{ "id": 6138805, "name": "Liza Michelle GEROT v. Paul Alan GEROT", "name_abbreviation": "Gerot v. Gerot", "decision_date": "2001-12-05", "docket_number": "CA 01-448", "first_page": "138", "last_page": "149-C", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 Ark. App. 138" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "65 S.W.3d 494" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "61 S.W.3d 890" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "873 S.W.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6657231 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/45/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ark. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451153 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ark. 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1700046 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/230/0872-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ark. App. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/74/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138404 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding, in part, that there were no material changes in circumstances to justify changing joint-custody order to award custody to the mother where there was no allegation that either parent was unfit" }, { "parenthetical": "holding, in part, that there were no material changes in circumstances to justify changing joint-custody order to award custody to the mother where there was no allegation that either parent was unfit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ark. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1629908 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/252/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12023229 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ark. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/70/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "986 S.W.3d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138313 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ark. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142893 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/70/0438-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 987, "char_count": 27564, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3674150173283254e-07, "percentile": 0.6376051267853841 }, "sha256": "6ea91ea3558f0c54f9a71b841b3dca175291a7a57d518ffc67e04325f6bcf16f", "simhash": "1:2d057548ee221f87", "word_count": 4581 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:25.039079+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Bird and Crabtree, JJ., agree.", "ROAF, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "Liza Michelle GEROT v. Paul Alan GEROT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wendell L. GRIFFEN, Judge.\nLisa Gerot appeals from a chancery order granting the appellee\u2019s petition for a change of custody, denying her petition to relocate to Florida with her minor child, and dismissing her request for a contempt citation pursuant to the court\u2019s order mandating the division of certain marital property. She argues that appellee failed to demonstrate a material -change in circumstances justifying a change in custody; that the chancellor did not consider the proper factors in determining whether to grant her petition to relocate; and that it was undisputed that appellee has not divided the property as ordered by the court.\nWe reverse the order granting appellee\u2019s motion for a change of custody because there was no allegation or proof of a material change of circumstances warranting a change of custody. In addition, because the chancellor based his finding on the motion for a change of custody and made no ruling on appellant\u2019s petition to relocate, we remand for a ruling in that respect. Finally, we affirm with respect to the chancellor\u2019s dismissal of the contempt citation.\nAppellant obtained a divorce from Paul Gerot, appellee, on October 20, 1999. Appellant was granted custody of their nine-year-old daughter, Victoria (\u201cTory\u201d), and appellee was awarded visitation. The chancellor ordered appellee to equally divide the parties\u2019 A.G. Edwards stock, to equally divide his 401k account, and to sell his Harley-Davidson motorcycle within ninety days and split the proceeds with appellant.\nIn January 2000, appellant, who is a registered nurse, accepted a job in Pal Bay, Florida. In March 2000, she filed a petition to relocate to Florida, citing as her reasons for relocating a substantial increase in earnings, a job requiring her to work fewer hours per week that would allow her increased time with Tory, and better educational and extracurricular opportunities for Tory. She also requested that visitation be modified to ensure \u201ccontinued quality time\u201d with appellee. Because appellant did not want to move Tory during the school year, the parties agreed that she would stay with appellee until after the current school year had ended and he had exercised his summer visitation.\nOn April 4, 2000, appellee filed a formal objection to the move. He asserted that he had maintained a strong relationship with Tory and that it was not in Tory\u2019s best interest to move to Florida while she was attending school. On April 15, 2000, appellant moved to Florida, and pursuant to the parties\u2019 agreement, Tory-remained in Arkansas with appellee.