{ "id": 6141131, "name": "LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Film Transit v. Randall CHAMBERS", "name_abbreviation": "Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Chambers", "decision_date": "2002-01-09", "docket_number": "CA 01-424", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "291", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "76 Ark. App. 286" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "64 S.W.3d 775" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "72 Ark. App. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138419 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/72/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ariz. 180", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 1499243 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/154/0180-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.W.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10705162 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/529/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 A.2d 1067", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 12013619 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/698/1067-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 So.2d 1007", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11922501 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/691/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 So.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11635918 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/728/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 A.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11915042 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "van not \"orthopedic appliance\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/692/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.W.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "van not \"other treatment or care\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "322 S.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 89739 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "van not \"other treatment or care\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sc/322/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "645 So.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7460465 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "van not \"other apparatus\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/645/1072-01" ] }, { "cite": "931 P.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10316546 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "van not \"apparatus\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/931/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 A.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 2012641 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/md/323/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703813 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-704", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "345 Ark. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 939023 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/345/0056-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 686, "char_count": 11122, "ocr_confidence": 0.751, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1595558653130494e-07, "percentile": 0.5837353838003683 }, "sha256": "aa179cbcf4798daa03d04d46c9ec0faf1a9aa54bea3aad073dd77bc7ffb11ff8", "simhash": "1:858b7baac4da7ac1", "word_count": 1769 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:25.039079+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Griffen, Neal, Vaught, and Crabtree, JJ., agree.", "Pittman, Hart, Jennings, and Bird, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Film Transit v. Randall CHAMBERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John F. Stroud, Jr., Chief Judge.\nThis is a workers\u2019 compensation case in which appellee, Randall Chambers, sustained an admittedly compensable injury on August 20, 1999. He was injured in a automobile accident, and as a result of those injuries both of his legs were amputated. He was fitted with prostheses, but relies primarily upon a wheelchair because he has little or no balance without the use of assisted devices and can only walk ten to fifteen feet with the use of a walker. Appellants, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Film Transit, paid to have appel-lee\u2019s 1986 Lincoln Continental equipped with a wheelchair rack and hand controls in spite of the fact that the prosthetic laboratory and Baptist Health Rehabilitation Institute both found that these modifications would not be sufficient. The modifications were, in fact, not successful because appellee was not able to put the wheelchair on the rack and walk to the driver\u2019s side of the vehicle. Moreover, in order to drive the vehicle, he had to remove his prostheses. Consequently, appellee\u2019s wife quit her job to assist him.\nAppellee contended that he was entitled to a wheelchair-accessible, hand-controlled van. Appellants countered that they were only responsible for the cost of converting a van to wheelchair accessibility, not for the van itself. They also sought credit for the hand-control/rack modifications that they had already made to appellee\u2019s car. The Commission found in favor of appellee with respect to appellant being obligated to provide a \u201csuitable van\u201d and the necessary modifications, and in favor of appellants with respect to being entitled to a credit against liability equal to the present value of the claimant\u2019s 1986 Lincoln. Both parties appealed. We affirm on direct-appeal and reverse on cross-appeal.\nThe primary issue before us on direct appeal is whether appellee is entitled to a hand-controlled, wheelchair-accessible van pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-9-508(a) (Repl. 1996). This statute provides:\n(a) The employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical, hospital, chiropractic, optometric, podiatric, and nursing services and medicine, crutches, ambulatory devices, artificial limbs, eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and other apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.\n(Emphasis added.) Section ll-9-508(a) was amended by the 1993 act and no longer ties \u201capparatus\u201d to medical services, but rather \u201cother apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received by the employee.\u201d The Commission determined:\nAt any rate, we modify the Administrative Law Judge\u2019s decision to the extent that we find the respondents Hable for the cost of a suitable van (not necessarily a new van) and for the costs of van modifications. We also find that the respondents are entitled to a credit against Lability equal to the present value of the claimant\u2019s 1986 Lincoln.\nMoreover, as noted by at least one Commissioner, the undisputed testimony was that appellee could not afford to purchase a van; therefore, interpreting the statute as argued by appellants would essentially eliminate recovery of such benefits by appellee because he could not afford to purchase the vehicle itself\". We will not overturn an administrative agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute unless it is clearly wrong. Byars Constr. Co. v. Byars, 72 Ark. App. 158, 34 S.W.3d 797 (2000). We find that the Commission\u2019s interpretation of this statute with respect to appellants\u2019 liability for providing a suitable van is not clearly wrong.