{
  "id": 6138871,
  "name": "John Ashley MAGEE v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department",
  "name_abbreviation": "Magee v. Director, Employment Security Department",
  "decision_date": "2002-12-18",
  "docket_number": "E 01-293",
  "first_page": "162",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:54.237003+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Pittman, Robbins, Bird, Neal, and Vaught, JJ., agree.",
      "Hart, Griffen, and Roaf, JJ., dissent.",
      "Griffen and Roaf, JJ., join."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "John Ashley MAGEE v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "John E. Jennings, Judge.\nJohn Magee was employed as the plant manager by U.S. Agricultural, Inc. His father, Allan Magee, and Ed Howard were co-owners.of the business. Allan Magee was the president, and Mr. Howard was the treasurer.\nAppellant quit his job in June 2000. Some four months earlier he had increased his own salary from $590.00 a week to $670.00 a week. When Mr. Howard learned of this, he reduced appellant\u2019s salary back to its former level. Appellant then quit.\nAppellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review denied the claim on a finding that appellant had failed to take appropriate steps to prevent the mistreatment from continuing. In an earlier decision, we held that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded the case to the Board with the direction that it determine whether the appellant had good cause to quit his work. See Magee v. Director, 75 Ark. App. 115, 55 S.W.3d 321 (2001). On remand the Board determined that appellant did not have good cause to quit work, and the appellant has once again appealed, contending that the Board\u2019s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.\n\u201cGood cause is a cause that would reasonably impel an average, able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment.\u201d Garrett v. Director, 58 Ark. App. 7, 944 S.W.2d 865 (1997). We will affirm the Board\u2019s decision on a question of fact if it is supported by substantial evidence. Rankin v. Director, 78 Ark. App. 174, 79 S.W.3d 885 (2002). Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Walls v. Director, 74 Ark. App. 424, 49 S.W.3d 670 (2001). In the case at bar the Board of Review stated:\nThe general rule is that a substantial pay reduction gives an employee good cause for quitting. Yet, there is no set percentage or bright-line rule that makes a reduction in pay \u201csubstantial.\u201d The weight of authority, however, appears to be that a reduction of over twenty percent is so substantial as to compel an employee to quit a job and have good cause to do so, but a reduction of less than twenty percent is not.\nIn this case, restoring the claimant\u2019s salary to its previous level amounted to a reduction of approximately eleven-percent. The Board finds that this reduction is not substantial and does not constitute good cause for quitting the employment.\nAlthough the Board reviewed a number of cases from other jurisdictions, it clearly recognized that there was no \u201cbright-line rule.\u201d The Board\u2019s decision is therefore consistent with our statement in Price v. Everett, 2 Ark. App. 98, 616 S.W.2d 766 (1981), that \u201cthere is no talismanic percentage figure that separates a substantial reduction in salary from one that is not.\u201d We are unwilling to hold that an eleven-percent reduction in salary, under the facts and circumstances of this case, constitutes good cause for quitting, as a matter of law.\nAs we discussed in our earlier opinion, there were additional problems between appellant and Mr. Howard relating to the ordering of supplies. On this issue the Board found:\nAs to the four examples the claimant offered concerning the Secretary-Treasurer\u2019s refusal to pay, the requested repairs were ultimately made and the requested materials were ultimately purchased. The Secretary-Treasurer\u2019s assertion that cash flow problems delayed the payment of the bills was not disputed and is a reasonable explanation concerning the delay.\nThe Board\u2019s findings on this issue are supported by substantial evidence and are, therefore, conclusive. See Terry Dairy Products Co., Inc., v. Cash, 224 Ark. 576, 275 S.W.2d 12 (1955). For the reasons stated, the decision of the Board of Review is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nPittman, Robbins, Bird, Neal, and Vaught, JJ., agree.\nHart, Griffen, and Roaf, JJ., dissent.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "John E. Jennings, Judge."