\nOn June 13, 2000, after appellee\u2019s summer visitation had ended, he filed a petition for a change of custody. He cited the fact that appellant had recently relocated to Florida and asserted that he has maintained a strong relationship with Tory, including participation in her school activities, in an effort to create a stable environment for her. On July 11, 2000, appellant filed a contempt citation, alleging that appellee had failed to divide the stock, failed to divide his retirement account, and failed to sell his motorcycle. He conceded the terms of the property setdement and that appellant was entided to one-half of the stock and the retirement account, but denied any willful violation of the court\u2019s order.\nA hearing on these matters was held on December 20, 2000. The chancery court dismissed appellant\u2019s petition for contempt and granted appellee\u2019s request for a change of custody. After appellant requested that the court provide specific findings of fact, the chancellor orally indicated his specific findings of fact. The chancellor stated:\nI feel it is in the best interest of the child. I think the evidence is clear from the testimony of the teachers that the child is doing quite well and it would not be in her best interest to remove her from the situation she is in now. Furthermore, she has extended family on both sides here. And it was Mrs. Gerot\u2019s choice to move to Florida. I think it is clearly, in my opinion, in the best interest of the child to remain here at this time.\nThe chancellor reiterated these findings in his subsequent written order.\nThe court further ordered appellee to obtain three bids on his motorcycle; to sell his motorcycle within the next thirty days and divide the proceeds accordingly; and to inform appellant of all documentation necessary to prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to divide the stock and retirement funds as previously directed.\nAppellant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and a motion for a new trial, which the chancellor denied. She appeals only from the order entered on December 20 dismissing her motion for contempt and granting appellee\u2019s petition for a change of custody.\nI. Summary of the Testimony\nAppellee conceded that he and appellant originally agreed that Tory would stay with him only until after he exercised his summer visitation. However, he subsequently objected to Tory moving to Florida \u201cbecause she\u2019s content, she\u2019s happy here, her friends are here, her school is here and her family is here.\u201d He fives with his mother and father in their house, but testified that his parents intend to give the house to him. Appellee asserted that he has a close relationship with Tory. He also stated that he has a good relationship with appellant\u2019s parents and that Tory visits them. Appellee stated that Tory did not talk about her mother often and did not appear to be having any problems with her mother living in Florida.\nAppellee also testified that Tory earns As and Bs in school. He stated that he has lunch at school with Tory three to four times per week and participates in parent-teacher conferences. Appellee testified that he and Tory love fishing and that he takes her to a members-only hunting lodge three weekends of each month.\nAppellant is a registered nurse. She works in an emergency room, serving three twelve-hour shifts per week, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. She felt that Florida offered \u201cmore opportunities\u201d for her daughter, including the ocean, Sea World, theme parks, and the Kennedy Space Center. At the hearing, she presented a letter from her employer stating that she would initially earn $21.30 per hour and would receive a $3,000 sign-on bonus. She testified that she would earn ten to twelve thousand dollars more per year, she would work fewer hours, and that the cost of living was less expensive in Florida. Appellant would also be able to return to college herself at a lower cost through her employer. She purchased a three-bedroom home located five minutes from Discovery Elementary, which she asserted was a highly rated school. She has made arrangements for a babysitter and transportation to school on those days that she is working. Appellant also has a longtime friend who resides in Pal Bay, whom Tory knows, who is also willing to help appellant if needed.\nShe stated that she left Tory with appellee because she did not want to move her during the middle of a school year and that her attorney indicated that she would receive permission from the court to relocate \u201cwithin about thirty days.\u201d She testified that she talks to Tory on the phone twice each week and that she had visited Tory three times since April 2000. Appellant also testified that she likes fishing and that she and Tory can salt water fish in Florida.\nAppellant maintained that she has always encouraged visitation and wants Tory to have fair visitation with her father. Appellee felt that it was important for Tory to \u201chave all of her family.