellee\u2019s claim to temporary partial disability benefits at a prehearing conference on October 20, 1998. Appellants did not agree to pay the temporary partial disability benefits until December 1998, a month before the scheduled hearing. Appellee\u2019s attorney requested a hearing for attorney\u2019s fees on the temporary partial disability benefits. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission\u2019s findings in this case, and that the Commission strictly interpreted \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 715(a)(2)(B)(ii).\nAffirmed.\nGriffen and Baker, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roberts, Roberts, & Russell, EA., by: Mike Roberts and J.R. Wildman, for appellant.", "Philip M. Wilson, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Claims Management, Inc. v. Kemberly BROWN\nCA 00-944\n40 S.W.3d 835\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered March 28, 2001\nRoberts, Roberts, & Russell, EA., by: Mike Roberts and J.R. Wildman, for appellant.\nPhilip M. Wilson, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0174-01", "first_page_order": 200, "last_page_order": 203 }