{ "id": 6141983, "name": "Shawn Leigh JIMENEZ v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Jimenez v. State", "decision_date": "2003-11-12", "docket_number": "CA CR 02-1111", "first_page": "377", "last_page": "388", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "83 Ark. App. 377" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "128 S.W.3d 483" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "577 S.W.2d 581", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1665022 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 45", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183319 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1771581 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ark. App. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141528 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/82/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51308 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ark. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1665051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/265/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 U.S. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1248336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/527/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ark. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513714 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-38" }, { "page": "815-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/349/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443727 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9158336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "705-706" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ark. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513769 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/349/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 S.E.2d 403", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. App. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525354 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/110/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 A.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Md. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2087429 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/286/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 A.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Md. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2300115 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/41/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-3-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155533 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0372-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 973, "char_count": 19724, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.525008588908956e-08, "percentile": 0.5244425447197887 }, "sha256": "7db607fd7bdf19bf95345801d922ac1e288f085901ae05c37cd1dde22c215be8", "simhash": "1:0d3994a5eda99b5d", "word_count": 3284 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:20.130178+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart and Griffen, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Shawn Leigh JIMENEZ v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mauzy Pittman, Judge.\nThe appellant in this criminal case was charged with solicitation of capital murder of two police officers. After a jury trial, she was convicted of those offenses and sentenced to two thirty-year terms of imprisonment to be served consecutively. From that decision, comes this appeal.\nFor reversal, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; that she was denied a fair trial by the prosecution\u2019s reference to terrorist activity; that the trial court erred in refusing to require the State to produce federal Drug Enforcement Administration employment files of a witness; and that the trial court erred in refusing to give proffered jury instructions on her defense of impossibility and her theory that her conduct was nothing more than constitutionally-protected speech. We affirm.\nWe first address appellant\u2019s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 108 S.W.3d 622 (May 29, 2003). We affirm a conviction if it is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resort to speculation or conjecture. Id.\nA person commits the offense of capital murder if, with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of any law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty, he causes the death of any person. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101(a)(3) (Repl. 1997). Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-3-301 (a) (Repl. 1997), a person solicits the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of a specific offense, he commands, urges, or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would (1) constitute that offense; (2) constitute an attempt to commit that offense; (3) cause the result specified by the definition of that offense; or (4) establish the other person\u2019s complicity in the commission or attempted commission of that offense.\nViewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the appellee, the record reflects that Officers Jerry Hart and Andre Dyer of the Little Rock Police Department were assigned to bicycle patrol in appellant\u2019s neighborhood near Central High School. In the course of their patrols, they learned that appellant was a drug addict, and they arrested her several times for various offenses during May 2000. Appellant was angered by these arrests. On May 23, 2000, she told an acquaintance, Bryan Johnston, that she wanted Officer Hart killed. Appellant talked to Johnston for two hours about wanting to have Officer Hart killed.