\u201d She indicated that she would pay for one-half of the travel expenses to bring Tory back to Arkansas to visit her father. She also planned to return to Arkansas with Tory at least twice per year. She stated that Tory had asked her to take her to Florida the last time that appellant was in Arkansas.\nMarvelle Converse, Tory\u2019s teacher at the time of the hearing, testified that Tory maintains a B average, and that appellee eats lunch with her three to four times a week and picks her up every afternoon. Her impression was that they have an \u201cenjoyable relationship.\u201d She stated that appellee serves as a \u201croom mother\u201d and has gone on some of the outings with Tory\u2019s class. Converse said that appellee attends parent-teacher conferences and is very active in Tory\u2019s education. She stated that Tory is well-adjusted, active in the classroom, and plays well with her peers. She testified that it would be detrimental to move Tory during the middle of a school year.\nSusan Wilson, Tory\u2019s second-grade teacher, who taught Tory during the period in which appellee moved, testified that Tory\u2019s relationship with her father was very loving; that they had a strong bond; and that Tory seemed to be very comfortable in her father\u2019s care. She testified that appellee visits school on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and brings Tory\u2019s lunch; that he also stays to play with her after lunch; and that he picks her up from school.\nShe further stated that prior to April 2000 (when Tory began living with appellee), Tory \u201cdidn\u2019t focus. . . . The last part of school when living with her father she was more active. She seemed to be a little more with it. She participated in conversations . . . She seemed more comfortable.\u201d Wilson said that Tory did not participate in class at the beginning of the school year, although she was always very active at recess. Wilson said that Tory became more relaxed from the beginning of the school year to the end of the school year; that she talked more; that she formed friendships; \u201cthat her activities in class and with her peers became stronger as she grew older.\u201d She stated that Tory became more self-confident as the school year progressed. She opined that \u201cmoving in with her father was what made the changes.\u201d Wilson also said that Tory told her in May 2000 that she did not want to move to Florida.\nDebbie Nordin, Tory\u2019s first-grade teacher, said that when she taught Tory, she was sullen, quiet, and lacked self-confidence, whereas now, she seems happy and more confident. Nordin stated that both appellant and appellee attended parent-teacher conferences. She stated that she had seen Tory several times in the period from January to May 2000, and that Tory \u201cappears happy and stable. She has really come out and come into her own this year.\u201d Nordin has seen appellee eat lunch with Tory and pick her up from school. She stated that it appears that they have a strong bond. She said that Tory has changed since she moved in with her father, but conceded that Tory is three years older now than when she taught her and that children\u2019s personalities change as they grow. She also admitted that she has not talked to Tory in the last year.\nII. Change of Custody\nWe first address the chancellor\u2019s error in finding that appellee demonstrated a material change in circumstances warranting a change of custody. We review chancery cases de novo and reverse the findings of the chancellor only if his findings are clearly erroneous. See Hickmon v. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. 438, 19 S.W.3d 624 (2000). Custody should not be changed unless conditions have altered since the decree was rendered or material facts existed at the time of the decree but were unknown to the court, and then only for the welfare of the child. See Hollinger v. Hollinger, 65 Ark. App. 110, 986 S.W.3d 105 (1999). The chancellor must first determine that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last order of custody; if that threshold requirement is met, he must then determine who should have custody with the sole consideration being the best interest of the child. See id.\nA custodial parent\u2019s move that is made in order to better his or her financial ability to provide for a child is not, in and of itself, a material change in circumstances to be used to the detriment of that parent. See Hollinger v. Hollinger, supra. However, such a move is one factor which may be considered when determining whether a material change in circumstances exists. See Hollinger v. Hollinger, supra. The party seeking the modification has the burden below to show a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in custody. Hollinger v. Hollinger, supra. While custody is always modifiable, our courts require a more rigid standard for modification than for initial determinations in order to promote stability and continuity for the children and to discourage repeated litigation of the same issues. See Stellpflug v. Stellpflug, 70 Ark. App. 88, 14 S.W.3d 536 (2000).