{ "id": 6142591, "name": "James McKINNEY v. TRANE COMPANY & Travelers Indemnity Company", "name_abbreviation": "McKinney v. Trane Co.", "decision_date": "2004-01-28", "docket_number": "CA 03-742", "first_page": "424", "last_page": "429", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "84 Ark. App. 424" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "143 S.W.3d 581" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "347 Ark. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683196 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "976 S.W.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11691437 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/976/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ark.App. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139183 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/63/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark.App. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139035 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/66/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130684 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478-79" }, { "page": "100-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683187 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856-57" }, { "page": "3-4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ark. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138319 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/62/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)(A)(i)" }, { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "B" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 548, "char_count": 11379, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4543309751116576e-07, "percentile": 0.6556677628695727 }, "sha256": "95573186ed535a66fde36933dc80a38a03f989dd3daa0b673fbcff25adbc9da8", "simhash": "1:2bb8ae35e2ebf6df", "word_count": 1896 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:52:08.452411+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Griffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "James McKINNEY v. TRANE COMPANY & Travelers Indemnity Company" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Sam Bird, Judge.\nJames McKinney appeals the denial of his workers\u2019 compensation claim for an injury to his left knee. The injury, sustained in the workplace on December 14, 2001, required medical treatment and ultimately resulted in surgery. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the administrative law judge, which denied his claim on the following basis:\n[T]he claimant was not performing employment services at the time he chose to jump over the tube sheeting to retrieve his soda so that he could go on his smoke break. This jump and landing which injured the claimant\u2019s left knee did not occur at a time when the claimant was advancing the respondent\u2019s interests or performing employment activities.\nMcKinney contends that the Commission erred in determining that he was not performing employment services at the time of his injury. We affirm the decision of the Commission.\nMcKinney testified that he was a union employee working as a sheet-metal fabricator under a full-time contract of hire pursuant to a union contract with appellee Trane Company. He testified that on the date of the injury he was working in the coil shop, and that a co-worker came to get him to go on his last break about five or six minutes before the break. He walked to the break table to get his cigarettes and turned around to go outside, but he decided instead to go back to get a soda he had left on the break table. He took the most direct route by leaping over tube sheet buckets instead of going all the way around, and he landed on the floor on a pile of aluminum fins that he had not seen before leaping. His leg slipped, and his knee was injured. He testified that the setup of the department where the buckets were located had \u25a0been changed from the time that he had been there previously, which was probably more than a month earlier. On the day after his injury, the company posted a \u201clost-time injury notice\u201d stating that there should be no jumping or running in the facility.\nMcKinney testified that he was pinning coils until his co-worker came to get him for break, at which time he removed his apron, gloves, and safety glasses, putting his equipment on the table. He said that if he had gotten his soda and had not fallen, he would have gone outside to smoke on his break. He said that although he would not have been pinning coils on break, he would have been under a duty to report anything askew in the workplace had he observed it during that time. He said that the break gave employees an opportunity to go to the restroom, to smoke, or to refresh themselves with a drink. He explained that this was a scheduled ten-minute break under the union contract of employment, and that almost everyone in the plant was on break at the same time.\nA compensable injury is defined, in part, as an accidental injury \u201carising out of and in the course of employment.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). A compensable injury does not include an injury \u201cinflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-102(4) (B) (iii). In Harding v. City of Texarkana, 62 Ark. App. 137, 970 S.W.2d 303 (1998), we held that the claim was not compensable because employment services were not being performed when Harding tripped over a rolled-up carpet on her way to a designated smoking area in the workplace. We rejected her argument that the break advanced her employer\u2019s interest by allowing her to relax and to work more efficiently. We observed that an employee\u2019s injury sustained en route to a break area would have been in the course of employment under prior law and the personal-comfort doctrine, but that Act 796 of 1993 excluded from the definition of \u201ccompensable injury\u201d any injury inflicted upon an employee while the worker was not performing employment services.\nIn Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002), a truck driver was injured while returning to his truck after using the restroom during a break. The supreme court, stating that it had not directly addressed the personal-comfort doctrine since the enactment of Act 796, refused to automatically accept or reject the doctrine. Instead, the court said that the critical issue was whether the employer\u2019s interests were being advanced directly or indirectly by the claimant at the time of the injury. The Pifer court wrote the following:\nSince 1993, we have twice been called upon to construe the statutory language found in sections 11-9-102(4) (A) (i) and 11-9\u2014 102(4)(B)(iii). See White v. Geogia-Pacific Corp., supra, and Olsten Kimberly Quality Care, supra. We have held that an employee is performing \u201cemployment services\u201d when he or she \u201cis doing something that is generally required by his or her employer....