\nUnbeknownst to appellant, Bryan Johnston was, in reality, an undercover informant for the federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After appellant expressed her desire to have Officer Hart killed, Johnston became concerned that she might find someone to do it for her of whom the police would be unaware. Johnston then told appellant that he might know someone who could help her and that he would get back to her after he made a couple of telephone calls. Johnston later telephoned the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Little Rock Police Department and reported the incident. Johnston agreed to contact appellant again and record their conversations. On May 24, 2000, Johnston met appellant. Johnston informed appellant that he found someone who would kill Officer Hart for a price if she still wanted it done. Appellant stated that she did want it done because Officer Hart was making her life miserable. Appellant then asked when the killing would take place, and remarked that she couldn\u2019t believe that she was \u201cplotting a murder.\u201d\nJohnston then had a conversation with appellant in which he told her that he would introduce her to the assassin. On June 6, 2000, Johnston introduced appellant to Steve Pledger, a detective with the Little Rock Police Department who was posing as a hired assassin. Appellant told Steve Pledger that she wanted it done, that she wanted Officer Jerry Hart dead because he tried to send her to the penitentiary. She described Officer Hart as a black police officer who rode \u201ca bicycle over in the hood,\u201d and described his beat as being \u201cfrom 24th Street over to 10th and 11th Street, back down to Martin Luther King, all the way up to Chester.\u201d Appellant described Officer Hart\u2019s personal automobile and told Steve Pledger where he parked it. She stated that she did not care how the killing was done, just \u201cdo it. Do it.\u201d Appellant also told Steve that she wanted Officer Hart\u2019s partner \u201cHenry\u201d killed as well. (Henry was Officer Dyer\u2019s radio call sign.) Appellant agreed to pay Steve $1000 to kill both police officers, although she cautioned Steve that \u201cif something happens, I just \u2014 I don\u2019t feel like going to the penitentiary for plotting a murder.\u201d\nJohnston recorded another conversation he had with appellant on June 7, 2000. Appellant informed Johnston that Officer Hart had jailed her again \u201cfor walking down the f --g street\u201d and that she had just been released on probation. Johnston asked appellant if she still wanted his friend. Appellant responded: \u201cYeah. Are you kidding? But I don\u2019t have the money. I can\u2019t get on the street.\u201d\nJohnston telephoned appellant again on June 7, 2000, and told her that Steve would be in town next week and would need to speak to her. Appellant told Johnston to give Steve her address, \u201c2012 West 17th, and I\u2019ll talk to him because I want this done, and I want it done. Once I have [the] $500, I\u2019ll have it done. In fact, if I have to f\u2014 k for it, I\u2019ll have your $500.\u201d She then added that \u201cI don\u2019t want one of them, I want both of them. I\u2019ve had it. I\u2019ve had it. I can\u2019t take it any more. My freedom is on the line. Now that - now that I\u2019m on probation, if I walk to the store he throws me in jail.\u201d\nOnjune 15, 2000, Steve met again with appellant. Appellant told Steve that she did not yet have the money, but she said that she would get it and reaffirmed her desire to have the police officers killed. She told Steve that Officer Hart wore a bullet-proof vest, agreed that Officer Hart\u2019s head was vulnerable despite his protection, and stated that \u201cI want him dead immediately. Yeah. I\u2019d kind of like his partner to watch, and then he\u2019ll be next, you know what I\u2019m saying. He\u2019ll be like squatting, saying, \u2018No, no, no, no,\u2019 like squealing and everything. You know what I\u2019m saying.\u201d\nSteve Pledger had a third conversation with appellant on July 21, 2000. He told appellant that the other officer\u2019s name was not Henry, but was instead Dyer, and appellant agreed that was correct. Steve told appellant that he was \u201cready to do it\u201d immediately and had everything lined up for the assassinations. Appellant told Steve that she did not have the money but that she would do what she could to get it.\nOn August 16, 2000, appellant told Johnston that she was going to leave town to visit her family in Texas so that she would not be around when Steve killed the police officers and she could \u201chide out there until the heat cooled.\u201d Appellant was arrested that day.\nAppellant argues that there is no evidence that appellant \u201cever actually urged, commanded, or requested that another person kill\u201d the police officers. There is no merit in that argument. As the testimony recited above clearly indicates, appellant was quite aware that she was plotting a murder, and repeatedly told Steve that she wanted him to kill both police officers. Appellant asserts that her actions were mere \u201cwindow shopping,\u201d and that they did not rise to the level of criminal solicitation because she never paid the purported assassin his agreed-upon fee of $1000. We do not agree. The identical issue was presented to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303, aff'd 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 317 (1979). There it was argued that Gardner\u2019s conviction for solicitation to commit murder should be reversed because the prospective murderer was never actually directed to proceed with a murder, and because payment for the murder, which never occurred, was a condition precedent to any contemplated action by the prospective murder. We agree with the Maryland court\u2019s holding that \u201cthe crime of solicitation requires neither a direction to proceed nor the fulfillment of any conditions. It is, in essence, asking a person to commit a crime. The gravamen of the offense is in the urging.