{ "id": 6140863, "name": "Dora CASTANEDA v. PROGRESSIVE CLASSIC INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Castaneda v. Progressive Classic Insurance", "decision_date": "2003-10-22", "docket_number": "CA 03-186", "first_page": "267", "last_page": "276", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ark. App. 267" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "125 S.W.3d 835" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "76 Ark. App. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139370 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/76/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922697 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 P.3d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 11082514 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/27/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "928 P.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 11952558 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/928/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "890 P.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10347393 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/890/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 So.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9583387 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/404/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 F. Supp. 901", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3854067 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/633/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-403", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210166 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257743 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ark. App. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139436 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/74/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. App. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140989 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/58/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ark. App. 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139286 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/76/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ark. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139109 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/71/0162-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 705, "char_count": 14701, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.235450940621901e-08, "percentile": 0.4318159089583987 }, "sha256": "baa93234f79b5f3fea0a1f4a157babe2fc05ea173f7ebeb70c30b2b30c0c960e", "simhash": "1:ec708990651d9548", "word_count": 2383 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:20.130178+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Dora CASTANEDA v. PROGRESSIVE CLASSIC INSURANCE COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Layton Roaf, Judge.\nThis appeal is from a summary judgment entered for appellee Progressive Classic Insurance Company in a lawsuit brought by its insured, appellant Dora Castaneda, for uninsured-motorist benefits. Progressive moved for summary judgment on the ground that the accident occurred while a named excluded driver was at the wheel of Castaneda\u2019s car. On appeal from the summary judgment for Progressive, Castaneda argues (1) that the named-driver exclusion is ambiguous, (2) that she did not reject her own uninsured-motorist benefits for injuries suffered while riding as a passenger of an excluded driver, and (3) that it is against public policy to construe the named-driver exclusion as applying to this situation. We affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.\nOn August 6, 2001, Castaneda was injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile covered by her policy; the driver of the automobile was Castaneda\u2019s son, Aaron Castaneda. Their car was stopped at a traffic signal and was rear-ended by an uninsured negligent driver. Alleging that the accident was the result of an uninsured third party\u2019s fault, Castaneda sued Progressive in circuit court for $25,000 in uninsured-motorist benefits. Progressive denied coverage on the ground that the vehicle was operated by Aaron, who was a named excluded driver under the policy. Castaneda amended her complaint to assert that the policy\u2019s named-driver exclusion applied only if Aaron was at fault, which was not the case here, and that it would be against public policy to interpret the exclusionary clause in any other manner. Progressive then moved for summary judgment, relying on the express terms of the policy.\nThe insurance policy\u2019s named-driver exclusion, which Castaneda signed, stated:\nYou have named the following persons as excluded drivers under this policy.\nNAME OF EXCLUDED DRIVER DATE OF BIRTH\nAARON CASTANEDA 01/13/86\nNo coverage is provided for any claim arising from an accident or loss that occurs while a covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle is operated by the excluded driver(s). THIS INCLUDES ANY CLAM FOR DAMAGES MADE AGAINST YOU, A RELATIVE, OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ORGANIZATION THAT IS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF THE OPERATION OF A COVERED VEHICLE OR NON-OWNED VEHICLE BY THE EXCLUDED DRIVER.\nThe policy\u2019s general provisions also stated:\nIf you have asked us to exclude any person from coverage under this Policy, then we will not provide coverage for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle that occurs while it is being operated by the excluded person. THIS INCLUDES ANY CLAIM FOR DAMAGES MADE AGAINST YOU, A RELATIVE, OR ANY OTHER PERSON OR ORGANIZATION THAT ISVICARI-OUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT ARISING OUT OF THE OPERATION OF A COVERED VEHICLE OR NON-OWNED VEHICLE BY THE EXCLUDED DRIVER.