\nAppellee maintains that the change of circumstances in this case are demonstrated by appellant\u2019s relocation to a place where neither she nor Tory have any \u201croots\u201d and by Tory\u2019s \u201cdramatic change\u201d in her attitude since she moved in with him. Appellant notes that the court failed to specify any finding of a material change in circumstances in its oral or written order and maintains that the only testimony offered by appellee was offered as if he were already the custodial parent and is not sufficient to show a change of circumstances to warrant a change in custody.\nWe agree that the chancellor erred in granting appellee\u2019s motion for a change of custody where the appellee failed to allege or present evidence of a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a such a change. The only change in circumstances that occurred from October 20, 1999, the date of the original custody order, to the date of the hearing, was that appellant voluntarily left Tory with appellee so she could finish out the school year. However, relocating in order to obtain employment itself does not constitute a material change in circumstances. See Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996). Nor does the fact that appellee would not get to visit Tory as often. See Plum v. Plum, 252 Ark. 340, 478 S.W.2d 882 (1992).\nAppellee also maintains that his testimony and that of Tory\u2019s teachers demonstrates a \u201cdramatic change\u201d in Tory\u2019s demeanor since she began living with him. He testified that Tory was happy and content living with him, and it is undisputed that they share common interests, such as the love of outdoor pursuits.\nIt is implicit in the chancellor\u2019s original order awarding custody to appellant that Tory had a good relationship with her father but was happy and content in appellant\u2019s care. Appellee presented no evidence that this has changed. Rather, the evidence shows that Tory continues to enjoy a good relationship with both parents. Appellee did not seek custody on the ground that appellant was an unfit mother. He simply maintained that he was close to Tory and that she was happy and content with him. See Barnes v. Newton, 69 Ark. App. 115, 10 S.W.3d 472 (2000) (holding, in part, that there were no material changes in circumstances to justify changing joint-custody order to award custody to the mother where there was no allegation that either parent was unfit). Moreover, while the evidence demonstrates that appellee has taken a more active role with regard to Tory\u2019s education since she moved in with him and that Tory is doing well in school, the evidence also showed that both appellant and appellee were actively involved in Tory\u2019s education prior to appellant\u2019s relocation. Thus, appellee\u2019s assertion that he is close to Tory, that she is happy in his care, and that he is actively involved in her education does not demonstrate a material change in circumstances.\nSimilarly, the testimony by Tory\u2019s teachers regarding Tory\u2019s progress in school does not justify a change of custody. Tory\u2019s teacher at the time of the hearing, Ms. Converse, stated that Tory is well-adjusted, active in the classroom, plays well with her peers, and opined that it would be detrimental to move Tory during the middle of a school year. While Wilson, Tory\u2019s second-grade teacher, opined that Tory\u2019s change in attitude was attributable to her new living arrangements with her father since mid-April 2000, she also stated that she had noticed changes since the beginning of the school year. Further, she direcdy observed Tory\u2019s demeanor after she moved in with her father for only a short time, from mid-April until the end of May, when the school year ended. Although Nordin, Tory\u2019s first-grade teacher, has not spoken with Tory within the past year, she testified that Tory has \u201ccome into her own this year.\u201d Nordin apparently based her conclusions on seeing Tory around the school. Further, Nordin\u2019s comments, as well as common sense, demonstrate that Tory\u2019s change in demeanor is just as likely the result of her normal maturation process.\nFurther, while it is certainly proper for the chancellor to consider the child\u2019s happiness and progress in school, see Barnes v. Newton, supra, the testimony showed that Tory maintained an A-B average both before and after she moved in with her father. According to her teachers\u2019 testimony, she also played well with other children at recess before and after she moved in with her father. While her personality changed during the months prior to and immediately after the petition for a change in custody, this appears to be due, at least in part, to the natural maturation process and not simply to the fact that she moved in with her father late in the school year.\nEven giving due deference to the witnesses\u2019 testimony, their testimony does not demonstrate a material change that would justify a permanent change in custody. Because the chancellor erred in granting the motion for a change of custody in the absence of an allegation or proof of a material change warranting a change of custody, we reverse that portion of the chancellor\u2019s order.\nIII. Petition to Relocate\nFurther, we remand for reconsideration of appellant\u2019s petition to relocate because we find the chancellor based his decision solely on the motion for a change of custody and failed to rule on appellant\u2019s petition to relocate.