{ "id": 6139859, "name": "Freddie E. YARBROUGH v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department and Conway Transportation Services", "name_abbreviation": "Yarbrough v. Director, Employment Security Department & Conway Transportation Services", "decision_date": "2001-12-12", "docket_number": "E 01-161", "first_page": "231", "last_page": "235", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 Ark. App. 231" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "61 S.W.3d 922" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "264 Ark. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1668737 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ark. App. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/1/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ark. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142334 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/74/0424-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 426, "char_count": 6600, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0678041250728425e-07, "percentile": 0.5589849060698133 }, "sha256": "4734dea56f17f255206578bcfa647d97235e69067172e7987b8f183f96d69e96", "simhash": "1:34be98025537af28", "word_count": 1038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:25.039079+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "GRIFFEN and ROAF, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Freddie E. YARBROUGH v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department and Conway Transportation Services" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John B. ROBBINS, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from a decision of the Arkansas Board of Review holding that appellant was disqualified to receive unemployment compensation for a period of eight weeks because he had been discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work. We hold that there is no substantial evidence that supports the Board\u2019s decision and reverse.\nAppellant Freddie Yarbrough was employed for over three years as an account executive in sales for appellee Conway Transportation Service. His employer held annual sales meetings that appellant was expected to attend. It was at the February 21-22, 2001, meeting that appellant was discharged. The sales meeting began at 7:30 a.m. each day. Appellant appeared timely the first day, but was tardy the second day. Johnny Thompson, appellee\u2019s service center manager, testified that appellant was forty-five to sixty minutes late, and the explanation appellant gave him was that he had set his alarm clock but his pet had somehow pulled the cord from the wall and he did not wake up early enough to get to the meeting on time. Thompson said that this incident of not reporting on time was the terminating event, but there had been some overall attendance problems and some issues with his personal life.\nAppellant acknowledged that it was mandatory to attend both days of the meeting, that there were alcoholic beverages served the evening of the first day of the meeting, and that he drank too much. He said when he arrived fifteen minutes late the second morning of the meeting, he was sent home without being given an opportunity to explain that his daughter\u2019s puppy knocked over his alarm clock.\nThe Board found that appellant was discharged for failing to report on time on the second day of the sales meeting, and further found that the \u201cemployer credibly testified that, due to personal problems, the claimant\u2019s attendance had declined and was generally unsatisfactory.\u201d Consequendy, the Board concluded that appellant\u2019s conduct violated a standard of behavior the employer had a right to expect and constituted misconduct.\nOur standard of review in cases from the Board of Review is as follows:\nOn appeal, the findings of the Board of Review are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board\u2019s findings. Even when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it.\nWalls v. Director, 74 Ark. App. 424, 427, 49 S.W.3d 670, 672 (2001). The statutory authority cited by the Board in its decision was Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-514(a)(l) (Supp. 2001), which states that \u201can individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he was discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with his work.\u201d In earlier decisions we have given the following definition to the term \u201cmisconduct:\u201d\n[MJisconduct involves: (1) disregard of the employer\u2019s interests, (2) violation of the employer\u2019s rules, (3) disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees, and (4) disregard of the employee\u2019s duties and obligations to his employer.\nTo constitute misconduct, however, the definitions require more than mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith error in judgment or discretion. There must be an intentional or deliberate violation, a willful or wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design.\nNibco, Inc. v. Metcalf, 1 Ark. App. 114, 118, 613 S.W.2d 612, 614 (1981); see also Walls v. Director, supra.\nShowing up at work, whether at the plant, the office, or even a sales meeting, is certainly a standard of behavior that an employer has a right to expect of its employees. Even a single incident of missing work has been held to violate a standard of behavior that a restaurant employer had a right to expect and constituted employee misconduct. Parker v. Ramada Inn & Daniels, 264 Ark. 472, 572 S.W.2d 409 (1978). However, since Parker was decided by our supreme court, the applicable statute was amended, to-wit:\nArkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514.\nDisqualification \u2014 Discharge for misconduct.\n(a)(1) If so found by the Director of the Arkansas Employment Security Department, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work.\n(2) In all cases of discharge for absenteeism, the individual\u2019s attendance record for the twelve-month period immediately preceding the discharge and the reasons for the absenteeism shall be taken into consideration for purposes of determining whether the absenteeism constitutes misconduct. (Italics added.)\nThe italicized sentence of subsection (2) was added by Act 482 in the 1983 legislative session. This amendment clearly evinces a public policy to require consideration of an employee\u2019s attendance record for the preceding twelve-month period when determining whether the employee\u2019s absence constitutes such misconduct as to disqualify the employee from entitlement to unemployment compensation.\nAppellant was not discharged for being absent; he was discharged for being tardy, sixty minutes at most. Surely, if a determination of misconduct for missing an entire work shift requires consideration of the employee\u2019s attendance history for the previous twelve months, a single incident of tardiness should receive no less consideration. The appellant\u2019s tardy arrival on this single occasion and the vague reference by appellant\u2019s manager to \u201csome overall attendance problems\u201d does not constitute substantial evidence that appellant intentionally violated his employer\u2019s requirements of punctuality so as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. See Walls v. Director, supra.\nWe reverse and remand for an award of benefits.\nGRIFFEN and ROAF, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "John B. ROBBINS, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "No brief filed by appellant.", "Phyllis A. Edwards, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Freddie E. YARBROUGH v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department and Conway Transportation Services\nE 01-161\n61 S.W.3d 922\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered December 12, 2001\nNo brief filed by appellant.\nPhyllis A. Edwards, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0231-01", "first_page_order": 273, "last_page_order": 277 }