{ "id": 6136475, "name": "Gregory LAMB v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Lamb v. State", "decision_date": "2002-03-20", "docket_number": "CA CR 01-846", "first_page": "54", "last_page": "61", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "77 Ark. App. 54" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "70 S.W.3d 397" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "337 Ark. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240978 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-81-203", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "459 U.S. 882", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6399650 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/459/0882-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 S.W.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753679 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907817 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889908 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ark. App. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6650251 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/20/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ark. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 138", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377599 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0138-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604763 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922772 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ark. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1342421 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/342/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922688 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0567-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 11863, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.000172216365309e-08, "percentile": 0.5031355109892507 }, "sha256": "58e39666737c9cea7a98585170d6563123d53b3b5e54e617ea5297ff703e8504", "simhash": "1:41d9d2dd0548d386", "word_count": 1953 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:28.541561+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart and Jennings, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Gregory LAMB v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Olly Neal, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in the Craighead County Circuit Court, after which appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty for possession of methamphetamine and reserved his right to appeal the suppression denial. In denying the motion, the court held that the seizure of appellant was unreasonable under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1, but was proper under Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2. Lamb was sentenced to thirty-six months of supervised probation. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it held that his stop was valid and that his constitutional rights were not violated. We reverse and remand.\nOn July 17, 2000, at 11:45 p.m., Officer Cooper Taylor responded to a call at 1508 Overhill in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Mr. Ronnie Shaver reported a broken windshield on his vehicle. While taking the criminal mischief report at the home, the officer and Shaver noticed a slow-approaching truck, traveling southbound on Overhill, stop in the general vicinity of the intersection with Westwood. A passenger, later identified as appellant, stepped out of the vehicle and walked down the street going eastbound on Westwood. The time was approximately 12:15 a.m. on July 18, 2000.\nOfficer Taylor became suspicious when he noticed that appellant did not go directly into a residence. He testified that \u201cMr.'Shaver spoke to me about some problems with a residence south of his on Overhill. He was complaining about suspicious activity, a large number of vehicles in and out at all hours of the day and night.\u201d Shaver indicated to Officer Taylor that he thought appellant could possibly have been involved with the mischief; therefore, the officer got into his vehicle and headed towards appellant to make contact. Taylor made contact with appellant, whereupon he requested to see some identification. Appellant, thereafter, produced a driver\u2019s license. Officer Taylor ran a local check, discovering that appellant had a warrant for failure to appear. He then placed appellant under arrest and performed a search incident to that arrest. He found appellant in possession of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine.\nTaylor testified at the suppression hearing that one of Shaver\u2019s neighbors, Mr. Thetford, heard a window break and saw a vehicle leave the scene. According to Thetford, there appeared to be two male passengers in a sports utility vehicle. Further, the officer testified that \u201cI made contact with this individual because of a combination of my own observations and what Mr. Shaver had related to me. Due to the late hours, the reason I was there, Mr. Shaver\u2019s indications to me, that the person did not go directly into a residence, and he was walking down a street, are reasons I made contact with this individual.\u201d Again on cross-examination, the officer stated that \u201cI went up and detained Mr. Lamb because he got out of a vehicle and walked down the street, the time of night, it was a residential neighborhood, a crime had occurred prior to my contact with Mr. Lamb, and the statement that a male was involved.\u201d\nThe trial court, in ruling on the motion to suppress, held that Lamb\u2019s encounter with the police was not a valid stop under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1. The trial court stated:\nthe interesting aspect of this stop is the fact that you are talking about midnight in a private neighborhood, a crime has been committed, without question, a crime has been committed. The defendant is within three hundred yards of the area where the crime has been committed. You have officers there who don\u2019t know what happened. They have reports of two individuals about the crime. They have a bare suspicion by one of the persons that this gentleman may be involved, although there is really no basis for that.\nNevertheless, the court found that the officer had authority under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.2 (2001), \u201cto do an investigatory stop of this defendant.\u201d\nIn reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Brunson v. State, 327 Ark. 567, 940 S.W.2d 440 (1997); McDaniel v. State, 65 Ark. App. 41, 985 S.W.2d 320 (1999). Due deference is given to the trial court\u2019s findings in the resolution of evidentiary conflicts and determinations of credibility. Stephens v. State, 342 Ark. 151, 28 S.W.3d 260 (2000).\nPolice-citizen encounters have been classified into three categories. The first and least intrusive category is when an officer merely approaches an individual on a street and asks if he is willing to answer some questions. State v. McFadden, 327 Ark. 16, 938 S.W.2d 797 (1997). Because the encounter is in a public place and is consensual, it does not constitute a \u201cseizure\u201d within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Rule 2.