\nAfter the court issued its decision, appellant\u2019s attorney requested specific findings of fact pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b)(2) stating, \u201cYour Honor, can we ask for a finding of fact?\u201d The chancellor indicated:\nI feel it is in the best interest of the child. I think the evidence is clear from the testimony of the teachers that the child is doing quite well and it would not be in her best interest to remove her from the situation she is in now. Furthermore, she has extended family on both sides here. And it was Mrs. Gerot\u2019s choice to move to Florida. I think it is clearly, in my opinion, in the best interest of the child to remain here at this time.\nIn determining whether to grant a petition to relocate, the chancellor must first determine whether a move would result in a real advantage to the family as a whole. See Hass v. Hass, 74 Ark. App. 49, 44 S.W.3d 773 (2001). The record supports that the chancellor limited his order to the grant of appellee\u2019s motion for a change of custody because he only examined the best interest of the child, without regard for the best interests of the family unit as a whole. Absent from the record and from the chancellor\u2019s oral and written findings is any indication that he ruled on appellant\u2019s petition to relocate or even considered the advantage to the family unit as a whole. Accordingly, we remand to the chancellor for a ruling on appellant\u2019s petition to relocate.\nIV Dismissal of the Contempt Citation\nFinally, we affirm the chancellor\u2019s dismissal of appellant\u2019s petition for a contempt citation. The chancellor entered an order on October 30, 1999, ordering appellee within ninety days to equally divide the parties\u2019 A.G. Edwards stock, to equally divide his 401k account, and to sell his Harley-Davidson motorcycle and split the proceeds with appellant. It is undisputed that as of July 11, 2000, the date that appellant filed her motion for contempt, appellee had not complied with this order.\nAppellee concedes that at the time of the hearing, he had not complied with the court\u2019s order. However, the failure to comply was apparently due to appellee\u2019s attorney\u2019s failure to act, not appel-lee\u2019s. Appellee\u2019s attorney informed the court that appellee had supplied him all of the necessary information to prepare the QDR.O and that appellee stipulated that appellant was entitled to one-half of the stock and retirement account. While the chancellor could have imputed appellant\u2019s attorney\u2019s negligence to appellee, see Midwest Timber Prod. Co., Inc. v. A.A. Self, 230 Ark. 872, 327 S.W.2d 730 (1959), he apparently found the attorney\u2019s inaction was not willful, and appellant offered no proof to the contrary.\nWith regard to the motorcycle, appellee testified that it was \u201ctore apart\u201d and that he did not have the money to repair it. He also testified that he had advertised the motorcycle for sale twice in the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, and had made inquiries at the Road House, a local motorcycle shop, but received no suitable offer.\nThe purposes of civil contempt are to preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders made for the benefit of those parties. Arkansas Dep\u2019t Of Human Servs. v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998). The standard of review where the chancellor has refused to punish a contemnor is abuse of discretion. See Jones v. Jones, 320 Ark. 449, 898 S.W.2d 23 (1995). Based on the foregoing facts, we hold the chancellor\u2019s finding that appellee\u2019s failure to comply with the October 30 order was not willful was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm with respect to the chancellor\u2019s dismissal of the contempt citation.\nWe reverse the order granting appellee\u2019s motion for a change of custody. We also remand for a ruling with respect to appellant\u2019s petition to relocate. We affirm the dismissal of the contempt citation.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded in part.\nBird and Crabtree, JJ., agree.\nCA 01-448\n65 S.W.3d 494\nOpinion delivered January 30, 2002\nWilliam F. Smith, for appellant.\nLaws & Murdoch, P.A., by: Allen Laws, for appellee.\nSUPPLEMENTAL OPINION on DENIAL of REHEARING\nWendell L. Griffen, Judge.\nAppellee Paul Gerot petitions for rehearing from an unpublished opinion rendered by this court, reversing in part a chancery order awarding him a change of custody and granting him primary custody of his daughter, Victoria (\u201cTory\u201d). We deny appellee\u2019s petition for rehearing and reiterate our holding in this case with regard to his petition to change custody.\nIn this case, appellant Lisa Gerot, appellee\u2019s ex-wife and Tory\u2019s mother, moved to Florida because she was offered a better job with a larger salary and more flexible hours that would allow her to spend more time with Tory. Tory remained with her father in Arkansas to complete the remainder of her school year. Appellant thereafter filed a petition to relocate and a contempt petition, alleging that appellee failed to divide certain property in accordance with the parties\u2019 divorce decree. Appellee filed a petition for a change of custody, alleging that Tory had experienced a \u201cdramatic change\u201d in her attitude after she moved in with him. At the hearing, appellee testified regarding Tory\u2019s alleged \u201cdramatic change\u201d and also offered testimony by Tory\u2019s teachers to that effect.