\nThe uninsured-motorist bodily-injury coverage provision was set forth as follows:\nSubject to the Limits of Liability, if you pay a premium, for Uninsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage, we will pay for damages, other than punitive or exemplary damages, which an insured person is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury:\n1. sustained by an insured person;\n2. caused by accident; and\n3. arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.\nIn response to the motion for summary judgment, Castaneda contended that the named-driver exclusion was ambiguous and that it and the uninsured-motorist provisions of the policy did not adequately reject the uninsured-motorist coverage to comply with Arkansas law.\nAt the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the judge made the following statement:\n[T]he argument that the policy language becomes ambiguous because of the amplification [in the exclusion] ... I don\u2019t find that that creates an ambiguity. I see it strictly as a warning, an attempt to warn them that they are losing all protection from suits by others arising out of the operation of this vehicle. I don\u2019t buy a public policy issue here. I mean, in fact, everything here works against that. This lady excluded the driver. That reduced her premium. And then she, I will have to assume knowingly and intentionally, put this young man in the vehicle as the driver and let him operate the vehicle and an accident ensued. It doesn\u2019t appear to be connected to fault or non-fault or fault on the other person, it just seems to be an exclusion which as I read it... I don\u2019t see any ambiguity at all. \u201cAny claim arising from an accident or loss that occurs while a covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle is operated by the excluded driver.\u201d There\u2019s no public policy argument here. A totally innocent person would not have coverage and a pedestrian, driver of another car. Why in the world should this lady have coverage when she is the one that paid the reduced premium and then willfully allowed a non-covered or an excluded driver to operate the vehicle? ...\nI know exclusions are upheld unless ... they violate a clearly enunciated or well-founded public policy. I don\u2019t find that here.The language of the contract is plain and unambiguous in my opinion, and so is Arkansas precedent on this issue, and so the motion for summary judgment will be granted.\nCastaneda takes this appeal from the circuit court\u2019s award of summary judgment to Progressive.\nIn reviewing summary-judgment cases, we determine whether the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented by the moving party left a material question of fact unanswered. Alberson v. Automobile Club Interins. Exch., 71 Ark. App. 162, 27 S.W.3d 447 (2000). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is not a genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. All proof submitted with a motion for summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and any doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving party. McWilliams v. Schmidt, 76 Ark. App. 173, 61 S.W.3d 898 (2001). Summary judgment is not appropriate where evidence, although in no material dispute as to actuality, reveals aspects from which inconsistent hypotheses might reasonably be drawn and reasonable minds might differ. Lee v. Hot Springs Village Golf Schs., 58 Ark. App. 293, 951 S.W.2d 315 (1997).\nCastaneda first contends that the named-driver exclusion is ambiguous because it did not expressly state that uninsured-motorist coverage was not available to a named insured for injuries sustained when the excluded driver was operating the vehicle. Therefore, Castaneda argues, summary judgment was inappropriate because the rules of construction, which favor insureds over insurance companies, come into play when a policy is ambiguous.\nIn reviewing an insurance policy, the appellate court submits to the principle that, when the terms of the policy are clear, the language in the policy controls. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 74 Ark. App. 166, 47 S.W.3d 909 (2001). The language in an insurance policy is to be construed in its plain, ordinary, popular sense. Norris v. State Farm. Fire & Cas. Co., 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242 (2000). If a policy provision is unambiguous, and only one reasonable interpretation is possible, the court will give effect to the plain language of the policy without resorting to rules of construction; if, however, the policy language is ambiguous, the policy will be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Id. Language is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Elam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 346 Ark. 291, 57 S.W.3d 165 (2001); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Midgett, 319 Ark. 435, 892 S.W.2d 469 (1995). Whether the language ofapolicyis ambiguous is a question of law to be resolved by the court. Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., supra.\nAn insurer may contract with its insured upon whatever terms the parties may agree upon that are not contrary to statute or public policy Jordan v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 344 Ark. 81, 40 S.W.3d 254 (2001). Absent statutory strictures to the contrary, exclusionary clauses are generally enforced according to their terms. Id. The terms of an insurance contract are not to be rewritten under the rule of strict construction against the company issuing it so as to bind the insurer to a risk that is plainly excluded and for which it was not paid. Id.\nCastaneda argues that the exclusion is rendered ambiguous by the sentence beginning \u201c[t]his includes any claim for damages made against you....\u201d The trial court found that this language was in the nature of a warning that liability protection could be lost. We agree that the sentence merely emphasizes the effect of the exclusion on the policyholder\u2019s liability coverage and does not purport to limit its application in respect to other types of claims.