{ "id": 6141899, "name": "Merlene DUNCAN v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department", "name_abbreviation": "Duncan v. Director, Employment Security Department", "decision_date": "2002-11-06", "docket_number": "E02-69", "first_page": "367", "last_page": "370", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 Ark. App. 367" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "88 S.W.3d 858" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "269 Ark. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712544 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-10-513", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ark. App. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/10/0077-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 364, "char_count": 5574, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.862779287211486e-08, "percentile": 0.4180212823218651 }, "sha256": "0787021803df6fc3fdc52a19b4ef057ac37d2384114809b950933a0fb2d90ae1", "simhash": "1:ab6cb5c2d1bca059", "word_count": 938 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:26.957939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Vaught and Crabtree, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Merlene DUNCAN v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "John E. Jennings, Judge.\nMerlene Duncan appeals from a decision by the Board of Review in an unemployment compensation case. Duncan\u2019s argument in essence, is that the Board\u2019s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree and reverse.\nThe Board fairly summarized the testimony:\nThe claimant testified that she began working for the listed employer in either 1991 or 1992. She said that she was working in the bakery/deli at the time she quit on September 29, 2001. She stated that she quit because her hours were reduced from forty hours per week to approximately twenty-eight hours per week and she could not pay her bills. She believed that the reduction in work hours was a result of a Wal-Mart Super Center opening in her town, Clinton, Arkansas. She reported that because she could not afford to maintain her home on her reduced salary, she had to move to California to live with her nephew. She noted that she sought employment for one month before she filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits. The claimant estimated that she worked the reduced hours for six or seven weeks before she quit. She added that she informed the store manager that if she could not be given more hours of work that she would have to quit. She maintained that she also asked for a leave of absence, but the employer did not grant her request. The claimant acknowledged that her intention was to visit her nephew in California until January 2002, and then return to Arkansas.\nThe store manager testified that he took over the store in June 2001, and the claimant\u2019s hours had already been reduced. He said that after June 1, 2001, the claimant worked an average of thirty hours per week. He thought that the reduction in hours was because of the increased competition from the Wal-Mart store. He noted that his store \u201creleased a lot of full-time/part-time people because they just didn\u2019t need them anymore.\u201d He indicated that the claimant was able to work more hours only when someone went on vacation. He recalled that the claimant asked for a leave of absence so she could move to California to earn more money, but his company does not grant leave of absences. He argued that the claimant quit her job with his company to move to California to earn more money, and he did not believe his company was responsible for the claimant being unemployed because if she had stayed she could have continued to work.\nThe Board then found and concluded:\nBased on the evidence, the Board of Review finds that the claimant voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, left last work. Allegations of a substantial decrease in wages may be considered good cause for voluntarily leaving one\u2019s employment. See Hopkins v. Stiles, 10 Ark. App. 77, 662 S.W.2d 177 (1983); rev\u2019d on other grounds, 282 Ark. 207, 666 S.W.2d 703 (1984). While the Board is aware of the Court\u2019s holding in Hopkins, the Board believes that other factors must be considered in this case to determine if the claimant\u2019s reason for quitting was good cause. Factors such as, the claimant worked the reduced hours approximately four months; the reduction in work hours affected all employees and was due to increased competition; and the claimant wanted a leave of absence so she could leave the state to live, and allegedly work, a brief time in California. The Board finds that while the claimant\u2019s wages may not have been what she wanted, she has not established that her reason for quitting rose to the level of good cause. Additionally, the Court has held that general economic conditions which lead to a claimant\u2019s seeking higher wages or lower living costs do not constitute \u201cgood cause connected with the work\u201d as contemplated in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-10-513. Broyles v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 712, 600 S.W.2d 426 (Ark. App. 1980). Therefore, the decision of the Appeal Tribunal, which reversed the Department determination, is reversed on the finding that the claimant voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, left last work.\nThe Board recognized that a substantial decrease in wages may be considered good cause for quitting one\u2019s work and, by implication, found that this appellant had incurred a substantial decrease in wages. The Board then considered \u201cother factors.\u201d This was entirely appropriate \u2014 when a case is not clearly governed by applicable precedent, the administrative agency must simply do the best it can.\nNevertheless, we conclude that none of the \u201cother factors\u201d recited by the Board justify a denial of compensation here. The first and third are immaterial. The second reason given by the Board is worthy of consideration. Clearly, the reduction in appellant\u2019s hours was not the fault of the employer.\nEven so, the general rule is that a substantial reduction in pay, even if attributable to economic conditions beyond the employer\u2019s control, will not bar a finding that the reduction constitutes good cause for quitting. See 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation \u00a7 146 (1992). Finally, we consider the Board\u2019s reference to Broyles v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 712, 600 S.W.2d 426 (Ark. App. 1980). That case did not involve a reduction in pay, but rather an increase in the claimant\u2019s cost of living. It is not in point here.\nWe reverse and remand with directions for the Board to award benefits.\nReversed and remanded.\nVaught and Crabtree, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "John E. Jennings, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellant, pro se.", "Allan Franklin Pruitt, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Merlene DUNCAN v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department\nE02-69\n88 S.W.3d 858\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered November 6, 2002\nAppellant, pro se.\nAllan Franklin Pruitt, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0367-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 396 }