{ "id": 6140754, "name": "Lynne PITTMAN v. Claude PITTMAN", "name_abbreviation": "Pittman v. Pittman", "decision_date": "2003-12-17", "docket_number": "CA 03-212", "first_page": "293", "last_page": "300", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 Ark. App. 293" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "139 S.W.3d 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "71 Ark. App. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138274 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/71/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138655 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 Ark. App. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139814 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/83/0206-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 602, "char_count": 12322, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4270353479922978e-07, "percentile": 0.650135973178359 }, "sha256": "ec3fdfb14adc920b28bc7e3bcea965ffe3cf06b948c6f572ed83175c1bce7a96", "simhash": "1:9d96c4667accddfc", "word_count": 1984 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:08.452411+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stroud, C.J., Baker, and Roaf, JJ., agree.", "Neal and Crabtree, JJ., dissent." ], "parties": [ "Lynne PITTMAN v. Claude PITTMAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.\nThis case arises from a judicial construction of a clause in a property, child custody, and support agreement between appellant, Lynne Pittman (now Gordy), and appellee, Claude Pittman. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by interpreting the parties\u2019 contract rather than giving effect to the plain language of the contract. We reverse and remand.\nThe parties were divorced injuly 1998. Prior to the divorce, they executed the property, child custody, and support agreement now in question. The trial court incorporated that agreement into the final divorce decree. In December 2001, appellee filed a petition to modify the provisions of that agreement as they related to spousal support. Appellant eventually filed a motion for summary judgment on that petition.\nBefore that litigation was put to rest by the trial court, the parties began a new disagreement over one particular clause of the existing property, child custody, and support agreement. Section Twelve of the Agreement states:\nHusband [that is appellee] agrees to provide and be solely responsible for the payment of the costs associated with an undergraduate degree for the minor child of the parties. Said expenses shall include tuition, books, lab fees, room, board, and other legitimate educational expenses.\nAppellant filed a petition for contempt and breach of contract on September 10, 2002. The petition alleged that appellee had failed to make payments according to Section Twelve. Appellee denied that he was in contempt or that he breached the agreement.\nOn November 3, 2002, a trial on the matter took place. Appellee testified that he acknowledged the text of Section Twelve of the agreement. He stated that their mutual daughter, Hayley Pittman, for whose benefit Section Twelve existed, was at Johnson and Wales University at the time of the hearing. He admitted that he had not paid for any of her tuition, books, room, or board, but stated that he had not done so because no one had informed him how much to pay. He sent her seven hundred dollars. He stated that he knew that his daughter\u2019s apartment cost about $1,000 per month, but that he had not taken any action to determine any of the other expenses. Specifically, appellee acknowledged in court that under the agreement he was required to pay whatever it cost to put the daughter through school.\nAppellee next testified that he, a veterinarian, made about $120,000 the previous year. Appellant is a teacher and makes approximately $20,000 per year. Appellee stated that he recently had become seriously ill and had hired his son, whom he paid about $60,000 per year. Appellee received $32,400 in disability and stated that his overall income had dropped to $92,000. He stated clearly that, if he \u201chad to,\u201d he \u201ccan afford to send my daughter to the school.\u201d He also stated that the previous year he had sent his daughter to the University of Arkansas.\nOn cross-examination, appellee also stated that the cost of tuition at his daughter\u2019s current school was about $18,000 per year. He expressed a willingness to pay whatever it was he paid \u201clast year.\u201d\nAppellant testified that her daughter was pursuing a degree in culinary arts and restaurant management. She stated that her ex-husband, appellee, had agreed to pay all of their daughter\u2019s educational expenses rather than paying continuing child support. Neither of the parties had agreed to modifying the agreement in question. Appellant then introduced a chart of their daughter\u2019s living and school expenses, but we do not have that chart in the abstract or addendum. She also stated that their daughter had some scholarships and a grant to cover part of the cost.