\nCastaneda also argues that, when considered in conjunction with the uninsured-motorist provision, the exclusion is ambiguous. We disagree. In our view, the only reasonable interpretation of the policy is that the named-driver exclusion, which applies to \u201cany claims arising from an accident or loss that occurs while a covered vehicle ... is operated by the excluded driver,\u201d prevents the recovery of uninsured-motorist benefits by Castaneda, even though she was a named insured. The exclusion is not qualified by the terms \u201cexcept when the excluded driver is without fault\u201d or \u201cexcept when an insured is riding as a passenger\u201d; it simply states that there is no coverage for \u201cany claims\u201d whenever an excluded driver is operating the vehicle. Castaneda has not raised the issue of whether the exclusion might be rendered ambiguous in any other manner or by the policy\u2019s lack of a definition for the phrase \u201cis operated by\u201d or by any other conflicts between the language of the various policy provisions, and we therefore need not consider any other possible sources of ambiguity in this policy. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s decision on this issue.\nCastaneda argues that, in light of the ambiguity, she did not intentionally and knowingly reject uninsured-motorist coverage in writing as is required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-403 (Supp. 2001). Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-89-403(a)(l) provides that all automobile liability insurance policies must provide \u201cfor the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.\u201d However, such coverage \u201cshall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy has rejected the coverage in writing ....\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-89-403(a)(2) (Supp. 2001). Castaneda points out that the named-driver exclusion did not mention her uninsured-motorist coverage and asserts that she was not put on notice that, by signing the named-driver exclusion, she was rejecting such benefits when Aaron was driving the car.\nCastaneda also argues that it is against the public policy of this state to construe this exclusion as barring her from recovering uninsured-motorist benefits and asserts that the purpose of excluding an inexperienced or poor driver does not apply when the excluded driver is not the cause of the collision. She points out that this exclusion would not have prevented her from recovering uninsured-motorist benefits if she had been injured while driving, riding as a passenger in a car, riding a bicycle, or walking as a pedestrian. She argues that she paid for uninsured-motorist coverage for herself without regard to whether an excluded driver was operating the vehicle and that to deny it in this instance violated the public policy of protecting those who pay for automobile insurance against the negligence of those who violate the law and do not pay for it. In response, Progressive asserts that Castaneda received the benefit of a significantly reduced premium because of the exclusion and that it cannot be the policy of this state to require the payment of benefits for which Castaneda did not pay a premium. Castaneda contended in oral argument that uninsured-motorist premiums are not reduced where there is an excluded driver, because they are predicated on negligence other than that of the driver of the insured vehicle.\nCastaneda cites decisions from other states that have held that this type of named-driver exclusion was inadequate to reject uninsured-motorist coverage, such as Lowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 633 F. Supp. 901 (S.D. Miss. 1986). We note, however, that other courts have held to the contrary. See McCullogh v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of Ala., 404 So.2d 637 (Ala. 1981); Lopez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); O\u2019Brien v. Dorrough, 928 P.2d 322 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996). See also Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Progressive Mountain Ins. Co., 27 P.3d 343 (Colo. 2001). It is also clear that, in general, named-driver exclusions do not violate public policy in Arkansas. See Jordan v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., supra; Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 208, 937 S.W.2d 180 (1997); Shelter Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 315 Ark. 409, 867 S.W.2d 457 (1993).\nGiven the record presented, however, we cannot decide this issue because Castaneda has failed to satisfy her burden of bringing up a record demonstrating error on appeal. See Cassidy v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 76 Ark. App. 190, 61 S.W.3d 880 (2001). Even though both parties base their arguments in part on the amounts and types of premiums that Progressive collected from Castaneda, no premium calculation or analysis has been provided for our consideration. Without this necessary calculation, we are left with the general principle that named-driver exclusions do not violate public policy in Arkansas and cannot reach the specific public-policy question based upon the assessment and collection of premiums. Therefore, we are left with no choice but to affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.\nAffirmed.\nStroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Layton Roaf, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Odom and Elliott, P.A., by: Don R. Elliott, Jr., for appellant.", "Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by: Julia L. Busfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Dora CASTANEDA v. PROGRESSIVE CLASSIC INSURANCE COMPANY\nCA 03-186\n125 S.W.3d 835\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division III\nOpinion delivered October 22, 2003\n[Petition for rehearing denied November 19,2003.]\nOdom and Elliott, P.A., by: Don R. Elliott, Jr., for appellant.\nHuckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by: Julia L. Busfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0267-01", "first_page_order": 303, "last_page_order": 312 }