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure allows an officer to make the non-seizure police-citizen encounter. The second permissible police-citizen encounter involves one where an officer justifiably restrains an individual who he or she has an \u201carticulable suspicion\u201d has committed or is about to commit a crime. Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 (2001); Frette v. City of Springdale, 331 Ark. 103, 959 S.W.2d 734 (1998). The final category is the full-scale arrest, which must be based on probable cause. Frette v. City of Springdale, supra.\nAlthough the trial court found the encounter impermissible under Rule 3.1, it nevertheless held appellant\u2019s encounter with Officer Cooper Taylor to be permissible under Rule 2.2. In part, Rule 2.2 provides:\n(a) A law enforcement officer may request any person to furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or prevention of crime. The officer may request the person to respond to questions, to appear at a police station, or to comply with any other reasonable request.\nArk. R. Crim. P. 2.2 (2001). The insertion of the word \u201cotherwise\u201d in the rule shows beyond question that the officer\u2019s request for information must be in aid of the investigation or prevention of crime. Stewart v. State, 332 Ark. 138, 964 S.W.2d 793 (1998); Meadows v. State, 269 Ark. 380, 602 S.W.2d 636 (1980). \u201cSeizure\u201d occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. State v. McFadden, 327 Ark. 16, 938 S.W.2d 797 (1997). There is nothing in the Constitution that prevents the police from addressing questions to any individual; however, the approach of the citizen pursuant to a policeman\u2019s investigative law enforcement function must be reasonable under the existent circumstances and requires a weighing of the government\u2019s interest for the intrusion against the individual\u2019s right to privacy and personal freedom, with due consideration being given to the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved, and the circumstances attending the encounter. McDaniel v. State, 20 Ark. App. 201, 726 S.W.2d 688 (1987).\nBased on the attending circumstances giving rise to the police-citizen encounter at hand, we hold that Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.2 is simply inapplicable in this situation, and that appellant\u2019s stop constituted an impermissible stop and detainment under Ark. R.Crim. P. 3.1.\nRule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2001) provides that a law enforcement officer may stop and detain any person he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a felony. For purposes of this rule, reasonable suspicion means a suspicion based upon facts or circumstances which give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion. Addison v. State, 298 Ark. 1, 765 S.W.2d 566 (1989). An officer does not have to witness the violation of a statute in order to stop a suspect. Piercefield v. State, 316 Ark. 128, 871 S.W.2d 348 (1994). The justification for an investigative stop depends upon whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police have specific, particularized, and articulable reasons indicating a person or vehicle may be involved in criminal activity. Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d 284 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).\nAmong the factors to consider in determining whether an officer has grounds to \u201creasonably suspect\u201d are the time of day or night the suspect is observed; the particular streets and area involved; any information received from third persons, whether they are known or unknown; the suspect\u2019s proximity to known criminal conduct; and incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-81-203 (1987); see also Muhammad v. State, 337 Ark. 291, 988 S.W.2d 17 (1999).\nThe facts presented in this case are akin to those found in Stewart v. State, 332 Ark. 138, 964 S.W.2d 793 (1998). In Stewart, an officer pulled over to a curb and asked the appellant to approach his patrol car simply because she stood on the corner in a high-crime area late in the evening. The officer in Stewart was not investigating a nearby crime or a tip from an informant at the time of the encounter, and on appeal, the supreme court held the encounter impermissible under Rule 2.2.\nWe recognize that the difference in this case is that officer was investigating a nearby crime. However, the problem lies with weighing the government\u2019s interest for the intrusion against Lamb\u2019s right to privacy and personal freedom, with due consideration being given to the manner and intensity of the interference, the gravity of the crime involved, and the circumstances attending the encounter. Here, similar to the circumstances in Stewart, Officer Taylor drove up next to Lamb and asked him for his name and identification. Nowhere in the record is it evidenced that when Officer Taylor approached Lamb, he told appellant that he was investigating a nearby crime and wanted to see if Lamb could provide any information.\nBased upon the totality of the circumstances, the trial court properly ruled that the stop was not one that fell under Rule 3 because, taking into consideration the applicable fourteen factors, the factors present here to support a determination that Sergeant Cooper Taylor had \u201creasonable suspicion\u201d to stop Lamb were the time of day, his proximity to the crime, and the fact that a crime had happened earlier. Although no exact number of factors are dispositive on the issue of \u201creasonable suspicion,\u201d the facts suggest that the officer had no particularized, specific, or articulable reason to stop the appellant, but did so only based upon the fact that the victim, Shaver, who was in the house when the incident occurred, stated to the officer that the appellant could have \u201cpossibly\u201d been involved. Further, the statement by. the neighbor only indicates that there were two men in a red and tan sports utility vehicle near the scene when he heard the windshield break. The officer testified that he saw a pickup truck, not a sports utility vehicle, containing appellant stop near the scene of the incident, and appellant emerged and began to walk on foot down the side-' walk and went toward no particular residence.\nBecause the police-citizen encounter here amounted to an unreasonable seizure under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 when Officer Taylor detained Lamb, requested his driver\u2019s license, and ran a local check on him, we reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to suppress as it was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence and remand for trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHart and Jennings, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Olly Neal, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark Rees, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Gregory LAMB v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 01-846\n70 S.W.3d 397\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division III\nOpinion delivered March 20, 2002\n[Petition for rehearing denied May 1, 2002]\nMark Rees, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0054-01", "first_page_order": 74, "last_page_order": 81 }