{ "id": 6141147, "name": "Travis HOLLINS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Hollins v. State", "decision_date": "2003-01-29", "docket_number": "CA CR 02-519", "first_page": "342", "last_page": "345", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "80 Ark. App. 342" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "96 S.W.3d 755" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "545 S.W.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1616825, 1616690, 1678846 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "holding that a claim of error unsupported by citation to authority or convincing argument will be considered on appeal only if it is apparent without further research that the argument is well taken" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0857-01", "/ark/260/0785-01", "/ark/261/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ark. 857", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616825 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862", "parenthetical": "holding that a claim of error unsupported by citation to authority or convincing argument will be considered on appeal only if it is apparent without further research that the argument is well taken" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-614", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-2-605", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-74-107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683217 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17" }, { "page": "399-400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-110", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 398, "char_count": 6168, "ocr_confidence": 0.73, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17493954280732196 }, "sha256": "ef8428c37ad95a59b9629e8e448092410c478820e0c3b197892924aa84e4fe5e", "simhash": "1:6960357a73c78bd0", "word_count": 1017 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:54.237003+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stroud, C.J., and Griffen, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Travis HOLLINS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge.\nAfter a jury found appellant, Travis M. Hollins, guilty of aggravated assault and four counts of second-degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, he was sentenced to a total of twenty years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, he first argues that, prior to trial, the trial court should have dismissed three of the four counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm because the four shots he fired from the vehicle were part of a continuing course of conduct and constituted only one offense. Second, he argues that, because he fired the four shots from his vehicle in self-defense, the jury should have been instructed on and allowed to consider the defense of justification with regard to those four counts. We affirm.\nPrior to trial, appellant argued that the trial court should dismiss three of the four counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. In support of his argument, he cited Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1 \u2014 110(a)(5) (Repl. 1997), which provides that a person may not be convicted of more than one offense if \u201c[t]he conduct constitutes an offense defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant\u2019s course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses.\u201d He argued that the four shots he fired constituted a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct and thus constituted only one offense. In response, the State argued in part that appellant\u2019s motion was an attempt to seek a directed verdict in advance and thus procedurally inappropriate. The court denied the motion, stating that the issues could go to the jury \u201cand then it can be a court decision whether or not some of them are double jeopardy. . . .\u201d The issue, however, was never raised again.\nThe State then presented testimony establishing that, while appellant was driving a vehicle in circles in a parking lot and an adjacent grassy area, he fired four shots .with a pistol. In close proximity to the parking lot were basketball courts, a boxing gym, a playground, and a church. Other persons were present at these locations, including the victim of the aggravated assault, Herman Madison. During the shooting, Madison and a small child took cover behind Madison\u2019s truck. Two of the four shots hit the truck and the other two were unaccounted for. Appellant also testified and contended that he had fired shots at Madison in self-defense because Madison had approached him while holding a bat.\nThe trial court correctly refused to dismiss the charges prior to trial. While the subsection of the statute relied upon by appellant prohibits conviction of more than one offense in certain circumstances, \u201c[w]hen the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one (1) offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-110(a) (Repl. 1997)(emphasis added). Quoting from this portion of the statute, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that because it is not a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy to charge and prosecute on multiple and overlapping charges, an appellant cannot raise any double-jeopardy challenge until he has actually been convicted of the offenses. Brown v. State, 347 Ark. 308, 316-17, 65 S.W.3d 394, 399-400 (2001). In Brown, the court held that a double-jeopardy motion made in the form of a directed-verdict motion was premature. Appellant\u2019s pretrial motion for dismissal of the charges was likewise premature, as the State could properly charge and prosecute appellant on multiple and overlapping charges. Following his conviction on the four counts, appellant never argued that three of the four counts should have been dismissed; consequently, the argument was not preserved for appellate review. Id. We affirm on this point.\nNext, appellant argues that because he alleged that he was acting in self-defense when he fired the four shots from the vehicle, the jury should have been instructed on and allowed to consider the defense of justification as to the four counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm. We disagree.\nAppellant was charged with and ultimately convicted of four counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. \u201cA person commits unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in the second degree if he recklessly discharges a firearm from a vehicle in a manner that creates a substantial risk of physical injury to another person or property damage to a home, residence, or other occupiable structure.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-74-107(b)(l) (Repl. 1997). Although a person may be justified in the use of physical force or deadly physical force under certain circumstances, see Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-2-605 to -621 (Repl. 1997), when \u201che recklessly or negligently injures or creates a substantial risk of injury to a third party, the justification afforded ... is unavailable in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence toward the third party.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-614(b) (Repl. 1997). Consequently, appellant could not pose as a defense his argument that he was justified in creating a substantial risk of physical injury.\nAppellant acknowledges in his brief that \u00a7 5-2-614(b) is controlling, but nevertheless contends that the statute, in its application here, leads to an unfair result. He does not, however, present this court with any argument or authority providing a means by which this court may disregard the statute\u2019s plain language, and we are not aware of any such controlling authority. Given this absence of any argument or authority, we affirm. See Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857, 862, 545 S.W.2d 606, 609 (1977) (holding that a claim of error unsupported by citation to authority or convincing argument will be considered on appeal only if it is apparent without further research that the argument is well taken).\nAffirmed.\nStroud, C.J., and Griffen, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Josephine Linker Hart, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy W. Bunch, Public Defender, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Travis HOLLINS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 02-519\n96 S.W.3d 755\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered January 29, 2003\nTimothy W. Bunch, Public Defender, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0342-01", "first_page_order": 368, "last_page_order": 371 }