{ "id": 6141331, "name": "Bill CLARK, Jr. v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department, and Coca-Cola Bottling Company", "name_abbreviation": "Clark v. Director, Employment Security Department", "decision_date": "2003-10-29", "docket_number": "E03-173", "first_page": "308", "last_page": "314", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ark. App. 308" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "126 S.W.3d 728" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "269 Ark. 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1712456 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/269/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ark. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426-27", "parenthetical": "reversing Board finding no evidence of intentional violation of written policy regarding absenteeism" }, { "page": "672-73", "parenthetical": "reversing Board finding no evidence of intentional violation of written policy regarding absenteeism" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/74/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Ark. App. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138641 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/1/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ark. App. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139478 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "claimant's actions did not amount to misconduct" }, { "parenthetical": "claimant's actions did not amount to misconduct" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/54/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 Ark. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6143590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "claimant did not intentionally withhold information vital to the employer's interest, nor was deliberately inefficient, nor was guilty of such negligence as to be deemed in deliberate violation of the employer's rules" }, { "parenthetical": "claimant did not intentionally withhold information vital to the employer's interest, nor was deliberately inefficient, nor was guilty of such negligence as to be deemed in deliberate violation of the employer's rules" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/55/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ark. App. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136882 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the claimant's use of \"harsh and provocative\" words held to have not risen to the level of misconduct" }, { "parenthetical": "the claimant's use of \"harsh and provocative\" words held to have not risen to the level of misconduct" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/58/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Ark. App. 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139859 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "minor tardiness at sales meeting did not constitute misconduct to ban unemployment benefits" }, { "parenthetical": "minor tardiness at sales meeting did not constitute misconduct to ban unemployment benefits" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/76/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. App. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136948 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "misrepresentation on job application that involved mistaken belief about expungement was not disqualifying dishonesty" }, { "parenthetical": "misrepresentation on job application that involved mistaken belief about expungement was not disqualifying dishonesty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/80/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Ark. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140291 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "absenteeism did not amount to misconduct that would warrant forfeiture of right to unemployment compensation" }, { "parenthetical": "absenteeism did not amount to misconduct that would warrant forfeiture of right to unemployment compensation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/80/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ark. App. 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136641 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/60/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139971 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 Ark. App. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138437 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/52/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ark. App. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140277 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/42/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ark. App. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138848 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/61/0139-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 568, "char_count": 10515, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3767147806288044e-07, "percentile": 0.7964099451357975 }, "sha256": "6d8c7ee95a72775c3f9f9e0c196b5f89383ae84707c6d833eb5da38443ca94d9", "simhash": "1:398e924265eec65a", "word_count": 1674 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:20.130178+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Vaught and Crabtree, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Bill CLARK, Jr. v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department, and Coca-Cola Bottling Company" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "R. Baker, Judge.\nAppellant, Bill Clark, Jr., was discharged from his job as a truck driver for Coca-Cola Bottling Co., for safety violations. The employer has a safety policy providing for discharge of a driver who accumulates more than a certain number of points for driving accidents. Appellant began work for the employer on February 4, 2002. He had four accidents between March 6, 2002, and January 10, 2003, accumulating more than the maximum allowed by the safety policy. Each of the accidents occurred when appellant was backing up his truck and ran into something. Each of the accidents was minor with no reported injuries to people. The Board of Review disqualified appellant from receiving unemployment benefits for eight weeks, finding that he was discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work. The Board explained the disqualification as follows:\nAlthough the Appeal Tribunal found that there was no evidence that the claimant was negligent, the evidence establishes that each of the accidents occurred when the claimant was backing up and struck a stationary object. Clearly it was the claimant\u2019s negligence, and not some action by the stationary object, which caused the accident. In addition, the evidence establishes that the claimant repeatedly made the same error. As such, the Board finds that the claimant\u2019s actions demonstrate more than ordinary negligence in isolated instances, and instead, show such repetition as to demonstrate a wrongful intent or design.\nThe Board\u2019s focus on the causal connection between the accident and actions of the driver, or a stationary object, is not the question that must be addressed. The question is whether the action by the driver demonstrated wrongful intent or evil design rising to the level of misconduct sufficient to disqualify him from receiving unemployment benefits. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse and remand with instructions to award benefits.\nOn appeal, we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board\u2019s findings, and we will affirm the Board\u2019s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Hiner v. Director, Ark. Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 61 Ark. App. 139, 965 S.W.2d 785 (1998). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993). Even when there is evidence upon which the Board of Review might have reached a different decision, the scope of our review is limited to a determination of whether the Board reasonably could have reached the decision it did based upon the evidence before it. Id.