\nOn cross-appeal, Chambers contends that the Commission erred in giving Liberty Mutual and Film Transit credit for the value of the 1986 Lincoln, which would include the cost of placing the rack and hand controls on the vehicle owned by him at the time of his injury. We reverse on cross-appeal because we find that the Commission was clearly wrong in its interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-9-508(a) (Repl. 1996), which requires that the employer promptly provide such apparatus as may be reasonably necessary in connection with the injury received. Based upon the findings of the prosthetic laboratory and Baptist Health Rehabilitation Institute, cross-appellees knew or should have known that their expenditures for modifying the Lincoln would not meet Chambers\u2019s needs. Consequently, they are not entitled to a discount for insisting upon useless measures that needlessly delayed Chambers\u2019s prompt receipt of reasonably necessary apparatus.\nAffirmed on direct appeal; reversed on cross-appeal.\nGriffen, Neal, Vaught, and Crabtree, JJ., agree.\nPittman, Hart, Jennings, and Bird, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "John F. Stroud, Jr., Chief Judge." }, { "text": "John E. JENNINGS, Judge,\ndissenting. Certainly the result reached by the majority in this case is an equitable one, but the question is one of law not equity. The question is what does this statute mean. Does a specially equipped van qualify as an \u201cother apparatus\u201d within the meaning of the statute?\nIn interpreting a statute, we try to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Jackson v. Blytheville Civ. Serv. Comm\u2019n, 345 Ark. 56, 43 S.W.3d 748 (2001). It was formerly the rule in this state, as it apparendy still is in all other states, that workers\u2019 compensation statutes, being remedial legislation, should be liberally construed. In 1993, the General Assembly passed Act 796, which includes the provision at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-704(c)(3), mandating that workers\u2019 compensation laws should now be \u201cstrictly construed.\u201d The legislature declared:\nWhen, and if, the workers\u2019 compensation statutes of this state need to be changed, the General Assembly acknowledges its responsibility to do so. It is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of any administrative law judge, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, or courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any provision in this act. In the future, if such things as the statute of limitations, the standard of review by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission or courts, the extent to which any physical condition, injury, or disease should be excluded from or added to coverage by the law, or the scope of the workers\u2019 compensation statutes need to be liberalized, broadened, or narrowed, those things shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, or the courts.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996).\nAll of the \u201crules of statutory construction\u201d are, at least in theory, aids to determining legislative intent. The judge-made doctrine of ejusdem generis is one of the more helpful rules of construction. When general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Commission, 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998).\nIn Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-508(a), \u201cother apparatus\u201d are general words following a specific enumeration. \u201cAmbulatory devices\u201d surely means wheel chairs or the like. Can it fairly be said that a specially-equipped van is \u201csimilar in nature\u201d to wheel chairs, crutches, and hearing aids, regardless of the requirement of strict construction?\nThe majority finds no Arkansas cases to help us with the problem at hand, and I agree there are none. Why then would we not want to consider decisions from other jurisdictions which are at least arguably directly in point?\nIn 1991 the Maryland Court of Appeals quoted Professor Larson\u2019s treatise on workers\u2019 compensation law:\n[A]s to specially-equipped automobiles for paraplegics, the cases have uniformly denied reimbursement, on the ground that an automobile is simply not a medical apparatus or device.\nR & T Constr. Co. v. Judge, 594 A.2d 99 (Md. 1991); 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 61.13(a), at 10-863 (1989). This was at a time when all states, including Arkansas, construed such statutes liberally. Since the decision in Maryland, the issue, in one form or another, has been decided in a number of states. Relief has been denied in Colorado, Bogue v. SDI Corp., Inc., 931 P.2d 477 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (van not \u201capparatus\u201d); Florida, Kraft Dairy Group v. Cohen, 645 So.2d 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (van not \u201cother apparatus\u201d); South Carolina, Strickland v. Bowater, Inc., 322 S.C. 471, 472 S.W.2d 635 (1996) (van not \u201cother treatment or care\u201d); and Pennsylvania, Petrilla v. Workmen\u2019s Compensation Appeal Board (People\u2019s Natural Gas), 692 A.2d 623 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (van not \u201corthopedic appliance\u201d). The most persuasive decision is City of Guntersville v. Bishop, 728 So.2d 611 (Ala. 1998). There, as here, the issue was one of first impression. The Alabama Supreme Court analyzed the statute in question, its own rules of construction, and the decisions from other states. The court said:\nWhile we recognize our duty to liberally construe the statute, we must nonetheless hold that a motor vehicle does not come within the term \u201cother apparatus\u201d as that term is used in \u00a7 25-5-77(a).\nIf we held that the workers\u2019 compensation statute required reimbursement of a claimant\u2019s expenses where the sole purpose of those expenses was to enhance the claimant\u2019s independent functioning, we believe we would be dangerously disturbing the balance of interests that the Legislature built into the workers\u2019 compensation system.\nOur workers\u2019 compensation system was designed to provide limited, but guaranteed, benefits to employees injured on the job. In addition to those benefits, employers are required to pay for medical and rehabilitative treatment. However, we hold that those benefits do not include the purchase price of a motor vehicle.\nThere are four cases that could be said to support the view the majority takes: Mississippi Transp. Comm\u2019n v. Dewease, 691 So.2d 1007 (Miss. 1997); Brawn v. Gloria\u2019s Country Inn, 698 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1997); Manpower Temporary Servs. v. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1995); and Terry Grantham Co. v. Indus. Comm\u2019n of Arizona, 154 Ariz. 180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). Each is distinguishable on several grounds and none is persuasive. It bears repeating that every state that has concluded that a van is not required under that state\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation law, has done so while following a rule of construction requiring the law to be liberally construed.\nPerhaps the law should be as the majority says it is. Because I cannot reach the same conclusion under any reasonable method of analysis, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judges Pittman, Hart, and Bird join in this dissent.\nThe statutes vary from state to state.", "type": "dissent", "author": "John E. JENNINGS, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Guy Alton Wade, for appellants.", "The Blagg Law Firm, by: Brad A. Cazort, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and Film Transit v. Randall CHAMBERS\nCA 01-424\n64 S.W.3d 775\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I, II, and III\nOpinion delivered January 9, 2002\nFriday, Eldredge & Clark, by: Guy Alton Wade, for appellants.\nThe Blagg Law Firm, by: Brad A. Cazort, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 328, "last_page_order": 333 }