{ "id": 6139050, "name": "Keith WREN v. DEQUEEN SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, et al.", "name_abbreviation": "Wren v. Dequeen Sand & Gravel Co.", "decision_date": "2004-06-30", "docket_number": "CA 03-1278", "first_page": "212", "last_page": "216", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "87 Ark. App. 212" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "189 S.W.3d 522" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "986 S.W.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11593873 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/986/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51342 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(2)" }, { "page": "(c)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895704 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0025-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935141 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)(B)(ii)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 429, "char_count": 6729, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17489513867410802 }, "sha256": "b24979167d6f778c3a7fbba72128ebf9a0c2066ec47bd55cd160582118957293", "simhash": "1:51de6188d9eec82c", "word_count": 1111 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:54:56.491359+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Stroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree." ], "parties": [ "Keith WREN v. DEQUEEN SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Terry Crabtree, Judge.\nThe appellant, Keith Wren, appeals from a decision of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission which denied his claim to an attorney\u2019s lien. Appellant contends on appeal that the Commission\u2019s ruling was in error. We agree and reverse and remand.\nThe facts necessary to an understanding of our decision are straightforward. On May 23, 2001, Kevin Wargo sustained an injury while working for DeQueen Sand & Gravel Company. The employer accepted Wargo\u2019s claim as compensable, and he was paid all appropriate benefits until he reached the end of his healing period on August 5, 2002. On February 9, 2002, before his healing period had ended, Wargo engaged the services of appellant to handle his anticipated claim for permanent disability benefits. Wargo and appellant entered into a written agreement setting out appellant\u2019s fee.\nOn May 2, 2002, Wargo phoned appellant\u2019s office to say that he was to have a CT scan and that he would call when he \u201cgets released.\u201d On May 15, 2002, Wargo again phoned the office, leaving a message that he was about to undergo a functional evaluation and that he would call when he was released. Then on July 30, 2002, Wargo contacted appellant\u2019s office and advised that he was moving and that he wanted to withdraw his claim because he did not want \u201cto fool with it.\u201d The next day appellant and Wargo spoke on the phone. Appellant wrote Wargo a letter confirming their conversation that Wargo did not want to take any steps to settle the workers\u2019 compensation claim and that he wished appellant to close his file. In actuality, however, on July 29 Wargo had hired attorney Charles Padgham to represent him in the matter, and on that date Padgham filed with the Commission an AR-C form on Wargo\u2019s behalf. By letter of August 26, 2002, appellant notified Padgham, the employer\u2019s claims representative, and the Commission that he no longer represented Wargo but that he intended to retain a lien pursuant to the fee agreement he had negotiated with Wargo.\nWargo\u2019s claim was settled by joint petition, which was approved by the Commission on January 31, 2003. The settlement provided that Wargo was to receive a lump-sum payment of $10,250 and that the employer would be responsible for the payment of any outstanding medical expenses. The Commission approved an agreed-upon attorney\u2019s fee in the amount of $1,425.\nA hearing was later held on the issue of appellant\u2019s entitlement to a lien. In his opinion denying appellant\u2019s claim to a lien, the administrative law judge observed that, under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Repl. 2002), fees in workers\u2019 compensation cases are allowed only on the amount ofbenefits controverted and awarded, and he reasoned that appellant was not entitled to assert a lien since Wargo\u2019s claim for benefits had not been controverted during the period of appellant\u2019s representation. The law judge also concluded that the attorney\u2019s fee statute in workers\u2019 compensation law took precedence over the attorney-lien statute. When appellant appealed, the Commission affirmed and adopted the law judge\u2019s decision.\nThe sole issue before us is whether appellant is entitled to assert an attorney\u2019s lien. We hold that he is. A client has the right to discharge his attorney at any time. Crockett & Brown v. Courson, 312 Ark. 363, 849 S.W.2d 938 (1993); Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 741 S.W.2d 233 (1987). However, with the passage of Act 293 of 1989, the legislature declared in unmistakable terms that the intent of the attorney-lien law is to allow an attorney to obtain a lien for services based on his or her agreement with the client and to provide for compensation in case of settlement or compromise without the consent of the attorney. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301 (Repl. 1999). Under the lien statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-304 (Supp. 2003), the lien established in favor of the attorney attaches to the proceeds of any settlement, verdict, report, decision, judgment or final order in his client\u2019s favor. The statute further provides that the lien cannot be defeated and impaired by any subsequent negotiation or compromise by any parties litigant. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-304(a)(2). Notably, the statute specifically states that the lien shall apply to proceedings before the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-304(c)(l). The current status of the law is that an attorney is to be compensated based upon the fee agreement when he or she is dismissed without cause. McDermott v. McDermott, 336 Ark. 557, 986 S.W.2d 557 (1999). Attorneys who are discharged with cause retain a lien, but the amount of compensation is determined on a quantum-meruit basis. Id; see also Crockett & Brown v. Courson, supra.\nIn the case at bar, the Commission determined that appellant was unable to assert a lien because Wargo\u2019s claim for benefits had not been controverted at the time of appellant\u2019s representation. Arkansas Code Annotated section \u2022 11-9-715(a)(1)(B)(ii) does provide that fees are allowed only on the amount of compensation for indemnity benefits controverted and awarded. However, we find the Commission\u2019s reliance on this provision to defeat the lien untenable. In Seward v. The Bud Avants Co., 65 Ark. App. 88, 985 S.W.2d 332 (1999), we observed that fees in workers\u2019 compensation cases are not capable of determination until benefits are no longer being paid. Here, appellant was discharged before the litigation had run its course. Mr. Wargo had not reached the end of his healing period; he was being paid all appropriate benefits; and, the question of his entitlement to permanent disability benefits, and how much, was not yet ripe for determination. Ultimately, the Commission concluded that a fee was warranted as shown by its approval of the fee in the joint-petition order. With these considerations in mind, and given the legislature\u2019s clear expression of its intent with regard to the attorney\u2019s-lien law, we are not persuaded that the initial lack of controversion forecloses the assertion of a lien.\nWe reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nStroud, C.J., and Neal, J., agree.\nRule 19 of the Rules of the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission provides that, in all joint petitions where the claimant is represented by an attorney, the amount of agreed-upon attorney\u2019s fees shall be set out in the petition. The rule further provides that the Commission shall not approve fees that are in excess of the limits set out in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-715.", "type": "majority", "author": "Terry Crabtree, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Appellant, pro se.", "No response." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Keith WREN v. DEQUEEN SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, et al.\nCA 03-1278\n189 S.W.3d 522\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas Division IV\nOpinion delivered June 30, 2004\nAppellant, pro se.\nNo response." }, "file_name": "0212-01", "first_page_order": 234, "last_page_order": 238 }