{ "id": 6142316, "name": "Berniece M. GROCE v. DIRECTOR, Arkansas Department of Human Services", "name_abbreviation": "Groce v. Director, Arkansas Department of Human Services", "decision_date": "2003-06-11", "docket_number": "CA 02-1274", "first_page": "447", "last_page": "455", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "82 Ark. App. 447" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "117 S.W.3d 618" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "79 Ark. App. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136843 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/79/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-77-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ark. App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139766 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/47/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 C.F.R.. \u00a7 416.1212", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "984 S.W.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6141507 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/64/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ark. App. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ark. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1756268 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/271/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240921 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ark. Appx. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App'x", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ark. App. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137042 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/79/0069-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 679, "char_count": 12679, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.3561647802632509 }, "sha256": "09fb23b6b6e65ff362ab049d33727194004c3c3c9df7390d1d63490e11215933", "simhash": "1:254d73957b605302", "word_count": 2046 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:45.234835+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Griffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Berniece M. GROCE v. DIRECTOR, Arkansas Department of Human Services" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Larry D. Vaught, Judge.\nThis is an appeal from a Pulaski County Circuit Court order in which appellant\u2019s application for Medicaid nursing home benefits was denied. On appeal, appellant asserts that appellee\u2019s hearing officer erred, as a matter of law, in refusing to allow her to claim a homestead exemption under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1382b(a)(l) (2000), and that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm.\nOn December 4, 1997, appellant Berniece Groce signed a durable power of attorney in favor of her daughter, Pat Monroe. The durable power of attorney was filed on May 25, 2001. Also on May 25, 2001, appellant, through her daughter, purchased a life estate in her daughter\u2019s home at 125 W. Cloverdale in Brinkley, Arkansas, for $43,953.13. The offer and acceptance to purchase the life estate required that appellant pay all of the closing costs, including a $1000 attorney\u2019s fee. The deed, which in no way restricted appellant\u2019s right to sell her life estate, was also filed on May 25, 2001.\nAppellant periodically stayed at the residence for short periods of time as a guest, but never occupied it as her principal place of residence. It is undisputed that appellant receives no income from the property. After the purchase of the fife estate, appellant never took possession of the property, but thousands of dollars of her money were spent by her daughter from May 2001 through June 2001 for repairs and improvements to the home. The expenditures included landscaping, upgrading the air conditioning, and adding a patio, carport, and fence.\nOn July 5, 2001, appellant, through her daughter, applied to the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) for nursing home benefits. At the time, appellant resided in Clay Cliff Nursing Home, where she moved in July 2000, and continued to reside at the time the briefs in this matter were filed. Prior to moving to Clay Cliff, appellant lived alone in an assisted-living complex for disabled and. handicapped residents. Appellant, who suffers from Alzheimer\u2019s disease, was eighty-four or eighty-five at the time of the administrative hearing on December 14, 2001.\nAppellee viewed the purchase of the life estate between appellant and her daughter to be a device through which to divest appellant of assets, without receiving value in return, for purposes of establishing Medicaid eligibility. Appellee found that appellant paid for a life estate from which she received no benefit because she neither received possession nor rent from her daughter and grandson, who were in possession of the home and never vacated the property. Accordingly, the transaction was deemed to be an uncompensated transfer, and appellant\u2019s application for nursing home assistance was denied.\nAt the administrative hearing, appellant\u2019s daughter testified that she had lived at the home in question for approximately twenty-seven years, and did not move out after the sale of the life estate to appellant. Her adult son, Todd Monroe, age thirty-one at the time, testified that he also lived in the home. It is undisputed that neither Pat Monroe nor Todd Monroe is disabled. Additionally, neither is dependent on appellant, as each has his or her own income. Pat Monroe is a retired teacher who receives teacher retirement, social security benefits, and additional income from an unnamed source. Todd Monroe is a nurse and supports himself through a contract with the Arkansas Department of Health. He files his own income taxes and claims himself as a dependent. The hearing officer affirmed the agency\u2019s denial of benefits because the home was never appellant\u2019s principal place of residence, and the life estate therefore could not be excluded for purposes of Medicaid eligibility. The life estate was determined to be a countable resource in the estimated amount that the sale of the life estate would bring. That decision was affirmed on appeal to the Pulaski County Circuit Court, where the trial judge found that the decision of the hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. From that order comes this appeal.\nBefore reaching the merits of appellant\u2019s arguments, we note that appellant failed to provide an abstract of the material parts of the record from the administrative hearing as required by Rule 4-2(a)(5) (2003) of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The abstract does not give an accurate picture of what transpired below or provide the information necessary to understand the questions presented to us. Additionally, the statement of the case is also deficient pursuant to the requirements of Rule 4-2(6) (2003) of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals because appellant failed to include page references to the abstract and addendum.\nFailure to abstract an item essential to an understanding of the appeal has traditionally been regarded as a fatal error, which has been held to be an adequate basis to affirm for noncompliance with the abstracting rules. See McNeil v. Lillard, 79 Ark. App. 69, 86 S.W.3d 389 (2002). However, pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(b)(3), which was modified by In Re: Modification of the Abstracting System, 345 Ark. Appx. 626 (2001) (per curiam), the court must now allow rebriefing before summarily affirming. However, in the instant case, appellee filed a supplemental abstract, which is sufficient to allow us to proceed with the merits of the case.