{ "id": 6139609, "name": "Darren Wayne HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Hawkins v. State", "decision_date": "2004-10-27", "docket_number": "CA CR 04-171", "first_page": "196", "last_page": "201", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 Ark. App. 196" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "196 S.W.3d 517" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark. Ct. App.", "id": 13370, "name": "Arkansas Court of Appeals" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "323 Ark. 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445744 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ark. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1751525 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/276/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1241012 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111398 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325-26" }, { "page": "700-01", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0319-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 557, "char_count": 11233, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.3481576981566e-08, "percentile": 0.3894885377487259 }, "sha256": "8459dadb37f6260df88b975afbd84e3c01d0d912479b9616c53235800f2d94d4", "simhash": "1:8b285046f11d8ee6", "word_count": 1818 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:43.833679+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Hart and Bird, JJ., agree." ], "parties": [ "Darren Wayne HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Karen R. Baker, Judge.\nA Washington County jury convicted appellant, Darrin Wayne Hawkins, of second-degree battery and sentenced him to seventy-two months\u2019 imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. He raises one point on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to warn him sufficiendy of the dangers and disadvantages of waiving his right to counsel and proceeding at trial pro se. We agree and therefore reverse and remand.\nMr. Hawkins was charged in the First Division of the Fourth Judicial Circuit with battery in the second degree in violation of section 5-13-202 of the Arkansas Code Annotated. He was arraigned on those charges on September 29, 2003. On the day of arraignment, the public defender\u2019s office was appointed to represent him. Soon thereafter, attorney Michael Dodson was assigned Mr. Hawkins\u2019s case. Mr. Dodson represented Mr. Hawkins until mid-November, when Mr. Hawkins expressed his desire to represent himself. On November 26, 2003, the trial court addressed Mr. Hawkins\u2019s wish to proceed without counsel in a motion hearing. In that motion hearing, the trial court acknowledged Mr. Hawkins\u2019s intention to proceed pro se and allowed him to proceed, appointing Mr. Dodson as standby counsel to answer any question or advise Mr. Hawkins at his request. On December 1, 2003, Mr. Hawkins wrote a letter directly to the trial judge \u201creleasing Mr. Dodson of his responsibility of representing [Hawkins], On December 9, 2003, Mr. Dodson filed a motion to withdraw in compliance with Mr. Hawkins\u2019s wishes.\nIn Hatfield v. State, 346 Ark. 319, 57 S.W.3d 696 (2001), our supreme court addressed the issue of whether an appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by stating as follows:\n[T]his court has long recognized the crucial aspect of informing an accused of his right to represent himself, along with the attendant risks. Furthermore, our court has held that the trial court maintains a weighty responsibility in determining whether an accused has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Every reasonable presumption must be indulged against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, and the burden is upon the State to show that an accused voluntarily and intelligendy waived his fundamental right to the assistance of counsel. Determining whether an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel has been made depends in each case on the particular facts and circumstances, including the background, the experience, and the conduct of the accused.\nA criminal defendant may invoke his right to defend himself pro se provided that (1) the request to waive the right to counsel is unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues. A specific warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, or a record showing that the defendant possessed such required knowledge from other sources, is required to establish the validity of a waiver. The \u201cconstitutional minimum\u201d for determining whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent is that the accused be made sufficiendy aware of his right to have counsel present and of the possible consequences of a decision to forego the aid of counsel.\nId. at 325-26, 57 S.W.3d at 700-01 (citations omitted).\nThere is no question that Mr. Hawkins\u2019s request to proceed pro se was unequivocal and timely asserted. Nor does it appear that Mr. Hawkins engaged in conduct that prevented the fair and orderly exposition of the issues in the case. We must therefore determine whether Mr. Hawkins knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. If we find that Mr. Hawkins\u2019s waiver was involuntary, we must also determine whether Mr. Dodson\u2019s assistance as standby counsel rendered the involuntary waiver moot.\nThe assistance of standby counsel may rise to a level sufficient for our court to moot an assertion of involuntary waiver of right to counsel based on our determination that the appellant had counsel for his defense. See Bledsoe v. State, 337 Ark. 403, 989 S.W.2d 510 (1999). Whether the assistance rises to this level is a question that is answered by looking at the totality of the circumstances. See id. To moot an assertion of involuntary waiver, the assistance must be substantial, such that standby counsel was effectively conducting the defense. See id.\nAfter applying the guidelines governing knowing and intelligent waiver to the facts and circumstances in Hatfield, supra, the Hatfield court determined that the trial judge failed to adequately advise Hatfield of the consequences of proceeding pro se. The court noted that the trial judge erred by failing to make even a limited inquiry into Hatfield\u2019s understanding of the legal process, although the judge allowed standby counsel to remain in the case. However, the court held that deficiencies in the judge\u2019s inquiry were rendered moot because standby counsel actively participated throughout the trial such that Hatfield waived his right to proceed pro se. See Hatfield v. State, supra.