\nArkansas Code Annotated section ll-10-514(a)(l) (Repl.2002) provides in relevant part that an individual will be disqualified for benefits if discharged from work for misconduct in connection with that work. For the purposes of unemployment compensation, misconduct is defined as (1) disregard of the employer\u2019s interest; (2) violation of the employer\u2019s rules; (3) disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect; and (4) disregard of the employee\u2019s duties and obligations to the employer. Rucker v. Price, 52 Ark. App. 126, 915 S.W.2d 315 (1996). There is an element of intent associated with a determination of misconduct. Fulgham v. Director, Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 52 Ark. App. 197, 918 S.W.2d 186 (1996). Therefore, for an individual\u2019s actions to constitute misconduct sufficient to disqualify him or her from benefits, the actions must be deliberate violations of the employer\u2019s rules or acts of wanton or willful disregard of the standard of behavior that the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Kimble v. Director, Ark. Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 60 Ark. App. 36, 959 S.W.2d 66 (1997). See also Oliver v. Director, Emplo. Sec. Dept. 80 Ark. App. 275, 94 S.W.3d 362 (2002).. .\nOn appeal, we are not limited to a \u201crubber stamp\u201d review of decisions arising from the Board of Review. Instead, where we have reviewed cases involving \u201cmisconduct\u201d and have found insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the Board, we have not hesitated to reverse. See, e.g., Oliver v. Director Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 80 Ark. App. 275, 94 S.W.3d 362 (2002) (absenteeism did not amount to misconduct that would warrant forfeiture of right to unemployment compensation); King v. Director Empl. Sec., 80 Ark. App. 57, 92 S.W.3d 685 (2002) (misrepresentation on job application that involved mistaken belief about expungement was not disqualifying dishonesty); Yarbrough v. Director, 76 Ark. App. 231, 61 S.W.3d 922 (2001) (minor tardiness at sales meeting did not constitute misconduct to ban unemployment benefits); Rollins v. Director, 58 Ark. App. 58, 945 S.W.2d 410 (1997) (the claimant\u2019s use of \u201charsh and provocative\u201d words held to have not risen to the level of misconduct); Blackford v. Arkansas Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 55 Ark. App. 418, 935 S.W.2d 311 (1996) (claimant did not intentionally withhold information vital to the employer\u2019s interest, nor was deliberately inefficient, nor was guilty of such negligence as to be deemed in deliberate violation of the employer\u2019s rules); Carraro v. Director, 54 Ark. App. 210, 924 S.W.2d 819 (1996) (claimant\u2019s actions did not amount to misconduct).\nThe question in this case is whether a truck driver\u2019s involvement in motor-vehicle accidents during working hours, which were attributable to the employee\u2019s negligence, constituted work-related misconduct sufficient to bar the employee from receiving unemployment compensation.\nTo constitute misconduct, the definitions require more than mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith error in judgment or discretion. Nibco, Inc. v. Metcalf, 1 Ark. App. 114, 118, 613 S.W.2d 612, 614 (1981). There must be an intentional or deliberate violation, a willful or wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. Id.\nIn rendering its decision, the Board cited the standard set forth in Nibco, supra, and Kimble v. Director, Arkansas Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 60 Ark. App. 36, 959 S.W.2d 66 (1997). In Kimble, the court held that a truck driver involved in five accidents in six months, all of which were attributable to her negligence, evidenced such disregard for the interests of her employer that she was discharged for misconduct relating to her work and was therefore unable to receive unemployment compensation. In affirming the Board\u2019s finding of misconduct, this court in Kimble did not rely solely on the driver\u2019s liability. We emphasized that even numerous accidents will not alone support a finding of misconduct. Instead, the court contrasted the driver\u2019s previous work performance, which indicated that she performed her job without incident prior to the spate of accidents, with the high number of incidents in a short time span. The driver\u2019s performance prior to the series of accidents was evidence that the driver had the ability and capacity to perform her job duties. Therefore, the evidence showed a pattern of carelessness from which one could infer an indifference that constituted a substantial disregard of the employer\u2019s interest as well as of the driver\u2019s duties and obligations to the employer.\nUnlike Kimble, nothing in the record in this case indicates that the driver had an accident-free period from which the Board could conclude that he had the capacity and ability to back his truck up without incident, but deliberately failed to act within his ability. The first accident occurred in March after he was hired in February. The only time he was involved in accidents is when he was backing up his truck.\nThe Board found that appellant violated the employer\u2019s written policy limiting the number of accidents occurring within a specified time and that this constituted misconduct sufficient to create a statutory bar to benefits. It is true that appellant violated the employer\u2019s policy by exceeding the number of accidents allowed. However, we hold that there is no evidence that appellant ever intentionally violated the rules so as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design, or engaged in conduct from which the Board could infer wrongful intent or evil design. See Walls v. Director, Empl. Sec. Dep\u2019t, 74 Ark. App. 424, 426-27, 49 S.W.3d 670, 672-73 (2001) (reversing Board finding no evidence of intentional violation of written policy regarding absenteeism); B.J. McAdams, Inc. v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 693, 600 S.W.2d 418 (Ark. App. 1980) (holding that mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are no't to be deemed \u201cmisconduct\u201d within the meaning of the statute applied to award of benefits to truck driver having three accidents in 11-month period of time).\nAt the most, the evidence supports finding an inability of the driver to safely back up without incident. The driver accepted full responsibility for the first accident, saying that he was hurrying too much to get the job done. For the second incident, he backed into a dumpster that pushed into a wall. His undisputed testimony was that there was no damage to the wall, dumpster, or truck from this accident. In the third accident, he backed over concrete posts that had been recently installed in a place commonly used by the truck drivers to turn around. In the last accident, appellant\u2019s rear tire barely hit the bumper of another truck and the bumper was bent back into place by the drivers.\nWhile the employer may have acted prudently and reasonably in deciding to terminate appellant from employment as a truck driver, there is simply no substantial evidence to support a determination by the Board that appellant\u2019s conduct amounts to an intentional disregard of his employer\u2019s interest. As such, we reverse and remand this case for an award of benefits.\nReversed and remanded for an award of benefits.\nVaught and Crabtree, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "R. Baker, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellant, pro se.", "Allan Franklin Pruitt, for appellee Director." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Bill CLARK, Jr. v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department, and Coca-Cola Bottling Company\nE03-173\n126 S.W.3d 728\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered October 29, 2003\nAppellant, pro se.\nAllan Franklin Pruitt, for appellee Director." }, "file_name": "0308-01", "first_page_order": 344, "last_page_order": 350 }