\u201d White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100. We use the same test to determine whether an employee was performing \u201cemployment services\u201d as we do when determining whether an employee was acting within \u201cthe course of employment.\u201d White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra; Olsten Kimberley, supra. The test is whether the injury occurred \u201cwithin the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee [was] carrying out the employer\u2019s purpose or advancing the employer\u2019s interest directly or indirecdy.\u201d White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100 and Olsten Kimberly, supra.\n347 Ark. at 856-57, 69 S.W.3d at 3-4. Pifer\u2019s claim was held to be compensable on the finding that the restroom break was a necessary function that directly or indirectly advanced the employer\u2019s interests.\nMcKinney, arguing that a claim is not precluded merely because an employee was engaged in an act of a personal nature at the time of injury, contends that the Commission erred in analyzing his claim under Harding v. City of Texarkana, supra. He points instead to the \u201ccritical issue\u201d set forth in Pifer as to whether the employer\u2019s interests were being advanced directly or indirectly by the employee at the time of the injury. McKinney proposes that the performance of a contract of employment is \u201cby definition\u201d performance of employment services because the contract, including in this case the paid break as a condition of contract, directly benefits his employer. The respondents contend that adoption of McKinney\u2019s argument would extend workers\u2019 compensation coverage to other activity allowed under an employment contract, such as paid vacations. Further, respondents argue that this case is distinguishable from those in which workplace injuries were sustained while employment services were being performed. We agree with the respondents.\nIn White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999), which was quoted extensively and with approval by the Pifer court, a claimant on break was injured while on his way to smoke in an area where he could keep an eye on equipment in his work station and could immediately return if necessary. The White court held that the claim, although not compensable under the personal-comfort doctrine, was compensable because employment services were being performed at the time of the injury. The supreme court wrote:\nThe court of appeals has held that when an employee is doing something that is generally required by his or her employer, the claimant is providing employment services. See Ray v. University of Arkansas, 66 Ark.App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558 (1999); Shults v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 63 Ark.App. 171, 976 S.W.2d 339 (1998).\nIn the present matter, Georgia-Pacific argues that White was on a personal break and not performing any employment services; thus, his injury is not compensable. This argument ignores the fact that someone had to monitor the dryers, whether it be White or a relief worker. Because there was no relief worker provided, White was forced to remain near his immediate work area in order to monitor those machines. If one of the dryers needed to be loaded or his supervisor needed him for some reason, White would have been forced to return to his forklift immediately. Georgia-Pacific\u2019s argument also ignores the fact that White\u2019s supervisor instructed him to take a break \u201cwhen he could.\u201d\nWe believe the present situation is analogous to the facts presented in Ray, 66 Ark. App. 177, 990 S.W.2d 558. In Ray, appellant was employed by the University of Arkansas as a food-service worker in a cafeteria. She was entitled to two unpaid thirty-minute breaks and two paid fifteen-minute breaks each day. During one of her paid breaks, appellant slipped and fell as she was getting a snack from the cafeteria for her own personal consumption. The Commission denied appellant\u2019s claim for disability benefits after determining that she was not performing employment services at the time of her injury. The court of appeals reversed the Commission\u2019s decision, noting that [she] was paid for her fifteen-minute breaks and was required to assist student diners if the need arose. Based on those facts, the court of appeals held that the employer gleaned benefit from appellant being present and required to aid students on her break. Likewise, in this matter Georgia-Pacific also gleaned benefit from White remaining near his work station in order to monitor the progress of the dryers and immediately return to work if necessary.\n339 Ark. at 478-79, 6 S.W.3d at 100-01.\nMcKinney argues that the activities and situation of this case are similar to those constituting \u201cemployment services\u201d in White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra, and Ray v. University of Arkansas, supra. He points to his testimony that he felt an obligation to report or take care of anything askew that he might observe during his break, and that he returned from break-time activities more refreshed and better able to complete his work. We do not find such an analogy. The claimant in Ray was required to aid students on her break, and the claimant in White was forced to remain near his immediate work area in order to monitor machines and immediately return to work if necessary: in each case the employer gleaned benefit from the worker performing, or standing ready to perform, specific activities while on break.\nMcKinney, on his way to his smoke break, was involved in nothing generally required by his employer and was doing nothing to carry out the employer\u2019s purpose; thus, the employer gleaned no benefit from his activities on break. See Pifer v. Single Source Transp., supra. We reject McKinney\u2019s argument that his left-knee injury was compensable because it occurred during a paid break taken pursuant to a union-negotiated contract. Thus, we affirm the Commission\u2019s finding that the jump and landing that caused the injury did not occur at a time when the claimant was performing employment services.\nAffirmed.\nGriffen and Crabtree, JJ., agree.\nSimilarly, in Collins v. Excel Specialty Products, 347 Ark. 811, 69 S.W.3d 14 (2002), the supreme court held that the claimant\u2019s restroom break was a necessary function and directly or indirectly advanced the interests of her employer.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sam Bird, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Walker, Shock & Cox, PLLC, by: J. Randolph Shock, for appellant.", "Hardin, Jesson & Terry, PLC, by: J. Rodney Mills, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James McKINNEY v. TRANE COMPANY & Travelers Indemnity Company\nCA 03-742\n143 S.W.3d 581\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered January 28, 2004\nWalker, Shock & Cox, PLLC, by: J. Randolph Shock, for appellant.\nHardin, Jesson & Terry, PLC, by: J. Rodney Mills, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0424-01", "first_page_order": 448, "last_page_order": 453 }