\nThe trial court subsequently ruled that Section Twelve did not clearly define the extent of the obligation to pay for the child\u2019s education. The trial court reiterated appellee\u2019s position that he had paid $12,000 the previous year and that this obligation should continue throughout the daughter\u2019s undergraduate studies. The court found that Section Twelve spoke only in \u201cgeneral terms,\u201d and that it used the words \u201clegitimate educational expenses.\u201d The trial court found further that those words implied \u201creasonable\u201d educational expenses. Based on Section Eight of the agreement, according to which appellee was obligated to pay appellant, inter alia, the sum of $1,500 per month for support, maintenance, and education of the parties\u2019 minor child, the trial court deemed Section Eight instructive concerning the parties\u2019 intent at the time they formed the instant agreement and that $1,500 would be a reasonable sum to support the daughter.\nThe final, written order of the trial court reiterated that, under the agreement, appellee had to pay spousal support to appellant in the amount of $3,500 per month (for a period of 96 months from the execution of the agreement filed July 9, 1998). The order further stated that the daughter had attended the University of Arkansas for one year, for which appellee had paid all expenses, and then relocated to a culinary school at the east coast. The order reiterated that the language of Section Twelve is very general in nature and sets no limits to be expended. The order equated \u201cother legitimate educational expenses\u201d with \u201creasonable expenses.\u201d The trial court emphasized in writing that its order did not constitute a modification of the agreement. The order fixed appellee\u2019s obligation for education at $1,500 per month, for three years. From this order appellant now appeals.\nAnalysis\nIt is true that independent property settlement agreements such as the one involved here remain subject to judicial interpretation. Rogers v. Rogers, 83 Ark. App. 206, 121 S.W.3d 510 (2003); Sutton v. Sutton, 28 Ark. App. 165, 771 S.W.2d 791 (1989). In the Rogers case, the trial court found that the appellant had agreed to pay for \u201csome other expenses\u201d in addition to the child\u2019s tuition and books not covered by scholarships, and ordered him to pay $300 monthly. This court disagreed and held that there was \u201csimply no provision in the agreement for such an allowance, and no evidence to support this award.\u201d Id.\nHowever, even though the right to interpret existing agreements may exist, we still must follow the rules of contract construction. When contracting parties express their intention in a written instrument in clear and unambiguous language, it is our duty to construe the written agreement according to the plain meaning of the language employed. Coble v. Sexton, 71 Ark. App. 122, 27 S.W.3d 759 (2000) . Where the meaning of the words is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to explain the writing. Id. When, on the face of the document, the reader can tell that something must be added to the written contract to determine the parties\u2019 intent, the ambiguity is patent. Id. Conversely, a latent ambiguity arises from undisclosed facts or uncertainties of the written instrument. Id. The initial determination of the existence of an ambiguity in a written contract rests with the trial court, and if an ambiguity exists, then parol evidence is admissible and the meaning of the term becomes a question for the fact finder. Id. On appeal, then, we do not set aside a trial court\u2019s finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous, but the determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is a matter of law. Id. We do not defer t\u00f3 the trial court\u2019s determinations of law.\nThe trial court ruled that Section Twelve did not clearly define the extent of the obligation to pay for the child\u2019s education. It found that Section Twelve spoke in \u201cgeneral terms\u201d only and that the section used the words \u201clegitimate educational expenses.\u201d The trial court reasoned that those words meant \u201creasonable\u201d educational expenses. Consequently, the trial c\u00f3urt referred to Section Eight of the parties\u2019 agreement, according to which appellee had obligated himself to pay appellant, inter alia, $1,500 per month for support, maintenance, and education of the child. As such, the trial court entered an order that appellee had to pay $1,500 per month for the child\u2019s college education.