      },
      {
        "text": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge,\ndissenting. For three reasons, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that substantial evidence supported the Board\u2019s finding that appellant was \u201cdisqualified for benefits\u201d because he \u201cvoluntarily and without good cause connected with the work left his . . . last work.\u201d See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-10-513(a)(l) (Repl. 2002). Thus, I respectfully dissent.\nIn an effort to clarify the facts, I note that the president of the company approved a raise for appellant, and he had been receiving the raise for four months before the company treasurer reduced his salary. However, whether appellant gave himself a raise is not the issue in this case.\nFirst, the majority concludes that the Board did not adopt a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d that a reduction of salary of less than twenty percent did not constitute good cause for quitting. I must disagree. The Board cited ten cases that purportedly supported the proposition that \u201ca reduction of over twenty percent is so substantial as to compel an employee to quit a job and have good cause to do so, but a reduction of less than twenty percent is not.\u201d Then, without discussing any relevant facts or circumstances, the Board flatly concluded that \u201cthe reduction is not substantial and does not constitute good cause for quitting,\u201d indicating that the Board adopted a \u201cbright-line rule.\u201d The Board erred as a matter of law, as \u201cthere is no talismanic percentage figure that separates a substantial reduction in salary from one that is not,\u201d and \u201c[e]ach case must be measured by its own circumstances.\u201d Price v. Everett, 2 Ark. App. 98, 100, 616 S.W.2d 766, 767 (1981). Because of this error of law and the lack of substantial evidence to otherwise support the Board\u2019s denial of benefits on this basis, I would reverse the Board\u2019s decision.\nSecond, in our earlier opinion, we remarked as follows:\nContrary to the Board\u2019s findings, the record plainly exhibits that there were long-held animosities between Howard and appellant, and that appellant had from time to time appealed to the president in order to find resolutions to the various incidents that fed the animosity. For whatever reason and despite the arguable authority to do so, the president did not resolve the matter. Appellant did, on many occasions, appeal his \u201ccase\u201d to a higher level of management without obtaining resolution. A stalemate has evolved between two equal owners with equal control. Appellant was in an untenable situation where an appeal for resolution was an exercise in futility. The law does not require an employee to engage in an act of futility as a precursor to obtain employment benefits.\nMagee v. Director, 75 Ark. App. 115, 123, 55 S.W.3d 321, 326 (2001). On remand, the Board found that there were reasonable explanations for Howard\u2019s delay in acting on appellant\u2019s requests to Howard that certain repairs and purchases be made. The majority agrees. The Board, however, wholly failed to address the stalemate between the two employers. Appellant was faced with the predicament of serving two equal owners who failed to resolve their underlying problems. The Board\u2019s failure to address this underlying fact leads me to conclude that its denial of benefits on this basis was not supported by substantial evidence.\nThird, although not discussed by the majority, the Board denied benefits in part based on its observation that the business was experiencing financial problems and that the salary reduction and delay of payments for repairs and materials was done in an effort to stabilize the company\u2019s financial condition. Thus, Howard was acting in his capacity as an officer of the company, and therefore, his actions were intended to strengthen the company\u2019s finances rather than to single out appellant for mistreatment.\nIn Duncan v. Director, 79 Ark. App. 367, 88 S.W.3d 858 (2002), we recently considered whether substantial evidence supported the Board\u2019s decision to deny benefits when the employee left her job as a result of a decrease in her work hours. In reversing the Board\u2019s decision, we held that \u201cthe general rule is that a substantial reduction in pay, even if attributable to economic conditions beyond the employer\u2019s control, will not bar a finding that the reduction constitutes good cause for quitting.\u201d Id. at 370. As Duncan suggests, the focus is on the economic injury to the employee, not the financial conditions of the employer. Consequently, in this case, the company\u2019s claim of financial distress should not have been considered by the Board in its analysis.\nThus, I respectfully dissent.\nGriffen and Roaf, JJ., join.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Allen Law Firm, by: David W. Sterling, for appellant.",
      "Phyllis Edwards, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John Ashley MAGEE v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department\nE 01-293\n92 S.W.3d 703\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I, II and III\nOpinion delivered December 18, 2002\nAllen Law Firm, by: David W. Sterling, for appellant.\nPhyllis Edwards, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0162-01",
  "first_page_order": 188,
  "last_page_order": 193
}
