{
  "id": 6142846,
  "name": "Wayne McCARLEY v. Rachael SMITH",
  "name_abbreviation": "McCarley v. Smith",
  "decision_date": "2003-04-23",
  "docket_number": "CA 02-537",
  "first_page": "438",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:00:28.541819+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Robbins and Vaught, JJ., agree."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Wayne McCARLEY v. Rachael SMITH"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nThe appellee, Rachael Smith, is the mother of appellant, Wayne McCarley. Appellee filed suit against appellant, alleging that he convinced her to deed her 108-acre farm to him so that he could obtain a loan to pay off mortgage debts on the property and make improvements, with the agreement that he would re-deed the property back to her. She further alleged that he failed to return the property to her, and prayed that the court would order him to do so. Appellant denied making any such agreement and filed a counterclaim, alleging that he had incurred damages in the form of a lost chicken contract because of his mother\u2019s lawsuit. The circuit judge entered an order that contained no findings of fact, but simply dismissed appellant\u2019s counterclaim and granted appellee a life estate in the disputed property. The son appeals, asserting that the circuit judge\u2019s order is not supported by the evidence and is otherwise erroneous, and the mother cross-appeals, asserting that the grant of a life estate was inadequate relief. We reverse and remand.\nOur supreme court has recently stated:\nTo impose a constructive trust, there must be full, clear, and convincing evidence leaving no doubt with respect to the necessary facts, and the burden is especially great when a title to real estate is sought to be overturned by parol evidence. The test on review is not whether the court is convinced that there is clear and convincing evidence to support the chancellor\u2019s finding but whether it can say the chancellor\u2019s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous, and we defer to the superior position of the chancellor to evaluate the evidence. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\nNichols v. Wray, 325 Ark. 326, 333, 925 S.W.2d 785, 789 (1996) (internal citations omitted).\nWe are convinced that a mistake has been committed in the present case because the trial court\u2019s order is not supported by the facts in evidence. It would be permissible, in a land-transfer case, for the court to impose a constructive trust and grant relief in the form of a life estate if there was clear and convincing evidence that the land was deeded with the intention that the conveyor would be allowed to live on the land for the rest of her life. This was done in Brasel v. Brasel, 313 Ark. 337, 854 S.W.2d 346 (1993). However, there was no such evidence in the present case. The only evidence of an agreement came from the appellee, who stated that she deeded the property to her son in order to get a loan with the understanding that he would later return the property to her. This evidence, if believed, would support the imposition of a constructive trust, but the relief would not be a life estate because there was no agreement to that effect. Instead, the proper relief in these circumstances would be to require the mother to reimburse the son for his expenses, at which time the mother would be entitled to have legal title vested in her. See, e.g., Kerby v. Feild, 183 Ark. 714, 38 S.W.2d 308 (1931).\nBecause the imposition of a constructive trust is potentially consistent with the facts in evidence, but the relief granted by the circuit judge is not, we are unable to determine the basis for the chancellor\u2019s decision on appellate review sufficiently to permit us to fully address the issues presented on appeal and cross-appeal. Therefore, further proceedings are needed to allow the chancellor to fashion relief consistent with the facts in evidence. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Wrightsell v. Johnson, 77 Ark. App. 79, 72 S.W.3d 114 (2002).\nReversed and remanded.\nRobbins and Vaught, JJ., agree.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "John Mauzy Pittman, Judge."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Herby Branscum, Jr. and James Henderson, for appellants.",
      "Alvin Schay, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Wayne McCARLEY v. Rachael SMITH\nCA 02-537\n105 S.W.3d 387\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered April 23, 2003\nHerby Branscum, Jr. and James Henderson, for appellants.\nAlvin Schay, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0438-01",
  "first_page_order": 464,
  "last_page_order": 466
}