\nThe pertinent text of Section Eight reads as follows:\nHusband shall pay to Wife the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00) per month for the support, maintenance, and education of the parties[\u2019] minor child. Husband\u2019s support obligation has been determined by agreement of the parties and by referring to the Child Support Chart in effect at the time of the execution of the Agreement and shall become effective upon entry of a Decree of Divorce in this matter. . . . Husband\u2019s support obligation will continue until any of the following events occur:\na. The death of the child;\nb. The attainment of the child\u2019s eighteenth birthday or graduation from high school, whichever occurs later;\nc. The child becomes emancipated, as defined by the laws of the State of Arkansas.\nFirst, Section Eight of the parties\u2019 agreement has nothing to do with Section Twelve. By its plain language, appellee\u2019s obligation to pay $1,500 in child support ceased when Hayley reached the age of 18 or graduated from high school, whichever occurred later. As such, Section Eight concerned itself with a different phase in her life. Section Twelve, on the other hand, concerns itself solely with Hayley\u2019s post-secondary-school education. Therefore, the $1,500 mentioned in Section Eight cannot serve as a basis to construe a purported ambiguity of Section Twelve.\nSecond, Section Twelve is not ambiguous. To the contrary, Section Twelve is quite clear in its meaning. Appellee agreed, wisely or otherwise, to pay for \u201cthe costs associated with an undergraduate degree,\u201d including \u201ctuition, books, lab fees, room, board, and other legitimate educational expenses.\u201d There is nothing ambiguous about these terms. The very last phrase, \u201cand other legitimate educational expenses,\u201d is admittedly open to interpretation. However, there is no reason to deem that phrase ambiguous where the rest of the language is clear and explicit, and where the proof is uncontradicted that appellee paid nothing toward Hayley\u2019s tuition, books, room, or board, at the culinary school.\nEven if we assume that this last phrase means \u201creasonable expenses,\u201d if one follows the syntax of Section Twelve, we disagree with the conclusion by the trial court that \u201creasonable expenses,\u201d which in the trial court\u2019s opinion should be $1,500, ought to replace the entire Section Twelve. If \u201clegitimate educational expenses\u201d means \u201creasonable expenses,\u201d then it follows that the end of Section Twelve reads: \u201cincluding tuition, books, lab fees, room, board, and other reasonable expenses.\u201d In other words, interpreting this last phrase does not relieve appellee of those expenses that precede the term in question. As such, allowing the trial court\u2019s construction to stand would be tantamount to rewriting the agreement so appellee can walk away from a deal to which he had freely agreed, even though the deal itself is anything but ambiguous, merely because appellee has what amounts to buyer\u2019s remorse.\nReversed and remanded.\nStroud, C.J., Baker, and Roaf, JJ., agree.\nNeal and Crabtree, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Wendell L. Griffen, Judge." }, { "text": "Olly Neal, Judge,\ndissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion reversing this case because I believe that under the facts of this case the trial court\u2019s interpretation of Section 12 of the parties\u2019 \u201cProperty, Child Custody, and Support Agreement\u201d was not clearly erroneous. Appellee estimated that Hay-ley\u2019s tuition at Johnson and Wales University was $18,000 per year and that her rent was $1,000 per month. The trial court, therefore, ordered appellee to pay $1,500 per month towards Hayley\u2019s educational expenses. This amount equals $18,000 per year. Appellant\u2019s testimony established that Hayley received scholarships and grants to attend Johnson and Wales. The scholarships and grants surely reduced the total cost of Hayley\u2019s education. Therefore, under the facts of this case, I believe that the trial court\u2019s decision was not clearly erroneous, and I would affirm.\nI am authorized to state that Judge Crabtree joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Olly Neal, Judge," } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven R. Jackson, for appellant.", "Jim Rose, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Lynne PITTMAN v. Claude PITTMAN\nCA 03-212\n139 S.W.3d 134\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I and II\nOpinion delivered December 17, 2003\nSteven R. Jackson, for appellant.\nJim Rose, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0293-01", "first_page_order": 317, "last_page_order": 324 }