\u201d Gardner v. State, 41 Md. App. at 200, 396 A.2d at 311; accord, State v. Davis, 110 N.C. App. 272, 429 S.E.2d 403 (1993). Here, the record shows that appellant urged Steve Pledger to engage in specific conduct that would constitute capital murder, and we hold that her convictions are supported by substantial evidence.\nNext, appellant contends that she was denied a fair trial by the prosecution\u2019s reference to terrorist activity at trial. As noted above, appellant\u2019s theory of the case was that no criminal liability would arise until she had actually paid the assassin, and that she had therefore not committed any offense because her behavior was \u201cjust talk.\u201d In furtherance of this theory, appellant elicited testimony from Detective Steve Pledger conceding that appellant\u2019s actions had been \u201cjust talk.\u201d Immediately afterward, the prosecution on redirect asked Detective Pledger if \u201cjust talk\u201d about terrorism was something that warranted police investigation. Appellant then requested a mistrial, which was denied.\nAmong the factors to be considered in determining whether or not a trial court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial motion are whether the prosecutor deliberately induced a prejudicial response and whether an admonition to the jury could have cured any resulting prejudice. Jones v. State, 349 Ark. 331, 78 S.W.3d 104 (2002). We are not convinced that the prosecutor deliberately introduced a prejudicial response in this case. His question on redirect was clearly intended to respond to appellant\u2019s previous question to the witness and to address appellant\u2019s theory that criminal liability could not be imposed for \u201cjust talk.\u201d\nAlthough the introduction of the issue of terrorism into this trial was perhaps inflammatory, we think any possible prejudice to appellant could have been cured by an admonition to the jury stating that there was no question of terrorist activity in this case. In Wilkins v. State, 324 Ark. 60, 66, 918 S.W.2d 702, 705-706 (1996), the Arkansas Supreme Court said that:\n[A] mistrial is a drastic remedy which should be resorted to only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial or where any possible prejudice cannot be removed by admonishing the jury or some other curative relief. Bullock v. State, 317 Ark. 204, 876 S.W.2d 579 (1994). An admonition is the proper remedy where the assertion of prejudice is highly speculative. Banks v. State, 315 Ark. 666, 869 S.W.2d 700 .(1994). . . . This court has held that the failure to request a cautionary instruction or admonition may not inure to the appellant\u2019s benefit on appeal. Stanley v. State, 317 Ark. 32, 875 S.W.2d 493 (1994).\nIn any event, appellant does not appear to be concerned with any potential bias that might have arisen by virtue of a mistaken association of her behavior with terrorism; instead, her theory of prejudice is that the jury may have been led by the prosecutor\u2019s question to misconstrue the law in such a way as to impose criminal liability for mere \u201ctalk\u201d without an additional overt act. However, that would not be a misconstruction. As we noted in our discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence, \u201ctalk,\u201d in the form of urging one to commit a specific criminal act, is precisely what the solicitation statute forbids. We find no error on this point.\nNext, appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to require the State to produce federal Drug Enforcement Administration employment files of Bryan Johnston pursuant to a request made under Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 17. Appellant\u2019s argument is based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cthe suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.\u201d Id. at 87.\nThe Arkansas Supreme Court discussed the subsequent development and application of this rule in Cloird v. State, 349 Ark. 33, 37-38, 76 S.W.3d 813, 815-16 (2002), noting that:\nIn Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999), the Court revisited Brady and explained its implications. It noted that since the decision in Brady, the court had held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. Such evidence is material \u201cif there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence \u201cknown only to police investigators and not the prosecutor.\u201d Therefore, to comply with Brady, \u201cthe individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government\u2019s behalf. . . .\u201d Stickler, supra; Larimore [v. State, 341 Ark. 397, 17 S.W.3d 87 (2000).] In Stickler, the court set out the three elements of a true Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; (2) that the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued.\nWe do not agree that there was reversible error in the case at bar. First, there is no evidence indicating that the employment files themselves were in the hands of any Arkansas state agency or were otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. Rule 17.3(b). See Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 119, 835 S.W.2d 852 (1992). Second, it is impossible to tell from the record before us precisely what information appellant was seeking and what she did not obtain. Although she informed the trial judge prior to trial that she had interviewed Johnston but that he gave her \u201cno information with respect to Brady material vis-a-vis his prior history with DEA,\u201d it is unclear from the record before us what was asked and answered in that interview, whether Johnston refused to answer questions, or whether he simply had no relevant information to offer.\nHowever, it is clear that Johnston did testify at trial concerning his employment as a paid informant for the DEA, describing the manner in which he was paid and disclosing the financial interest he had in the cases to which he was assigned. Johnston also readily testified that he had sex with appellant on one occasion and that he drove her to purchase drugs. While it is well settled that the prosecution\u2019s suppression of evidence material either to guilt or to punishment and favorable to an accused violates the defendant\u2019s due-process rights, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution, Brady v. Maryland, supra, there is no indication that any such evidence existed in the case at bar. On this record, we think appellant has failed either to establish any violation of Brady or to demonstrate that any prejudice ensued.\nNext, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to give her proffered jury instruction on the defense of impossibility. The proffered instruction, Arkansas Model Jury Instruction \u2014 Criminal 503(d)(2), provides an affirmative defense where \u201cthe conduct charged to constitute the solicitation was inherently unlikely to result in the commission of a crime and neither the conduct nor the defendant presented a public danger warranting a criminal conviction.\u201d Appellant asserts that her conduct was inherently unlikely to result in the commission of a crime because she never paid the purported assassin. This argument, too, is premised on appellant\u2019s theory that her conduct was merely \u201cjust talk\u201d for which no criminal liability arose until she paid the assassin, a theory that we have rejected supra. There was no evidence to support a finding that the murder of the police officers was \u201cinherently unlikely,\u201d and we can find no error in the refusal of the instruction offered. Chronister v. State, 265 Ark. 437, 580 S.W.2d 676 (1979).\nFinally, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to give her proffered instruction purporting to set out First Amendment limitations on the power of a state to criminalize speech. Fler proffered instruction stated that:\nSpeech, which \u201cmerely advocates law violation,\u201d is protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Criminal prosecution for words is limited to speech which \u201cincites imminent lawless activity.\u201d In the event you find Defendant\u2019s speech was not speech such that it would \u201cincite imminent lawless activity,\u201d you must find the Defendant not guilty of all the offenses charged.\nA party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and when there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction. Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 984 S.W.2d 432 (1999). An appellant may not complain of the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction which is only partially correct, as it is his duty to submit a wholly correct instruction. Merritt v. State, 82 Ark. App. 351, 107 S.W.3d 894 (2003). It is true that constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe mere advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Here, however, there is no question of mere advocacy. Instead, the only proof before the jury was that appellant contracted to pay Steve Pledger to murder Officers Hart and Dyer. The United States Supreme Court has said that:\nThe fact that ... an agreement [to engage in illegal conduct] necessarily takes the form of words does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, the constitutional immunities that the First Amendment extends to speech. Finally, while a solicitation to enter into an agreement arguably crosses the sometimes hazy line distinguishing conduct from pure speech, such a solicitation . . . remains in essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit, and may properly be prohibited.\nBrown v. Hartladge, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982). Appellant\u2019s proffered instruction does not distinguish between mere advocacy of law violation and an agreement to engage in criminal conduct, and was therefore both misleading to the jury and not a wholly correct instruction. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in refusing to submit it to the jury. See State v. Brown, 265 Ark. 41, 577 S.W.2d 581 (1979); Merritt v. State, supra.\nAffirmed.\nHart and Griffen, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mauzy Pittman, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hampton & Larkowski, by: Mark F. Hampton; and Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Shawn Leigh JIMENEZ v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 02-1111\n128 S.W.3d 483\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division I\nOpinion delivered November 12, 2003\nHampton & Larkowski, by: Mark F. Hampton; and Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0377-01", "first_page_order": 413, "last_page_order": 424 }