\nSimilarly, in Bledsoe, supra, our supreme court determined that there was no evidence of an inquiry by the trial court into Bledsoe\u2019s waiver of the right to counsel, and that Bledsoe\u2019s appointed standby counsel did not actively participate in his defense. Unlike Hatfield, however, Bledsoe was left to represent himself, and because Bledsoe\u2019s appointed counsel did not actively represent him, the court determined that Bledsoe was denied his right to counsel. See Bledsoe v. State, supra.\nWhile Mr. Bledsoe was informed several times about the requirement that he follow the rules and procedures of court, he was given no explanation as to the consequences of failing to comply with those rules, such as the inability to secure the admission or exclusion of evidence, or the failure to preserve arguments for appeal. There was simply no discussion about the substantive risks of proceeding without counsel. Furthermore, the reference to the State\u2019s offer of a thirty-five-year sentence on a plea of guilty to the rape and burglary charges did not include a full disclosure about the range of penalties Mr. Bledsoe faced on any of the charges.\nAs in Bledsoe, in this case Mr. Hawkins was neither sufficiently advised of the consequences of proceeding pro se, nor did standby counsel actively participate in Mr. Hawkins\u2019s defense so as to render deficiencies in the judge\u2019s inquiry moot. As the following colloquy between Mr. Hawkins and the court at the November 26, 2003, hearing demonstrates, while the court made it clear that it discouraged Mr. Hawkins from proceeding pro se, the requisite inquiry and admonitions were lacking.\nAppellant: I\u2019d still like to go to \u2014 represent myself and to go to the law library.\nThe Court: Well, you have the right to represent yourself. I\u2019d advise against it.\nAppellant: Yes, sir.\nThe Court: It\u2019s not a good idea, but... if you want to do that you have a right to do that.\nAppellant: Yes, sir.\nThe Court: I\u2019ll appoint Mr. Dodson as standby counsel and ... if you want some legal advice he will give it to you. So that\u2019s fine, if that\u2019s your request.\nThe trial court further tried to discourage Mr. Dodson from proceeding pro se at the December 12, 2003, hearing but once again the requisite inquiry and admonitions were lacking.\nThe Court: [A]s I have said in previous hearings, you have a right to represent yourself and I don\u2019t think that\u2019s a good idea. I have tried to discourage it and in fact, I\u2019ve appointed Mr. Dodson as your standby counsel and he\u2019s of course here present today. And if you choose to avail yourself of his services, and I recommend that you do so, he\u2019s as I say, standing by.\nMerely discouraging appellant from proceeding pro se did not adequately inform him of the risks attendant to pro se representation. Additionally, under the facts of this case, this failure is not rendered moot by the trial court\u2019s appointment of Mr. Dodson as standby counsel.\nWe must determine whether the assistance of standby counsel was so substantial that the defendant is deemed to have had counsel for his defense, thereby mooting any assertion of involuntary waiver. See Calamese v. State, 276 Ark. 422, 635 S.W.2d 261 (1982). Whether or not such assistance rises to that level is a question that must be answered by looking at the totality of the circumstances. See Wicoff v. State, 321 Ark. 97, 900 S.W.2d 187 (1995). Before an assertion of involuntary waiver is considered, the totality of the circumstances must demonstrate that the assistance was such that standby counsel was effectively conducting the defense. See Calamese, supra.\nIn Calamese, supra, there was no evidence of any inquiry by the trial court into the defendant\u2019s attempted waiver of counsel, but our supreme court determined that the defendant had been effectively represented at trial by the attorney appointed to assist her. The attorney \u201cimmediately assumed a fully active role as trial attorney, conducting the entire interrogation, cross-examination, making objections to evidence and exhibits, presenting a defense with numerous exhibits and four defense witnesses, including eliciting lengthy testimony from the defendant and making a forceful closing argument, all of which was done with evident familiarity.\u201d Id. at 424, 635 S.W.2d at 262. Under those facts, the defendant was not left to represent herself at any stage of the proceedings, and she was not denied her right to counsel. Id.\nSimilarly, in Oliver v. State, 323 Ark. 743, 918 S.W.2d 690 (1996), no effective waiver was obtained when the defendant elected to proceed pro se and standby counsel was appointed to assist during trial. As in Calamese, our supreme court affirmed the conviction where, with the exception of the defendant\u2019s cross-examination of the first State witness, standby counsel cross-examined each State witness, made objections during the State\u2019s case, and presented a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the State\u2019s case. Id. Further, standby counsel recalled the State\u2019s first witness and examined him as well as the remaining six defense witnesses. Id. Counsel also made the closing argument. Id. Under such circumstances, the court held that the defendant was not denied his right to counsel because standby counsel not only advised the defendant but actively represented him during most of the proceeding, and the defendant effectively relinquished representation to his standby counsel early in the trial. Id.\nNo similar factual analogy is indicated by the abstract or record in this case. In fact, standby counsel, although present in the courtroom during the trial, did not participate in any part of appellant\u2019s trial on December 17, 2003. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand.\nReversed and remanded.\nHart and Bird, JJ., agree.", "type": "majority", "author": "Karen R. Baker, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Washington County Public Defender\u2019s Office, by: Michael J. Dodson, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brent P. Gasper, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Darren Wayne HAWKINS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCA CR 04-171\n196 S.W.3d 517\nCourt of Appeals of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 27, 2004\nWashington County Public Defender\u2019s Office, by: Michael J. Dodson, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brent P. Gasper, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0196-01", "first_page_order": 222, "last_page_order": 227 }