\nWe stated that the testimony offered by appellee did not demonstrate a \u201cdramatic change\u201d that would justify a permanent change in custody. Therefore, we held that appellee failed to prove a material change in circumstances and we reversed that portion of the chancellor\u2019s order granting appellee primary custody of Tory.\nAppellee now asserts that in stating he failed to demonstrate a \u201cdramatic change\u201d that would justify a permanent change in custody, we either misstated or misapplied the law regarding the proof required to establish a change of custody. However, a full reading of our holding demonstrates that we did not misstate or misapply the correct standard governing motions to change custody. The standard regarding motions for change of custody, as we cited in our prior opinion in this case, is well-settled: Custody should not be changed unless conditions have altered since the decree was rendered or material facts existed at the time of the decree but were unknown to the court, and only for the welfare of the child. See Hollinger v. Hollinger, 65 Ark. App. 110, 986 S.W.2d 105 (1999).\nHere, appellee maintained that Tory\u2019s \u201cdramatic change\u201d in her attitude warranted a change in custody. We stated our holding, in full, as follows:\nEven giving due deference to the witnesses\u2019 testimony, their testimony does not demonstrate a \u201cdramatic change\u201d that would justify a permanent change in custody. Because the chancellor erred in granting the motion for a change in custody in the absence of an allegation or proof of a material change warranting a change of custody, we reverse that portion of the chancellor\u2019s order.\nThus, we held that, appellee\u2019s \u201cdramatic change\u201d argument notwithstanding, appellee failed to allege or prove facts demonstrating a material change in circumstances necessary to warrant a change in custody. Our decision did not change the well-settled proper standard governing motions for change of custody. Appellee\u2019s petition for rehearing raises no new issues of law and provides no additional grounds for consideration.\nPetition for rehearing denied.\nROAF, J., concurs.\nAppellee maintains that the facts in this case are similar to the facts in Riley v. Riley, 45 Ark. App. 165, 873 S.W.2d 564 (1994), in which this court affirmed a change in custody, where both parents had remarried and the custodial parent moved the children several hundred miles away from the children\u2019s extended family. However, the facts in Riley are easily distinguished from the facts in this case. In Riley, both parents had remarried and the mother surreptitiously moved the children without the father\u2019s knowledge and returned to the state on two occasions but did not allow visitation with the father on those occasions. See id. Here, by contrast, neither parent has remarried; appellant discussed the move with appellee beforehand; and appellant appeared to be following the court\u2019s order in not removing Tory from the state until she received the court\u2019s approval. By contrast, appellee violated the custody order by keeping Tory beyond her summer visitation.\nAppellee asserts that appellant\u2019s argument in this regard is barred, pursuant to Hickmon v. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. 438, 19 S.W.3d 624 (2000), because she failed to specifically request findings on the factors supporting the court\u2019s \u201cdenial\u201d of her petition to relocate. We disagree that Hickmon compels such a result.\nThe instant case is distinguishable from Hickmon. Unlike the appellant in the instant case, it appears that the Hickmon appellant failed to make any request for findings of fact. Here, despite a request for specific findings of fact, the chancellor failed to rule on appellant\u2019s petition to relocate. Accordingly, Hickmon does not preclude us from addressing the merits of appellant\u2019s argument.\nSee Gerot v. Gerot, 76 Ark. App. 138, 61 S.W.3d 890 (2001). We also affirmed that portion of the chancellor\u2019s order dismissing a contempt petition against appellee, and remanded for a ruling on appellant\u2019s petition to relocate.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wendell L. GRIFFEN, Judge. Wendell L. Griffen, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "William F. Smith, for appellant.", "Laws & Murdoch, P.A., by: Allen Laws, for appellee.", "William F. Smith, for appellant.", "Laws & Murdoch, P.A., by: Allen Laws, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Liza Michelle GEROT v. Paul Alan GEROT\nCA 01-448\n61 S.W.3d 890\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II Court of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions II and III\nOpinion delivered December 5, 2001\n[Petition for rehearing denied January 30, 2002.]\nWilliam F. Smith, for appellant.\nLaws & Murdoch, P.A., by: Allen Laws, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0138-01", "first_page_order": 176, "last_page_order": 190 }