\nUnder the Administrative Procedures Act, our review is limited to ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency\u2019s decision. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. v. Thompson, 331 Ark. 181, 959 S.W.2d 46 (1998). Decisions from an administrative appeal will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence and are not arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. McQuay v. Arkansas State Bd. of Architects, 337 Ark. 339, 989 S.W.2d 499 (1999). To set aside an agency decision as arbitrary and capricious, the party challenging the action must prove that it was willful and unreasoned, without consideration and with a disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case. See Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Comm\u2019n, 271 Ark. 351, 609 S.W.2d 23 (1980).\nOur scope of review is limited because administrative agencies are better equipped by specialization, insight, experience, and through more flexible procedures that occur to determine and analyze legal issues affecting their agencies. McQuay, supra. Additionally, the appellate courts refuse to substitute their own judgment for that of an agency. See Arkansas Bd. of Reg. for Prof. Geologists v. Ackley, 46 Ark. App. 325, 984 S.W.2d 67 (1998). It is not our role to conduct a de novo review of the circuit court proceeding; rather, our review is directed at the decision of the administrative agency. Id. When conducting our review, we look to the findings of the administrative agency, keeping in mind that courts have held that the hearing officer is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses and decide the proper weight to give the evidence. Id.\nAppellant contends that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1382b(a)(l) (2000), the life estate in the home in question should be excluded from resources when determining Medicaid eligibility. However, appellee maintains that from the facts of the case it appears that appellant\u2019s daughter sold appellant a life estate in the daughter\u2019s home, then spent thousands of dollars of appellant\u2019s money to improve the home in order to artificially impoverish appellant so that appellant would be eligible for Medicaid benefits.\nAppellee points out that appellant has overlooked 20 C.F.R.. \u00a7 416.1212(a) (2001), which defines the word \u201chome\u201d as follows:\nA home is any property in which an individual .... has an ownership interest and which serves as the individual\u2019s principal place of residence.\n(Emphasis added.) Additionally, under DHS Medical Services Policy 3331.5(l)(a.) (Medical Services Manual, November 1, 1995), which lists resources which may qualify for exclusion under specific conditions, \u201chome\u201d is defined as \u201cany shelter in which the individual.... has an ownership interest.... and which is used by the individual . ... as his principal place of residence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In this case, the hearing officer found that the property in question was never appellant\u2019s principal place of residence.\nHer daughter answered in the negative when asked if appellant had actually lived in the house and received mail there. She also testified that appellant had never moved in the residence or taken up residency, or given the nursing home notice that she was not returning from a visit. Occasional visits to the home after appellant purchased the interest did not convert the home into her principal place of residence. There was testimony that a nursing home resident may visit a home for as long as fourteen days, and no evidence was presented that appellant ever visited the property in question for a period of time longer than fourteen days.\nThe federal and state regulations are consistent in requiring a house to be an individual\u2019s principal place of residence before allowing it to be excluded as a homestead exemption. The fact that appellant signed an \u201cintent to return\u201d form does not negate this requirement \u2014 the house was never her principal place of residence to which she could \u201creturn.\u201d The evidence supports the hearing officer\u2019s finding that appellant\u2019s life estate in the residence remained a countable resource because the house was not her principal place of residence.\nAppellant also argues that the hearing officer erred in finding that appellant\u2019s daughter and grandson were not dependent on the residence in question for shelter. Medical Services Policy section 3331.5 (l)(b) allows the alleged dependency of a relative to be verified if there is a question about the status. In verifying whether there was such a dependency, the hearing officer obtained testimony from appellant\u2019s daughter that: (1) she had lived in the residence for twenty-seven years; (2) she is not disabled; (3) she supported herself; (4) she is a retired teacher who receives teacher retirement; (5) she also receives social security benefits and income from other unnamed sources. Appellant\u2019s grandson testified that he was thirty-one years old, not disabled, and worked as a nurse for the Arkansas Department of Health. The hearing officer determined that there was no evidence that either appellant\u2019s daughter or grandson were dependent on the residence in question for shelter, other than the fact that they lived there at the time of the hearing.\nIt is the prerogative of the agency to believe or disbelieve any witness and to decide what weight to give the evidence. See Arkansas State Police Comm\u2019n v. Smith, 338 Ark. 354, 994 S.W.2d 456 (1999). In order to establish an absence of substantial evidence, appellant is required to demonstrate that the proof before the administrative tribunal was so nearly undisputed that fair-minded persons could not reach the arrived-upon conclusion. The question is not whether the testimony would have supported a contrary finding, but whether it supported the finding that was actually made. See City of Hector v. Arkansas Soil & Water Comm\u2019n, 47 Ark. App. 177, 888 S.W.2d 312 (1994).\nMedicaid is a payor of last resort, and is intended to supplement, not supplant other potential sources of payment. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 20-77-101(a) (Supp. 1999). Our supreme court has cited that statute with approval, declaring that it is only after the individual has exhausted his or her own resources that the taxpayers are to assume the financial burden of an individual\u2019s necessary medical care. See Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. v. Walters, 315 Ark. 204, 866 S.W.2d 823 (1993). Based on our review, the evidence shows that appellant, albeit through her relatives, was attempting an end-run around the purpose of the statute. Substantial evidence has been defined as valid, legal and persuasive evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and force the mind to pass beyond conjecture. See Van Curen v. Arkansas Prof. Bail Bondsman Licensing Bd., 79 Ark. App. 43, 84 S.W.3d 47 (2002). There was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer\u2019s decision. Accordingly, we affirm.\nAffirmed.\nGriffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Larry D. Vaught, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ed Daniel, IV, for appellant.", "Ann West, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Berniece M. GROCE v. DIRECTOR, Arkansas Department of Human Services\nCA 02-1274\n117 S.W.3d 618\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division II\nOpinion delivered June 11, 2003\nEd Daniel, IV, for appellant.\nAnn West, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0447-01", "first_page_order": 467, "last_page_order": 475 }